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INTRODUCTION
This Article describes an alternative way of teaching the Property
course so as to have students appreciate that the rules covered there
are relevant to the everyday practice of law. It concentrates on the use
lawyers make of those rules, rather than treating the rules as ends in
themselves.
What I do here is approach the rules covered in Property from the
position of attorneys who have to deal with them in the ordinary course
of their practice-not at a jurisprudential or appellate level, but at the
earlier, simpler stages of questioning clients, drafting documents, nego-
tiating with others, preparing for litigation, and when necessary, litigat-
ing.
The traditional case method does little to make a student appreciate
what most class discussion has to do with actually being a lawyer. Rule
learning appears to many students to be something to do in order to
graduate law school but not very relevant to the activities of lawyering
which they hope to engage in after graduating.
Most teaching innovations that go beyond the pure case method do
so in a litigation context. But everyday real estate practice does not
consist primarily of litigation. Clients with real estate matters more
often consult their attorneys in order to make transactions terminate
favorably rather than because transactions have already terminated
unfavorably; they are clients who have not yet acted, or prepared their
offers, or commenced their negotiating, and who have generally not yet
started feeling antagonistic to the other side. Litigators and judges are
stuck with facts that have already occurred, but transactional practice
contains the extra dimension of creating the facts: telling clients what
they can and cannot do or that their desires can be achieved if they go
at it one way rather than another, inserting or deleting clauses in docu-
ments to avoid adverse consequences, or striking or not demanding
clauses that merely duplicate what the legal system already provides.
These creative possibilities are denied to those who merely litigate.!
Realistic coverage of the rules of Property need not be limited to
hypotheticals involving disputes over facts that already exist and docu-
ments that have already been executed. Co-ownership issues can be
1. A litigation approach also presents a narrow and unflattering picture of real es-
tate practice. Real estate lawyers are dealmakers as much as they are fighters; clients
retain them on the assumption that the transaction will more likely go through and
on better terms because of their involvement. Teaching the rules of Property as if
they were intended only for trial and appellate use conceals this positive aspect of
lawyering. See Gerald Korngold, Legal Education for Non-Litigators: The Role of the
Law Schools and the Practicing Bar, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. I.. REV. 621 (1985).
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raised in tenus of advising two clients how to take title to land they are
acquiring rather than in tenus of resolving a disagreement as to the
consequences of a deed they already have. Landlord-tenant coverage
can revolve around consideration of what provisions to include (or
omit) in a lease rather than as argument over the effect of the provi-
sions in an already executed lease. Conveyancing is clearly better suited
for asking what provisions to put in a listing, offer, deed, or escrow
instruction than in analyzing the provisions of an executed agreement
in order to determine whether to sue or not. Land use can be made
significantly more realistic and believable to inexperienced students by
having them consider what regulations they might wish to enact rather
than considering the effect of those already in force. Adverse posses-
sion is less subject to such a planning approach, but even it has many
aspects in which legal creativity about making use of the rules can play
an important pedagogic role.2
The teaching proposals presented in this Article are procedural and
not substantive. I do not seek to revise the corpus of the Property
course3 or to offer new insights into the cases, rules, or policies cov-
2. There is no reason why we professors cannot teach law in a planning climate,
even if that was not how we used our legal talents while we were engaged in prac-
tice prior to teaching. It has never been assumed that we must have practiced what
we preach. For the query, "What sort of dispute would involve the legal issues I
want to cover in class today?" merely substitute "transaction" or "negotiation" or
"deal" for "dispute."
Because we are cloistered in our academies, our knowledge of what occurs in
nonlitigation practice may be significantly behind the times. But such deficiencies are
not likely to have any significance in dealing with the subject matter of first-year
Property.
3. In preparing this Article, I examined all of the casebooks to make sure that
the classes I describe here do fit the mainstream course. Occasionally, there will be
footnote references to casebook coverage of the topic being discussed
The casebooks I reviewed are CURTIS J. BERGER, LAND OWNERSffiP AND USE (3d
ed. 1983 & 1989 Supp.); OLIN 1. BROWDER, JR., ET AL., BASIC PROPERTY LAw (5th ed.
1989); JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROPER-
TY LAw (3d ed. 1994); A JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON
PROPERTY (3d ed. 1984 & 1989 Supp.); RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY (1988); JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
PROPERTY (6th ed. 1990); CHARLES DONAHUE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION (3d ed. 1993); JESSE
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY (3d ed. 1993); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL PRoP-
ERTY (1984); CHARLES M. HAAR & LANCE LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAw (2d ed. 1985);
SANDRA H. JOHNSON ET AL., PROPERTY LAw (1992); SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY LAw (2d ed 1993); JOSEPH
1103
ered therej the teachers' manuals and law review articles already do
that. I address myself instead to the more mundane attempt to intro-
duce Property concepts to students in more pragmatic ways.4 Profes-
sors may 'continue to address their favorite themes just as before, with
only the background context for the class discUssion of these themes
being altered.5 .
Readers may note the absence of any systematic lawyering style in
what follows. The teaching techniques appear almost random because
the approach taken in each class is driven by the subject matter rather
than by the techniquej the course taught is Property rather than Legal
Process. For instance, although it might be desirable to begin with the
drafting of simple documents rather than with litigation, if the first
topic covered is adverse possession, most scenarios would have to be
wildly unrealistic to support drafting or planning questions.6 The ap-
W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW-RULES, POIJCIES AND PRACTICES (1993); EDWIN H. RABIN &
ROBERTA R. KWALL, FuNDAMENTAlS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAw (3d ed. 1992). In
some cases, new 'editions appeared as I was writing without my text being revised
accordingly. With apologies to the very deserving but alphabetically-disadvantageq
collaborators, I use only the name of the first author of each book in many of the
subsequent references.
The Seventh Edition of Cribbet arrived as this Article was going to press, and
there was not time to revise most references to reflect changes appearing in this
latest version.
4. I have also looked at the teachers' manuals (except for Haar which does not
have one). Although filled with rich discussion of cases and issues, none of them
concentrate on the style of questioning. The typical questions propounded by the
manuals are:' "What is property?" "What were the facts of the case?" "What did the
court actually hold?" "Why did the court ... ?" "Would the case have been decided
the same way if . . . ?" "What alternatives were open to the court?" "Do you agree?"
That type of interrogation is not likely to give students the impression that the pro-
fessor expects students to look at cases the same way as practicing attorneys do.
Only Donahue proposed an imaginative scenario-a simulated fox hunt-as a way of
starting the course.
Rabin's bpok is unique, selecting cases for inclusion based upon questions posed
by the book. The techniques described in this Article really require one of th~ more
traditional books, whose cases are intended as background for the class discussion
determined by the teacher (with some problems added as incidental accompaniment).
For users of Rabin's book, the questions contained in this Article are probably help-
ful only as minor gap fillers.
5. Contrary to what the title of this Article implies, the entire Property course is
not covered here. Servitudes (easements and covenants) and incidental rights in land
(airspace, nuisance, trespass, water, and support) are not included here, because I
have never been able to develop teaching techniques that I regard as especially ef-
fective. Estates in land is dealt with transactionally only for waste and partition, with
its major classification and rule components covered by streamlined lecture (which is
added as an Appendix for any utility it may have to readers).
6. It is not very likely that anyone will ever walk into an attorney's office and
say, "I want to be a squatter; tell me what to do." But even litigation topics can be
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proach taken for each topic has been developed by trial and error rath-
er than through a priori thinking.
There are also no large, complex questions, such as the problem
method of teaching tends to emphasize. 7 What is presented here is
more atomistic. Each rule or doctrine has a set of questions best suited
to get to the practical application and understanding of just that rule or
doctrine. Since the next rule to be covered might require switching
sides, changing facts, or moving to a different setting, too much flexibil-
ity is lost if all issues on the day's agenda are integrated into one single,
overarching problem.s
Most of this Article consists of the actual questions put to the stu-
dents. I think that it will be more helpful to my fellow instructors, espe-
cially those new to the teaching of Property, for this Article to provide
the literal text of questions one might ask in class, rather than with a
conceptual but elusive theory that forces the reader to figure out how
best to implement it.9 I have put all questions to be addressed to the
class in italics in order to clearly separate them from the pedagogical
commentary accompanying them.
The questions put forth are generally addressed to those students
who are asked to be lawyers for the day, "Laura" and "Larry" in this
Article. 1O Other students are designated as the principles for the trans-
approached from a planning perspective; instead of asking, for instance, What if the
possessor said she knew she did not oum the land?, you can ask, Would it· be
worthwhile looking for someone to testify that the possessor said she knew she did
not oum the land?
7. My colleague, Myron Moskovitz, describes it thusly, "The problem involves
several issues cutting across several cases and statutes. It is meant to resemble a
complex situation that a lawyer might face in practice." Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the
Case Method: It's Time to Teach with Problems, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 241, 250 (1992).
Moskovitz's article also furnishes enough of a review of the literature on this
topic as to embolden me to merely refer readers to it rather than to offer further
citations in a belated attempt at academic respectability.
8. For this reason I am reluctant to characterize this technique as one of "simu-
lation" in light of the fact that the practitioners of that pedagogic skill all seem to
have in mind large and complicated role-playing situations. See Jay M. Feinman, Sim-
ulations: An Introduction, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469 (1995).
9. Far too often, elegant and intriguing theories of teaching are presented to us
at Association of American Law Schools meetings without any guidance as to how
we listeners are actually supposed to carry them out in class.
10. Although these two names are used throughout this Article, they are but short-
hand for the different students called upon in each class to play those roles. Three
or four students may at any given time be acting as attorney for the client, notwith-
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action and topic under examination. ll By keeping their identities con-
stant for the duration of the topic,12 one less variable is introduced,
situations are humanized/3 and there is less of a need for cumbersome
labels in the discussion. It is easier and more realistic to say in class,
What about Sid? than to say What about Finder #2?14 But this feature
is hardly essential if your style is otherwise.
I. POSSESSION
A. Possessors' Rights
Most of the casebooks begin with cases on capturing, finding, steal-
ing, conquering, or creating property, usually personal property. These
cases may be more useful for illustrating the significance of possession
in our legal system than for providing a comprehensive review of the
law of personal property,15 or even the law of wild animals. 16 My goal
in the first class is, substantively, to have students appreciate that a
possessor of property has some "rights" to it, even though he or she
does not own it, and procedurally, to see how that principle has an
,effect on real world disputes. I begin with a situation involving compet-
ing claimants to an asset that someone else owns. 17 The claims should
be different from those covered in the cases assigned, and the issue
should be close enough to generate disagreement among the students
when they first consider it. First finder v. second finder or first thief v.
second thief best fits these conditions.18 I begin by telling a little story
standing that they are all referred to here as Laura or Larry.
11. In the text, I have chosen names that readily fit the roles played, e.g., Fern,
the first finder, and Sid, the second finder. Sometimes I am lucky enough in class to
have students whose names help.
12. E.g., in all ~e classes discussing finders, Fern and Sid are the parties.
13. It may be easy for a student to announce that a finder or a seller will lose
because of a rule. It becomes emotionally harder, however, to tell a real person who
has just found that she must suffer because of that same rule. Replacing abstract
categories with real persons adds a little more realism to lawyers' treatment of rules.
14. On the other hand, students can and do forget who is who, making it wise to
regularly combine names and designations (e.g., What about Sid, the second finder?).
15. Bruce makes personal property a second chapter, after Landlord-Tenant
Chused, Goldstein, and Rabin do not appear to include this topic at all.
16. According to the topic headings, this is what is intended in Casner and Haar.
17. For these purposes, the capture cases, whether of animals or inanimate re-
sources, are inappropriate because students too easily intuit the idea of letting a per-
son acquire title to the asset by capturing it and therefore are hardly stimulated to
think much about that
18. Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (KB. 1722), for instance, is a First
Finder v. Second Thief situation and very unlikely to generate any disagreement An-
derson v. Gouldberg, 53 N.W. 636 (Minn. 1892), is a good First Thief v. Second Thief
case, but appears only in Browder.
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around that scenario, ending with the two parties both claiming the as-
set.
I was downtown last week when this guy came along and offered to
seU me a bike. While I was looking at it, someone else came by and
asked the bike seUer how he had gotten the bike. When the seUer an-
swered that he had found it, the interlocutor said "I knew it; that's the
bike I lost last month. Give it back to me!" The seUer then said, "But
how do I know that you didn't steal it yourself?" His adversary was
taken aback by this question, but quickly recovered her wits and re-
plied, "What's that got to do with it?" The police then came by and
everybody scattered, so that I never fourul out whether that fact was
significant or not.
That is only the first version of the facts. Before letting the students
actually work on the problem, real people have to replace the abstract
ones earlier mentioned. Legal problems are best appreciated at a con-
crete and human level. In class, disputes will be resolved; documents
negotiated and drawn; and advice given to real, living persons so that
the students do not dehumanize the rules into disembodied legal ab-
stractions. So the second version is: Suppose that it was this stu-
denfr-what is your name? Fern?19 Suppose it was Fern who first had
the bike, and that she had gotten it by stealing (or finding) it. And
then she lost it (or had it stolen from her), and it came into Sid's
(another student at the opposite erul of the classroom) hands. If Fern
and Sid somehow found out about each other, who gets the bike? Fern,
do you think that Sid ought to have to give the bike back to you? If
Fern does not say yes, she obviously needs an attorney. Does anybody
think that Fern should be entitled to get the bike back from Sid?
Laura, you do? OK, teU Fern why Sid should have to give the bike
back to her. 20 The same questions go to Sid, or to his lawyer, Larry, if
Sid is too unselfIsh to assert himself.21
19. For the rest of this topic I will use Fern (the first possessor) and Sid (the
second possessor) as my subjects.
20. This can be put more elegantly by asking whether Fern has a "right" to get
the bike back or whether Sid instead has a "privilege" to keep it, in Holhfeldian ter-
minology.
Later, having the attorney tell her client what she can or cannot do will become
the dominant mode of class discussion, as we move from litigation to transactions. At
this stage, however, this advice to the client is just a starting point for making a
student "talk like a lawyer."
21. Both parties should get several lawyers along the way as you broaden the dis-
cussion base or move past unhelpful speakers.
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Since Sid presently has the bike, Fern or her lawyer should try to
persuade him to give it back. Sid's lawyer, Larry, however, should not
be persuaded,22 and so I suggest a democratic resolution. How many
in the class think Sid should be able to keep the bike? How many think
he should have to give it back to Fern? Two features usually emerge
from the voting: fIrst, the students are divided, and second, many did
not vote. The nonvoters can be put to productive use: How many of
you didn't vote because you were unsure of the outcome? OK, you six
undecideds are the jury; you are the ones the lawyers will have to
persuade. 23 Laura, wiU you argue to the jury why Sid should have to
give the bike back to your client'fA
Students clearly enjoy playing courtroom lawyer and may even dis-
cover how hard it is to persuade third persons who have the power to
decide issues. It is not the same as making the teacher happy by com-
ing up with an answer to which the reply from the podiwn is "right." It
makes for a less certain world than that for which college courses pre-
pared them; instead of objective (or at least authoritative) right and
wrong, there is the disquieting task of persuading nonexperts of the
validity of doubtful propositions in the face of adversaries who are
attempting to accomplish the opposite result.
The discussion that follows, in the format of argwnents to a jury, is
where you25 cover the substantive points on the issue of possession
that you deem worthwhile.26 When a student makes a point you want
22. You might ask: Slwuld Sid's lawyer permit himself to be persuaded? Of
course, if there was a rule Larry did not know about, he should, on learning it,
promptly correct his advice to his client But in our current situation, in which there
is as yet no controlling rule, Larry is ethically obliged to remain loyal to Sid. Sid,
Iww would you feel if Larry changes his mind and sides with Fern? Slwuld law-
yers only take cases they believe in? Usually you can intimidate Larry into sticking
with his client; if not, it is easy enough to appoint another student to pick up where
Larry dropped out
23. Obviously, one needs to blithely ignore the distinction between issues of law
and fact at this stage of the course.
24. A convenient byproduct of using a jury is that it reduces your obligation to
spend time refuting silly arguments sometimes made by the student lawyers. Instead
of responding to them, you need merely ask the jury: Is anyone persuaded by that?
Then move on, with a shrug of the shoulders, to another point.
Persuading others-judge, jury, or opposing counsel-is not the best way to
discuss issues, but for this first class when not everything may have been read or
understood, it fits.
25. The more fonnal approach of referring to readers of this Article as "one" or
"the professor" too often gets in the way of readable sentence writing. Frequently, I
will address "you," dear reader, as such-hoping that you forgive my infonnality.
26. As stated at the outset, this Article does not cover substance. Most of the
teachers' manuals contain excellent ideas that can be easily translated from the case
commentary fonn in which they were written into the fonnat propounded here.
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discussed, attorneys for the other side should be required to respond to
it then and there; the next speaker cannot ignore the last good point
because she wanted to make some new and different one.27 You may
need to assist the original proponent of a position into converting it
from the inchoate or crude version he put forth into the more sophisti-
cated version you want to see discussed in class.28
It is also your job to keep the debate honest and coherent. Students
cannot rewrite the facts just to fit their arguments, nor merely assume
the very conclusions they are proving.29 Nor can any student get too
officious by dogmatically relying on one of the cases in the book.30
If too many students have not yet had the opportunity to read the
cases, or if the assigned book lacks appropriate cases on the question,
you can invent precedents: any related rule that commands unanimous
assent should serve as an authoritative precedent.31 If the case were
Owner v. Thief, how many would vote for the thief? Then we have one
precedent that both sides can use in our case. Are there others? What
about Owner v. Finder? What about Finder #1 v. Thief #2? The class
regularly votes for the plaintiff in all of those situations32 and the stu-
dent attorneys have three precedents that they can be made to argue to
27. You may have to promise to corne back to her point later on, and you can
control the order of ideas by timing just when you will honor that promise and re-
turn to that point.
28. It is not hard to put your ideas into student'S' mouths. Statements like Stu, are
you saying that . . . ? or SteUa has just said . . . ; how do you answer that? will
almost always be endorsed rather than disavowed by their putative originators.
29. For example, The bike should go to Sid (or Fern) because it belongs to him,
or because he has a "right" to it (which will be Due only if the jury says so).
30. The students are allowed to argue law to the jury on this first class day in
order to keep the discussion going, notwithstanding the procedural impropriety of
doing so. (Later, that law/fact confusion can be mentioned to them.) But one should
not let a student simply cite a case to the jury and then sit down-she should be
made to argue and justify the result in the case she cites. Before she can use it, she
must show the rest of us that it is the same kind of case as ours, i.e., that the par-
ties there are in the same positions. Since this is never so (because the hypothetical
has been constJucted to be different), the student must argue by analogy and per-
suade the jury to follow the analogy. E.g., Since X v. Y was a case of Fi7Uler #1
beating Thief #2, how does that prove that Thief #1 should beat Thief #2? So put,
both sides can be forced to deal with the case cited.
31. This also keeps the unprepared students involved.
32. Other variations are less likely to achieve universal agreement and are not
worthy of class time since that may only confuse discussion of the issue at hand.
One variable is enough at this stage.
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the jury. Both sides should take account of these precedents in their
arguments.33
In addition to arguments from authority, you can easily coax: the
students into making policy arguments by reading underlying policies
into their statements. For example, Laura, are you saying that if Fern
loses this case, then no one will ever . .. again? That would be signifi-
cant. Larry, can you refute that? Public, nonparty considerations can
be introduced, if the parties have not raised it themselves, by asking,
Should the rest of us care about this fight? WiU our lives as finders,
losers, or taxpayers who have to pay for judges to decide cases be bet-
ter off with one rule rather than the other? and, Should that be a con-
sideration in deciding as between Fern and Sid?
As class nears its end, the jurors should deliberate in public (this will
reveal which arguments most affected them) and vote. You may prefer
to save your remarks on the outcome until the next class.
The following class can relate the assigned cases to the previous
discussion. If the jury voted in favor of the first possessor, then the
common law principle that first in time is first in right, or that posses-
sion is nine points, is morally justified and the law has a rational ba-
sis.34 But even if the jury voted the other way,35 the difference is not
critical. The important point of the previous class was that rival claims
to an asset were ranked and that one of the claimants prevailed, even
though neither party was the owner; i.e., one may have lawful claims to
an asset without owning it. The existence of a ranking system and the
protection of possessory claims is more significant than the question of
whether it is the "first" or the "better" possessor who prevails in the
lawsuit.36
If the assigned cases mention other types of claims, they can now be
added by lecture, by straightforward questions to the class, or by anoth-
er similar conflict, depending on how much time is available.37 There is
33. The party who likes one of these outcomes should be made to read it as stat-
ing a broad principle that fits our case; the other side should read it so narrowly as
to have it not fit, or-even better-reinterpret it in a way that makes it support the
opposite result in our case.
34. This rule also lets you make the point that even thieves can win lawsuits, if
their claims are better than those of their rivals. Our disapproval of theft may entitle
us to send the thief to jail for what she has done, but it does not mean that outsid-
ers have better claims to her stolen assets than she does. Common law rules try to
come up with the best solution to the particular problem at hand, even though the
outcome may not further other, more global, moral concerns.
35. This is often the outcome if the hypothetical involves Thief #1 v. Finder #2.
36. Helmholtz and Holmes, included in most of the casebooks, seem to say this.
37. For example, for landowner claims, Suppose Fern found a ring under the sofa
while visiting at Sid's house? Suppose this occurred in an apartment Sid was rent-
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also the question of what constitutes possession, when that is the basis
of the claim.38 You can readily move from the question of previously
owned assets to those which were formerly unowned, such as foxes,
whales, and natural gas, asking whether they should be subject to simi-
lar or different rules.39
B. Bailments40
Whoever prevailed in the previous class (say, Fern) is now better
entitled to possess the asset than her adversary. Laura, what if I, the
owner of the bike, appear and want my bike back? How wiU you ad-
vise Fern in that case? Because it is rare for a student to disbelieve her
professor, Laura will respond that Fern must return the bike to me.41
Thank you for the bike, but what if I was lying? What are you going
ing and Sid's landlord claimed the ring? Suppose Sid was merely subletting the
apartment for the summer? Suppose he was just housesitting for the weekend? Sup-
pose Sid was seUing books on the premises, and Fern was there purchasing a book
when she found the ring? Suppose she found the ring tucked behind a book on a
high shelf (i.e., hidden rather than mislaid)?
Other claims may raise different issue&-Such as when an employee finds goods
on the employer's premises or when the finder gives the goods to someone else for
inspection or holding-that may be better resolved by agency or contract law than by
possession principles. As such, those questions may be premature for first-year, first-
week law students.
38. This will come up again, and more significantly, when real property is taken
up. For personal property, you can ask Suppose Fern and Sid were walking together.
Fern said, "Look at that bike." Then Sid picked it up. W1w possessed it first? Sup-
pose Sid shoved Fern aside as she was going to pick it up? Suppose Fern was
standing on a $10 biU without knowing it, and Sid saw it under her foot and took
it?
39. This includes the question of whether privatizing ownership of these natural re-
sources would accentuate their demise or prolong their existence on earth. Would
every capitalisticaUy-minded owner automaticaUy kiU her whale immediately?
40. Most casebooks give only a passing nod to this topic, making it more sensible
to use it to illustrate other aspects of possession rather than to try for a thorough
account of the law of bailments. Average casebook coverage was 10 to 15 pages, al-
though Dukeminier and Johnson both reduced it to 2 to 3 pages and-at least ac-
cording to their tables of contents and indices-Chused, Goldstein, Haar, Rabin, and
Singer did not cover it at all.
41. Laura's advice to Fern to relinquish the bike is also the occasion for the ob-
servation or lecture that lawyers do not always fight with their adversaries. When an
attorney knows that the rules put her client in the wrong, the best thing the attorney
can do for her is tell her to abandon her position. Theoretically, the only time law-
suits should arise is when two attorneys really disagree as to the outcome of a par-
ticular dispute.
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to do when the true owner shows up? WiU Fern be liable to him for
losing his bike'r2 Did she owe him a duty to be careful (i.e., to not
lose) the bike? Was Fern free to throw the bike in the trash after she
found it? Should she be treated like a bailee'r3 TeU Fern what her ob-
ligations are regarding assets that she may possess but does not
own. 44
This last question is important because it transforms the role of the
student attorney from one of arguing with an adversary or judge over
some event that has already occurred into one of advising a client as to
how to behave in the future in order to keep out of trouble. Knowing
what the rules are is no less important to the attorney acting as advisor,
because the advice should be right rather than wrong,45 especially
since real estate attorneys spend more time advising clients what to do
or not to do than fighting over what their clients actually did or did not
do.
In class, the questions that will be asked of the attorney must come
from you rather than the student client because you are the one with
the necessary knowledge to know which questions to ask. You must
take on the role of client or speak on her behalf, determine the order of
questions and the adequacy of responses, reject the answers that avoid
the issue or change the facts, and prod the other students to refute or
challenge incorrect or provocative answers.46
Here is an easy place to begin. Larry, the advice Laura gave to Fern
makes me concerned. Students are always coming to my office to ask
42. Or you can ask another student, Has Laura committed malpractice by teUing
Fern w give the bike w a stranger?
43. Only Casner includes a case on this issue: Cowen v. Pressprich, 192 N.Y.S. 242
(App. Tenn), rev'd, 194 N.Y.S. 926 (App. Div. 1922).
44. The cases holding owners of animals (chicken-killing foxes, grass-trampling cat-
tle, and polluting pigeons) liable for the hann their animals do to other land or per-
sons can be used to raise the same problems, although some stretching is needed.
45. For instance, if a finder does have a duty of care, it would be bad advice
(even malpractice) to tell her that she need not be careful; conversely, if she does
not have such a duty, it is still malpractice (although less harmful) to impose on her
the unnecessary burden of care.
46. Student lawyers are frequently going to ask you, as client, questions about
your situation. This is usually just an attempt to avoid having to think about and
resolve the question you have put the them, since a properly put question from you
should already contain all of the facts necessary to generate an answer (unless your
goal is to cover the question of what additional infonnation is necessary). Their ini-
tial evasiveness is perfectly understandable and can often be put to good use by you.
For instance, if Laura responded to one of my questions about the bike by asking
me, Was the bike new or used? I would respond, Does that matter? Is there one rule
for new biJCl'.s and another rule for used bikes? If not, why do you need W know,
Laura? (And if it turns out that the student did have an interesting theory behind
her question, you may profit from it.)
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if they can leave their books there for a while. When I permit this,
does that make me responsible if someone steals them? From here,
planning is the inevitable next step. If I don't want to have to be re-
sponsible (meaning careful), is there a way out of that (other than by
refusing to let the books be left there)'t7 The next time a student asks
if he can leave his books in my office for a while, can I say "yes" only
if he agrees that I have no duty of care towards them't8 Or, if a duty
of care is imposed on me only because I am deemed a possessor of the
books, Gan I teU the student (or post a sign) that I provide only space
in the office and that no bailment of books is involved? WiU that make
me a nonpossessor? Should I teU him to lock the bookbag and not give
me a key?,,9
What occurred in this exchange is an example of a recurrent theme
of the course. Class time is not spent on discovering what the rule
is-it is assumed the students learned that from their reading. Instead,
discussion focuses on how the rule operates to guide behavior, by ask-
ing what it pennits and prohibits, and by exploring how a desired goal
can be obtained by maneuvering around the rule.50 Deeper questions of
the wisdom, fairness, or efficiency of a rule come up in this background
context of an attorney advising a client how to behave.
47. Students are sometimes shocked that anyone would not want to be careful,
and often prefer to admonish me to be so, rather than to cooperate in exonerating
me from this burden. In addition to observing that having no responsibilities is al-
ways selfishly better than having some, there is the equally important point that a
duty of care means finding out afterwards whether a jury thinks the conduct was
above or below some standard. Most clients prefer certainty or safe harbors from
their lawyers to post facto judgments from jurors.
48. This question should be asked only if the reading materials cover exculpatory
clauses in bailment agreements.
49. These questions are designed to playoff the parking lot cases found in many
casebooks. For example, Berger includes McGlynn v. Newark Parking Auth., 432 A.2d
99 (N.J. 1981); and Browder includes Wall v. Airport Parking Co., 244 N.E.2d 190 (lll.
1969). Most of the real world answers to such questions corne from contract, tort, or
statutory sources rather than from simple bailment law, making the discussion over-
simplified if bailment law alone is discussed.
50. For example, If a possessor has a duty oj care, can one avoid that duty by
attempting to become a nonpossessor instead?
In the real world, these kinds of suggestions would corne from the attorney
rather than the client In the classroom, a mlijor reason for the professor to be the
client is to generate these questions for the student attorney to work on.
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C. Possessing Land
The transition from personalty to realty comes through asking wheth-
er the rules about possessors that have been covered apply to land as
well.51 Because land is immovable, it is not found or stolen in the same
way as personalty. Rather, it is possible for one person to possess land
that someone else owns, as in landlord/tenant situations, or even to
possess it without the consent of the owner, as when A misreads the
property description in her deed and moves onto B's land instead.
Suppose the lwuse Fern is residing in turns out not to be hers, legal-
ly, because there was a defect in the wiU giving it to her. If she found
Sid in the lwuse when she got lwme yesterday, can she do anything
about it? Laura, teU Fern what her rights are. The lesson of the previ-
ous classes should now be converted into advice to a prior possessor of
land.
Insofar as this topic will ultimately lead to adverse possession, the
distinction between ejectment and trespass should be introduced.
Laura, before you sue on behalf of Fern don't you think you ought to
find out what she wants?52 Fern, would you rather get some money
from Sid or do you want to get the property back from him~ OK,
Laura, wiU you draJt a complaint in ejectment for Fern?
Drafting a complaint is easily manageable, even for first-year stu-
dents, if technical pleading rules are disregarded. Laura's complaint
needs to contain only three statements: (1) an allegation about Fern's
rights, (2) an allegation about Sid's wrongs, and (3) a prayer for relief.
Getting students to properly frame the first allegation is the hardest.
The natural temptation is to allege that Fern is the owner of the proper-
ty. Yet, those are not the facts of the case; Fern does not have a valid
deed. Laura could easily allege that Fern owns the land, but she would
not be able to prove it at the trial. Laura's reaction to this realization
may be a loss of faith in Fern's case, since students easily ignore rules
51. This question is easy to handle if the casebook includes an ~ectment or tres-
pass claim based on prior possession alone, such as Tapscott v. Cobbs, 52 Va. (11
Gratt) 172 (1854), which is included in Casner, Donahue, Haar, Kurtz, and Singer, or
Holden v. Lynn, 120 P.2d 246 (Okla. 1911), which is included in Goldstein.
It is only a question of making the students realize that the posture of the par-
ties in such an action is the same i.e., Possessor #1 v. Possessor #2. Without such a
case to assist the class, it may be easier just to just assume that realty and person-
alty are treated by the same rules.
52. Getting Fern's attorney to ask what the client wants, rather than deciding it
for her, is always difficult. I usually have to give a little talk about how attorneys
are supposed to help clients make their own decisions instead of deciding that for
them.
53. Having left the choice to Fern, it is nevertheless pedagogically important that
she choose possession over damages, so you may have to persuade her to do so.
1114
[Vol. 23: 1099, 1996] Teaching Real Property
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
that they just learned when they do not think that the learning has any-
thing to do with lawyering. But Laura, as we said yesterday, what it
means to say that a prior possessor has a better right than a subse-
quent possessor is that she can sue to get possession back, as Fern
wants to do today. That rule is not something that lawyers memorize
and then forget; it is something they use in aU aspects of their prac-
tice. It is knowing that rule that lets you decide to take Fern's case in
the first place,54 to plead a proper complaint in the second place, and
then to introduce the right evidence at trial in the third place. If the
rule were the other way, you would kick Fern out of your office and
limit your practice to representing owners.
With the realization that prior possession is sufficient, Laura need
only allege that Fern was in possession of the property before Sid. The
second allegation will have to be that Sid is currently in possession
("wrongfully," if Laura wants) of the property, since the prayer is going
to seek his removal from possession, and it is hard to dispossess any-
one not in possession. The prayer is therefore self-evident.
Now it is time for Sid's response. Larry, how are you going to reply
to Fern's complaint?55 Affirmative defenses and cross complaints
should be ruled out, so that the choice comes down to answering (de-
nying) or demurring (moving to dismiss).56 Can Sid demur? On what
ground? Larry may realize on his own that prior possession is a suffi-
cient allegation, or he may have missed the connection to his own strat-
egy and will propose to demur on the ground that Fern did not allege
that she owned the property. If he does so, you can take arguments on
the demurrer until sooner or later someone realizes that the same rule
of law also disposes of the demurrer.57
The appropriate response is for Sid to answer the complaint and
deny Fern's allegations, or at least the first one. Because there is now
an issue of fact, a trial is appropriate, and Fern has the burden of
proving her contention that she was a prior possessor. Laura should
54. Perhaps the lawyer will even take the case on a contingent fee.
55. This question should be asked only after finding out whether Sid wants to re-
sist (which, for class purposes, he must do).
56. A short explanation regarding the difference between saying "no" and "so
what" in response to a complaint is required.
57. Again, this lets you point out how useful knowledge of the rules of law are to
a lawyer's practice. Larry wasted Sid's money by raising a demurrer that was certain
to be overruled in light of a well-settled rule, which he knew but did not think to
apply.
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call her first witness, who is, inevitably, Fern. Her role on the witness
stand must be played by you58 who should testify to acts of occupation
that are light and sporadic.59 After being examined and cross-examined
by Laura and Larry on these acts, the case is closed, some students are
appointed as jurors, and both attorneys must argue the issue of
whether Fern was a possessor. Laura should stress how much Fern did
do and how her conduct amounts to possession, whereas Larry should
concentrate on how much was not done. The nature of possession of
land is the real subject matter of the class, but it is covered in the con-
text of jury arguments rather than academic hypotheticals.
Both counsel must also submit a proposed instruction to the jury on
this topic. Their rival versions will be argued before you (as judge now,
rather than as witness). The format of the instruction, for both, should
be: In order to conclude that Fern was in prior possession of the prop-
erty, you must find that . . . . This gives the attorneys an opportunity
to apply any statements in the casebook on the nature of possession to
the problem at hand. Finally, and to afford a common sense view of the
situation, the jurors should deliberate aloud and render a special verdict
on the question of whether Fern had possession of the property before
Sid entered.5O
You can eliminate issues around Sid's possession by having him actu-
ally reside on the property, so that the sheriff will have to remove him
in order to restore Fern to possession, or you can introduce other con-
siderations by putting his own possession into question as well.61
68. On rare occasions Laura will have the presence of mind to want to discuss
your testimony with her client before putting you on the stand. In that case, you
should meet with her in her office (with the class listening, of course), but the sub-
stance of the testimony will be the same. If she fears that the testimony is not good
enough, you will have to force her to take it to trial or look for another student
who does find it sufficient.
59. For example, I woul.d go to the house every few days (after the old lady, who
told me that I had inherited the house, died) to water the plants and coUect the
mail, up until the time I found Sid there; sometimes while I was there I woul.d
make myself a cup of tea before leaving.
Here again, your attorney may slip into wanting to treat you as an owner rather
than a possessor. Laura's opening question to you may well be, Do you own (have a
deed to) the property?-notwithstanding all that has been said about the sufficiency
of possession.
60. With luck, the case will be close enough to generate a split verdict on this
point.
61. I cover the issue of a defendant's possession in order to give some justifica-
tion to the adjectives later used in adverse possession cases (e.g., "open" and "notori-
ous"). I believe they exist because a defendant guilty of ejectment must also qualify
as an effective prior possessor in order to prevail as an adverse possessor. This is
raised by having Sid's possessory acts mirror Fern's, followed by the question of
whether the same standards apply to him. Shoul.d Sid have a defense to Fern's law-
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The transition to adverse possession begins with asking the jurors,
Did it matter how long Fern was in possession before Sid entered, so
long as she was there first? On the other hand, does it matter how
long Sid was there? Larry, could you make a better case for Sid if he
had been in possession siaf'3 years before Fern sued him? Should
ejectment actions be subject to statutes of limitations the same as all
other causes of action? If the statute of limitations does apply and Sid
has been there longer than the allowed time period, what does that
mean? How do you assert the defense, and what do you want the
judge to do about it? Lany may want to leap ahead and say that Sid
has title by adverse possession, but the proper and narrow answer at
this stage is merely that Fern can no longer have him ejected because
the statute has run.
What if the true owner shows up otter those six years-assume
that's me;64 can I eject Sid? Does the statute of limitations for
ejectment actions also apply to owners (or should we owners be given
forever to recover our land from ejectors)? The relation of adverse
possession to the statute of limitations is best brought out through us-
ing Fern as the example, rather than Sid. Suppose Fern was there six
years and the statute of limitations was only five; what is her status
vis-a-vis everyone else at that point? Can any stranger to the title (e.g.
Sid) dispossess her? Can I, otter the statute has run? Who is more of
suit if he can show that he was there only three times a week (or that his actions
were "inappropriate")? Is there a difference between the kind of possession that a
plaintiff in ejectment must show for herself and the kind of possession that she has
to show concerning the defendant? Since there seems to be no reason why inappro-
priate acts should stop the clock, perhaps the reason that a possessor claiming the
statute of limitations must show that the acts were appropriate because appropriate-
ness applies to prior possession instead.
62. Adverse possession appears early in most of the casebooks as a part of the
concept of possession. But Berger, Bruce, Cribbet, and Rabin tie it to conveyancing
(Cribbet, making it a part of title assurance, includes it as the very last substantive
theme in the book). Where so located, it is doubtful that the approach outlined here
will fit.
63. This hypothetical rests on a ~statute of limitations of five years; use a longer
period if your jurisdiction is different.
64. In adverse possession discussions, you should play the role of the client who
owns the land rather than the one possessing it. Real adverse possessors are rarely
aware of their status and do not consult attorneys for guidance on how to perfect
their possessory claims. Absentee record owners, on the other hand, have good rea-
sons to seek legal advice on an ongoing basis.
1117
an owner, Fern, who can kick everyone else off and cannot be kicked
off herself, or me? If you wanted to buy the right to live in that house,
how much would you pay for my record title? How much would you
pay for Fern's possessory rights'f'S
Teaching adverse possession as a logical consequence of prior pos-
session keeps students from being carried away by the name of the
doctrine and thinking of adverse possessors as calculating land
thieves.66 It also avoids their being affronted by their first encounter
with a legal doctrine which is not as pernicious as it sounds; Fern's
victory is not legalized land theft. She did not set out to appropriate
someone else's land; she carne there through some kind of mistake and
has now been there too long for society to want to let anyone undo it.
If students appreciate that the claimants in adverse possession cases
are usually innocent persons who got swindled when they purchased,
who got mixed up when they moved onto and improved the wrong
parcel, or who were confused when they put the fences on what they
believed to be their boundary lines, the doctrine is far more palat-
able.67
Although the rules are helpful to those who find themselves on
another's land, do they accomplish that at the expense of unfairness to
the owner? Larry, I own some vacant land out of town. How can I
keep from losing it by adverse possession? The advice that I visit it
65. Students should be reminded that 99% of a possessor's rights arise when she
first enters, before the statute of limitations even began; thus, she is immediately
superior to all other nonowners and only the true owner could eject her. It is only
the other 1% that arises later when the statute of limitations runs on the owner's
right to eject. Adverse possession actions involve that I%.
66. In fact, adverse possession is probably the most stupid form of theft possible,
since the wrongful possessor will owe damages and lose all improvements made if
the record owner fIles suit any time before the last minute.
67. A good case to avoid, if you take this approach, is Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz,
106 N.E.2d 28 (N.Y. 1952), in Dukeminier, which is so doubtful that it creates a very
misleading impression of what property law is all about. A recent article called it
"[p]robably the most notorious and complex of adverse possession cases" in light of
"the absurdity it iI\iects into the law of adverse possession." Lila Perelson, Note, New
York Adverse Possession Law as a Conspirocy of Forgetting: Van Valkenburgh v.
Lutz and the Examination of Intent, 14 CARDOZO 1. REV. 1089, 1089 (1993).
In most of the reported cases, adverse possessors were also the legal owners of
the properties they occupied, but their attorneys decided it was safer to show that
they met the elements of adverse possession than to prove that their paper titles
complied with all of the complicated formalities of record title. Adverse possession
lets land marketing be based on a "what you see is what you get" system whenever
someone has occupied the property for five or ten years. Buyers need not be overly
concerned about fuzzy links in long chains of title nor require surveys when they
purchase, because a long-standing house proves its own boundaries. I think that is
pretty useful, socially.
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every few years can lead to a discussion of open and notorious by my
protesting, But traveling there is expensive; slwuldn't I be entiUed to
not have to worry until I actually hear that someone is occupying my
property? Whether it is better to require actual notice to the owner
rather than openness and notoriety by the possessor is raised by,
Laura, if actual notice were required, would you have advised Fern to
notify me (given that Fern, like most nonowning possessors, was not
aware that she was on property that did not belong to her)?68
The structure of an adverse possession action is raised by asking my
attorney, If I didn't look at the property for six years and Fern says
she was there all that time, what will happen? If I bring an ejectment
action against her, what will I say in my complaint~How will she
answer it?70 At the trial, the burden of proof is reversed, with the de-
fendant possessor seeking to establish her wrongful possession for over
the statutory period and the plaintiff owner trying to refute it. 71
Laura, lww do you want the jury to be instructed on behalf of Fern
in such a case? Her instruction should ask the jury to merely determine
68. Alternatively, you could ask the class whom they would notify if it turned out
that the deeds or leases to their own residences were defective. In this regard,
Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A2d 258 (N.J. 1969), which is included in Browder and Kurtz;
O'Keefe v. Snyder, 416 A2d 862 (N.J. 1980), which is included in Berger, Browder,
Cribbet and Dukeminier; or Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426
(N.Y. "1991) in Kurtz, are unwise cases to use. Mannillo's requirement of actual notice
for small urban encroachments tends to make students take the exception more seri-
ously than the rule. The opinion makes the outcome seem appealing by looking at
the situations with hindsight and admonishing contractors to be careful, but how
comfortable does it make ordinary persons feel when purchasing existing houses
standing at the lot line? No longer can they count on the running of any clock for
comfort against the risk that it encroaches if it is located in a New Jersey town.
Swveys should be necessary in each turnover of title there. Similarly, how comfort-
able can an ordinary buyer of a painting be under O'Keefe with the risk of discover-
ing 30 years later that the painting belongs to someone else?
69. The important distinction between my complaint and the one Fern previously
filed against Sid is that I can allege that I own the property, which she could not
do.
70. Unlike Sid, Fern will admit her own possession but add the affirmative defense
that she has been in possession for over six years, an allegation I will have to deny
if I am to prevail.
71. If it is clear that Fern is a successful adverse possessor, someone may ask
whether I would be better off not suing her because I will lose. I explain that under
those circumstances, Fern may sue me to quiet title, alleging that I would lose if I
were to sue her in ejectment The issues are the same regardless of who files the
action.
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whether I could have brought ejectment against Fern more than five
years ago. Larry, can we impose a more restrictive standard in our
proposed instruction? Larry should want the jury to have to find that
Fern was open, notorious, continuous, hostile, exclusive, uninterrupted,
etc., for that time, using all of the judicial ac.ijectives found in adverse
possession cases.n The question of which standard is the correct one
leads to the classic question of whether adverse possession is merely
the negative effect of the running of the statute of limitations or the
positive act of transferring title from one person to another.73
Each of the elements of adverse possession can then be explored
through a series of questions about Fern's conduct posed by an owner
looking for evidence to refute her claim of adverse possession:
• Continuous. I heard that Fern was frequenUy out of town on week-
ends; does that mean that her possession has not been continuous?
What kind of evidence would I need to prove noncontinuity?74
• Exclusive. I know someone who was often invited over to visit Fern
on the property; will showing that someone else was there prove that
Fern was not in exclusive possession? What kind of testimony would I
need to establish nonexclusivity?
• Hostile. Suppose I testify that Fern was pleasant to me and even
invited me into the house for tea; will that show she was not hostile?
What do I have to testify that she said, to me or to someone else, in
order to prove nonhostility?
Other requirements can be considered through questions from an
owner who wants to stop the running of the clock (without having to
hire an attorney), e.g.,:
• Adverse. What if I just teU Fern that it's aU right for her to stay?
Does it matter whether she responds with "Thanks" or ''No thanks?'''5
• Uninterrupted. Can I sneak on the property at night for a few min-
utes and thereby interrupt Fern's possession? How much more would
I have to do?
Other questions can come from an owner already resigned to losing:
• Actual. Fern has been on my property for over six years and it is
72. In the alternative, Larry should want the jury to find that the special statutory
requirements in jurisdictions like New York and California, which call for cultivation
or improvement in the absence of color of title, have been met.
73. I suggest to the students that courts may want the more demanding standard
because they do not want to award the 1% to someone who did not also qualify for
the 99%. The adjectives are a way of deciding the 99% question. For example, if Fern
would not have prevailed as a prior possessor against Sid during the past six years,
then she should not prevail as an adverse possessor against me now.
74. Tacking can be included as a subtheme here.
75. Permissive possession and the role of ouster should also be discussed here.
1120
[Vol. 23: 1099, 1996] Teaching Real Property
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
too late to do anything about it. But she has only actuaUy been on a
smaU corner of the property, so do I have to worry about losing more
than that corner? Does it matter that she talks about having a deed to
the entire parcel? How can that deed increase her rights, since it is
obviously an invalid deed?
The discussion of adverse possession should close with a review of
what it means to be a successful or failed adverse possessor. Laura, if
Fern does prove that she satisfied aU of the elements of adverse posses-
sion, what wiU she get? WiU the court give her a deed to the property?
Since she now has aU of the rights of a real owner, is there some way
you can make the records reflect that? What about the mortgage that
the bank had on the property; does she owe that?
E. Innocent Improvers and Fixtures
The topics of innocent improvers and ftxtures can be raised by con-
sidering the effect of an unsuccessful adverse possession. Larry, what
wiU happen if Fern fails to satisfy aU of the elements of adverse pos-
session? Can I have her ejected and also recover damages for her past
wrongful possession? What happens to the house she built on the land
while she was there?
The doctrine of ftxtures can then be explained, pointing out that the
lumber Fern purchased changed from personal to real property when
the house was built. Thus, title to it passed to the owner of the land
where it was afftxed.
An unsuccessful adverse possessor is often merely an innocent im-
prover of another's property. If there are casebook materials on this
topic (or a good faith improver statute in your jurisdiction), it can be
raised by asking, Laura, teU Fern what she can do, if anything, about
the house she has built on Bernhardt's land. 76
76. Fixtures and innocent improvers have no settled location in the casebooks.
Only Dukeminier, Goldstein, and Kurtz cover it as part of adverse possession. Singer
puts it just before adverse possession. Bruce covers fixtures and Cribbet covers inno-
cent improvers as part of their sections on personal property which is substantially
separated from their coverage of adverse possession at the end of their books. Both
Casner and Rabin have entire chapters on fixtures, part of landlord/tenant and con-
veyancing, respectively. Donahue has a fixture clause and note in his form contract
of sale. I could not find references in the indexes of Berger, Browder, Chused, Haar
or Johnson using fixtures, good faith improvers, innocent improvers, landlord/tenant,




In boundary dispute cases, the neighbor claiming a strip on the other
side of the legal line is likely to plead both adverse possession and
agreed boundaries theories as alternative bases of relief. Based on this
pragmatic similarity, the two doctrines are easily taught together.
If the house I just purchased runs all the way up to wJwt I think is
the lot line, I don't need to worry, so long as it has been there long
enough. 78 But wJwt if the house is set back, and I want to build an
addition and be sure tJwt I am not trespassing on my neighbor's prop-
erty? In response to the answer that I should have a survey made, But
a survey is expensive. Can't I just ask my neighbor, Nate, where the
line is?
Then, using an aisle in the classroom as the strip that will come into
dispute, What if Nate (who lives left of the aisle) tells me tJwt the
boundary line is here (on the left side of the aisle), I then build up to
tJwt line, and later it turns out tJwt the true line was on the other
(right) side of the aisle (so tJwt my improvement is encroaching,
because the strip belongs to Nate rather tJwn to me)? This is not an
agreed boundary situation, since there is neither a dispute nor uncer-
tainty; however, a convenient way to lead up to that doctrine is to weed
away the situations that do not involve it. If I am allowed to keep my
encroaching structure under these circumstances, it is because Nate
should be estopped from denying the line is where he earlier told me it
was, knowing that I would rely on his statement.
What if, instead, Nate and I agree to use the left side of the aisle as
our boundary because tJwt is where we both think tJwt the legal line
reaUy is? This too is not an agreed boundary case. We were neither dis-
agreeing nor uncertain; we were quite certain, but wrong. In light of the
mutual mistake, it is unlikely that any court would enforce any agree-
ment arising from it.
What if, instead, Nate and I both know tJwt the right side of the
aisle is the true boundary, but it is more convenient for us to use the
77. Browder, Cribbet, and Kurtz cover agreed boundaries as an aspect of deed de-
scriptions in conveyancing; Rabin also has it there (along with adverse possession).
The drawback of teaching agreed boundaries as part of conveyancing is that the
parties there are grantor and grantee, whereas the fights resolved by the agreed
boundaries rules involve neighbors, who are at best only coincidentally grantor and
grantee (and where that feature is significant, some doctrine other than agreed
boundaries will resolve the issue, e.g., estoppel or mutual mistake).
Only Berger and Browder have cases on agreed boundaries; the others cover it
with a note or problem or not at all, so far as I could tell from their indices.
78. This would be true except perhaps in New Jersey, under the rule of Mannillo
v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258 (N.J. 1969). See supm note 68.
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left side; and we orally agree to change it; wiU that work? This is still
not an agreed boundary situation, but merely the conveyancing question
of whether a strip of land can be conveyed from one party to another
without a deed. When both parties lmow their true line and want to
change it, they should go to an attorney and have a deed drafted con-
veying the strip from one to the other.
But suppose neither of us knows where the true line is, although we
can say that we want to have it on the left. Under those circu'mStanc-
es, Laura, could you draft a deed? Of course she cannot, since a deed
can be written only if the true line is lmown. We would have to fIrst
hire a surveyor to tell us where the real line is and then hire an attor-
ney to change it, if it is not where we want it to be. Under those cir-
cumstances the legal system permits our oral agreement to be effective.
Likewise ifNate thinks the line is on the right and I think it is on the
left, and we agree to resolve matters by putting it in the middle or
along one of the sides.
Since the doctrine needs to be invoked only when the legal line is
somewhere else, it is always the case that the agreed line is "mistaken."
Students frequently confuse that factor with the earlier statement that
an agreed boundary cannot be based on mistake, unless the professor
clears up the confusion.79
II. CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP
Nowhere is the case method more at variance with real-world law
practice than in the area of co-ownership. From reading the decisions
in the casebooks, one would conclude that lawyering in this fIeld con-
sists of arguing cases whose outcomes depend on whether some home-
made document created, for example, a joint tenancy or a tenancy in
common. But outside of the casebooks, such constructional issues oc-
cur perhaps only 1% of the time;80 it is not what real estate lawyers
spend their time doing. Attorneys do regularly encounter co-ownership
problems, but not in contexts likely to work their way into appellate
opinions. Whenever two people purchase real estate together, their
attorney is (or should be) assisting them in making their choice by
79. There is certainly more to agreed boundaries than what has been said here,
but I have no special techniques for covering the other elements and aspects of the
doctrine.
80. Whether an asset is or is not community property in a divorce proceeding is
such an issue, but rarely requires construction of a will or deed.
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advising them as to the consequences of the options. It is not only a
common role, it is also one that clients can appreciate and an attorney
can feel good about playing.
That role can easily be replicated in the classroom, by making their
student attorney answer all of the questions two persons intending to
purchase property would ask.81 As one of the two buyers, I could, put
all of the necessary questions to the attorney myself without a com-
panion, but it is more realistic (and entertaining) for both acquirers to
see an attorney together, manifesting enough different circumstances
and interests to generate different concerns and favor different out-
comes. Beforehand, I have arranged with one of the students in the
class ("Fiona") to play the role of my fiancee, with her own agenda of
questions (written by me) to put to our attorney.82 Then in class, I an-
nounce our engagement, add that I have offered to buy us a house, and
ask Fiona if she is ready to start looking for one, to which her (script-
ed) response. is that we should see an attorney first. 83
A. The Choices
Fiona's first question to our attorney is, How should we take title?
The pedagogical goal is to get a list of possible ways to hold property
that can thereafter be compared, and the ideal lawyer's response would
be, "You can do it several ways; let me tell you about all of them." That
is not likely to occur in class. The student lawyer will probably blurt
out, "You should take title in joint tenancy." Anticipating this, you might
warn your fiancee to reply, But I thought it was your job to help us
make our own decision, not to make a decision for us. Can't you just
give us a list of choices and explain their consequences to us?
As the options are mentioned, a list will be kept on the blackboard. It
will of course contain tenancy in common and joint tenancy, but class
discussion is more coherent if the list begins with separately held title,
to serve as a basis for comparisons and analogies. So (early in the con-
versation) I ask, Would it be possible for us to put the house in my
name, even though we are married? Fiona, who knows this is coming,
follows up by asking, Could we put the house in my name instead?
Even though he is the one paying for it? My question raises the issue
of the relationship between separate property ownership and the mar-
81. Johnson approaches the matter in this fashion. Casner begins with a brief note
dealing with planning factors, and Haar, by virtue of including this topic as an aspect
of purchasing, inevitably invites such treatment. However, most casebooks and
teacher's manuals treat characterization as an after-the-fact issue: the deal has already
been done, the question now is, What does it mean?
82. Her ghostwritten questions are shown in the same italics as mine.
83. Another student, of course, ostensibly chosen by Fiona, will play this role.
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riage state.84 Her question introduces the distinction between the fonn
of title and the source of funds behind its acquisition.85 Our attorney
should be able to give us affinnative answers to all of these questions,
and the fIrst two entries on the blackboard list become: (1) my property
and (2) her property. Because it will make matters easier later, regard-
less of the order in which our attorney gives them to us, the next two
entries should be: (3) tenancy in common, and (4) joint tenancy. All of
these categories are listed without any significant discussion of their
characteristics at this time.
Tenancy by the entireties or community property or both should next
be added. As these are mentioned, I ask, Since we haven't yet gotten
married, can we take tiUe that way if we buy the house before the
wedding? Should I have asked that question about the earlier options?
As we discuss the special marital nature of these two estates, one of us
asks, What about the Jones couple who are gay; can people of the same
sex own a house as tenants by the entireties or community proper-
ty~
This is the basic list, but other categories can be added. Modern
fonns of community association are introduced by saying, My friends
own a condominium; what's that'?J7 The condominium and the time
share are good ways to show how modern real estate packaging takes
advantage of pre-existing legal categories.ll8 A similar question about
84. Some of my California students think .that everything a married person owns
becomes community property solely by virtue of the marriage, and many more be-
lieve that everything acquired by a person while married is community property, even
though separate funds were used to pay for it.
85. Students need to be reminded that gifts can be made between concurrent own-
ers as well as to third persons (I can buy Fiona a house as a gift, or I can gift her
half a house instead).
86. This topic is richly treated in Kurtz and generally ignored in the other books,
although both Donahue and Singer include it as a landlord/tenant issue.
87. Contemporary forms of community ownership receive quite disparate treatment
in the casebooks. Many (Bruce, Cribbet, Donahue, Johnson, Singer) include it as part
of concurrent ownership. It is alternatively located in estates (Berger), covenants
(Browder, Dukeminier), land use (Casner, Haar), or as a free-standing topic
(Goldstein, Kurtz). Chused spreads it among concurrent ownership, landlord/tenant,
sales, covenants, and housing quality. Rabin appears not to cover it at all. Coverage
ranged from a few pages of text to inclusion of several cases.
88. Students may be confused by the idea that two persons can hold a condomini-
um unit as joint tenants while also being tenants in common of the shared hallways
with the other unit owners. You will have to step out of your role as client to ex-
plain this to them.
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cooperative apartments also introduces the corporation as another form
of shared ownership, although rarely appropriate for a couple's internal
choice. The corporate form leads to the partnership form of concurrent
ownership, a common device for groups of real estate investors to em-




So far, the concurrent estates have merely been listed without any
comparative analysis. The differences between them and the reasons
for selecting one over the others are now brought out.
Fiona asks,90 If we're married and title to the 1wuse is in his name,
what wiU happen to the house when he dies? The question is incom-
plete, so I add, What if my wiU said that everything I owned went to
my son, Sonny? and Fiona then continues, What if he dies wit1wut a
wiU?91 Beginning with nonconcurrent, noncommunity property invites
a review of common law dower (or curtesy),92 testacy and intestate
succession, heirship, statutory forced shares, and probate homesteads.
The same answers also apply to the option of title being held in my
fiancee's name rather than mine.
This background makes Fiona's next question, What if we hold title
as tenants in common and he dies first? easy for the class to under-
stand, because that form treats half the house as my separate property
and the other half as her separate property for death purposes. The
same question for joint tenancy (and tenancy by the entireties) intro-
duces the concept of survivorship, especially when I raise the prospect
of devising my interest to my son.93 Community property naturally fol-
89. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). Donahue, Dukeminier, Haar, and Kurtz include
Marvin or a Marvin-type case. Covering it at this point pennits comparison with
standard business partnership rules, but it can be raised at any time by asking your
attorney, Suppose we postpone getting married and buying our own Muse until
later and she just moves into my Muse with me; wiU that have any effect on own-
ership of the Muse?
90. I have my student spouse ask these questions because I am older than she
and therefore most likely to die first.
91. Death consequences of separate property in nonmarriage cases take only a one
sentence comment by the professor.
92. Since I am a husband, curtesy is mentioned under the second option (title in
my wife's name).
93. Survivorship should be then elaborated upon by asking, What if we make my
son a joint tenant along with the two of us; what would happen when I die?
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lows from this because of its similarity to joint tenancy in intestate
situations and to tenancy in common in testate situations.
Death consequences can be concluded by Fiona asking, Our broker
told us that taking title as joint tenants would avoid probate fees; is
that right? This can be followed with a discussion (or lecture) on the
differing capital gains tax consequences of these estates.94
2. Marital Dissolution
A less complicated consideration is what effect a divorce would have
on ownership interests in the property. One or both of us ask, What
wiU happen if we get divorced and the property is held . . . ~5 Explo-
ration of the various options will bring out the distinctions between
separate property and community or marital property. Property that is
in only one of our names should be unaffected by a divorce.ll6 Commu-
nity property and tenancy by the entireties, on the other hand, are
clearly affected by divorce, and we can consider whether their division
should be equal or based on fault or contribution. Students tend to also
put tenancy in common and joint tenancy into the same hopper and to
divide them up in the marital dissolution action, which gives you the
opportunity to explain the differences between concurrent and commu-
nity property and between ending a marital relationship and ending a
property relationship.
3. Liability for Debts
Another consideration that separates the different forms of owner-
ship is the liability of the property for the debts of either spouse. These
issues are considered by questions from one of us based upon concerns
about the other's spendthrift nature.97 WiU her creditors be able to
94. Section 1014(b)(1) and (6) of the Internal Revenue Code can be included in
the materials to introduce the students to the notion of stepped-up basis. It is also a
manageable and useful introduction to tax law (which will come up again in convey-
ancing).
95. For increased drama, one of the spouses can visit another attorney separately
and pose these questions as if the other party were not present.
96. The only instance in which it may be affected is if the property is treated as
community or marital property notwithstanding the legal form of title. At this stage
the various presumptions of community property can be introduced to show that title
may not really be the way it appears in the records. That point can also be made
later when class gets to the drafting issues.
97. Either I worry about her jeweler and furrier, or else she frets over my gam-
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reach the house if it is in my name? If it is in her name? In . . . ~
These situations often puzzle students. For them to appreciate the out-
come in tenancy in common situations, you may have to explain execu-
tion sales and make them realize that the execution purchaser will
become a co-owner with the remaining (nondebtor) spouse, notwith-
standing the absence of any marital dissolution.99 The outcome for
joint tenancy is more complicated for them. First, it introduces the con-
cept of severance, when the execution purchaser becomes a tenant in
common rather than joint tenant with the remaining co-owner. 100 Sec-
ond, by postponing execution on the judgment until after one of the
joint tenants has died, you can illustrate the risky nature of the
creditor's position in such a case. 101 The same discussion can then be
had with regard to tenancy by the entireties102 and community proper-
ty. Finally, the distinction between general and secured creditors is
introduced, What if her creditor asks me to co-sign a mortgage on the
house to cover her debt? What if I do? What if I rejuse?l03
4. Inter Vivos Transfers
The last consideration is the effectiveness of a unilateral conveyance
by either spouse. The dramatic impact is greatest when it is raised as a
surreptitious consideration by one party alone. At the conclusion of the
joint interview with our common attorney, Fiona chooses joint tenan-
bling and car racing expenses.
98. Or What if she (or he) files bankruptcy?-a question covered in several books,
including Chused, Donahue, and Johnson.
99. If your student attorney is good enough, you can ask, If her creditor gets a
judgment against her and she doesn't pay it, can the creditor then go after the
(tenancy in common) Iwuse? How much of it can he reach? How will he get it? If
he has an execution sale of her interest in the Iwuse, and X buys it, what is my
relationship to X?
100. The same questions as in the previous footnote are appropriate, except that
the answer to the final question should mention the lack of unity of time or title be-
tween the execution purchaser and the remaining (former) joint tenant.
101. This issue can also be approached from the perspective of a potential mer-
chant contemplating extending credit to a spouse on the basis of a financial state-
ment that shows that all assets are held in joint tenancy. Mark, if Fiona wants you
to give her credit and tells you that she owns a Iwuse in joint tenancy, slwuld you
do it?
102. Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977), one of the most commonly in-
cluded cases in the books, extensively reviews creditor questions in a tenancy by the
entireties jurisdiction. It can also be used as a springboard for the other situations.
103. In California, for instance, neither party can mortgage community property
without the signature of the other, CAL. FAMILY CODE § 1102 (West 1994), but, per-
versely, community property is liable for the debts of either spouse. Id. § 910. So the
unsecured jeweler can reach my interest in the community house, but the secured
jeweler cannot!
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cy/04 and I visit another attorney privately105 to find out how much
that fonn of title interferes with my ability to convey my interest to my
son. If title were in my name, could I convey the property to Sonny
without her consent? Would I need her sign(~ture on the deed? Would I
have to tell her? What if title were in her name? What if we held title
as tenants in common? Joint tenancy introduces significant tension
into the conversation. If we were joint tenants, could I still execute a
deed of my share to Sonny without telling Fiona? Would Sonny have
to record the deed?l06 You mean Fiona will only learn of this at my
funeral? What would be the state of title after my death? The dangers
of joint tenancy can be made even more dramatic by continuing, But if
Fiona dies first, won't this device defeat my right of survivorship?
But didn't you say that I didn't have to tell Fiona about the deed to
Sonny? So if she dies before me, couldn't Sonny and I just tear up that
deed and forget about it?107 The natural instinct of the students to
criticize your behavior should be deflected into a discussion of how
attorneys can prevent this from happening to their clients-both actor
and recipient. lOS Community property and tenancy by the entireties,·
the final two options, gain significantly in attractiveness as students
appreciate the value of a two-signature requirement in conveyancing.
c. Drafting
Drafting considerations in practice are the reverse of those inlitiga-
tion. Instead of asking what kind of estate a certain set of words has
created, as casebook opinions do, the student lawyer must determine
what words to use in order to create the particular estate selected by
the clients. What should the deed say if I want to be sure that title is
in my name alone even though I am married? raises the question of
how to rebut any presumption of community property. What should it
say in order to create a joint tenancy? pennits consideration about the
104. This is what the students always recommend to her, after title in one name
alone is ruled out.
105. Obviously, everyone in class is listening in on this consultation.
106. Students probably will not lmow, without your telling them, that the deed
needs only to be executed and delivered to be effective.
107. I often see the lmuckles of some students whiten as they worry about whether
this has happened to them.
108. This should involve asking whether clients appreciate that this is how joint
tenants stand and whether there are ways for an attorney to create or guarantee a
truly indestructible joint tenancy for them.
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role of clauses reciting "and not as tenants in common" or "together
with right of survivorship."lll9 The unities of time and title are intro-
duced by my asking, How can I convert the house that I currently own
into joint tenancy with Fiona? The residual nature of tenancy in com-
mon is raised by asking, Can the deed just say to A and B, without
adding "as tenants in common"? To raise community property issues,
The deed the seUer proposes to give to us says '~ and B (or A and B,
husband and wife),,; is that good enough, or does it also have to say
"as community property?,,110 Another variable is introduced by ask-
ing, What should the deed say if we want to be 60140 tenants in com-
mon? Can we be 60140 joint tenants?
The fmal questions are, What if we aren't that certain of how we
want to hold title? Can we change our minds later? If we take title in
joint tenancy now, can we convert it to community property later?
How would we do that?
D. Money Issues
1. Title
What has been done so far may seem complicated to the students,
but the rules are coherent and easy to outline. ll1 The clarity of the pi-
geonholes blurs, however, when money considerations are factored in
to the analysis. Fiona asks, WiU the house reaUy be mine if we take
title in my name, but the entire price came from his separate bank
account?1l2 The class should appreciate the possibilities that I have
made a gift of my funds to her, or that there is a resulting trust on the
house because of the use of my funds. My converse question, If title
goes in my name and I pay the entire price from my separate funds,
wiU she be able to contend that she has some interest in the house just
109. If the student attorney does not include them, you ask whether the omission
was malpractice; if she does include them, you ask whether she is charging by the
word and including a lot of unnecessary verbiage.
110. In California, there is the added twist that, for purposes of marital dissolution,
joint tenancy and tenancy in common are presumed to be community property to
give the divorce court jurisdiction over the property. This presents a special problem
for the drafter who is asked to create a true joint tenancy or tenancy in common for
a married couple.
111. By way of review, you can help the class prepare a cross-indexed chart (by
type of estate and type of effect) through asking, for example, For a tenancy in
comnwn what are the death consequences? What are the marital dissolution conse-
quences? Etc.
112. A fraudulent conveyance issue can be added in by saying, I want title to be in
her name in order to keep my ex-wife or my creditors from ever getting their
hands on it.
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because we were married at the time of acquisition? raises questions
of tracing appropriate to community property, equitable distribution
rules, or unifonn marital property statutes.
Concurrent title situations are also fuzzy. If we take title as tenants
in common and I pay 90% of the price, do I own 90% or 50% of the
house? If I own only 50% of the house, does she owe me any money
back? These questions force the class to appreciate that the
overcontributing co-owner can be treated as having made an investment
(i.e., owning 90%), a loan (owning 50% and being owed 40% of the
price), or a gift (owning 50% and not being owed any part of the
price). 1I3 The question, WiU the same be true if we take as joint ten-
ants? asks whether the unity of interest requirement automatically
overrules the investment alternative possibility. For the community
property variation, Fiona asks, What ifmy parents bought the house for
us as a wedding present (with title in our names as community prop-
erty) but later we get divorced?1I4
Another dimension is added by dividing the price into a down pay-
ment and a mortgage. The down payment might be treated as a gift
from one co-owner to the other, while at the same time mortgage pay-
ments might be called loans if both had signed the mortgage. 1I5 In
community property jurisdictions, where salaries are community in-
come, use of one spouse's paycheck to make a mortgage payment on
the other spouse's house may give the community an ownership (invest-
ment) interest in the property unless a gift (or loan) can be shown to
have been intended. These are difficult and complicated issues, and stu-
dents may become frustrated by numerous variables and a lack of
bright line answers.
113. These options are more realistic if the students view the couple as two friends
going into a real estate venture, rather than as spouses purchasing a house.
114. In California, for instance, by statute, a separate property contribution to a
community asset is treated as an interest-free loan to the community, CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 2640, generating a novel answer to this question. See In re Marriage of Lucas, 614
P.2d 285 (Cal. 1980) in Donahue or Goldstein.
115. This is how the outcome in Giles v. Sheridan, 137 N.W.2d 828 (Neb. 1965),
included in Donahue, appears to have been calculated. Cummings v. Anderson, 94
Wash. 2d 135 (Wash. 1980), in Kurtz, involves mortgage and tax payments made be-
fore, during and after marriage and separation.
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2. Rent and Possession
Possession issues tie in neatly with money questions. Fiona asks, Can
he evict me or make me move down to the basement if we stop getting
along? I inquire, If a new job forces me to move to New York and she
stays behind in the house, can I make her help me out with my New
York expenses by collecting some rent from her? What do I have to do
to get some rental income from the property?1l6 Can I rent out my
''half'to someone else? What if she won't sign the lease? What if she
won't let my tenant in? What if she tries to rent out her half?ll7 All
of these questions explore and explicate the concept of unity of posses-
sion. The Statute of Anne is raised by my asking, If she rents out the
entire house while I am gone, can I claim any of what she receives?
3. Expenses
The liability side of the equation is raised by Fiona. If he leaves, what
about the bills? Can I make him pay half the property taxes? Half the
repair costs? Half the price of a hot tub I want to add? I counter by
asking, Is it fair for her to live there rent free and make me pay half
the bills at the same time? What if I would rather default on the mort-
gage because I think it is too large? What if I would prefer to lose the
property at a tax sale rather than pay the property taxes? Can she im-
pose personal liability on me for a bill the government cannot force me
to pay? What if putting in a hot tub was a stupid idea as far as I'm
concerned? As to the hot tub, she responds, But the hot tub generates
an extra $50 a month in rent. Do I have to share that with him if he
didn't pay for it? If we seU the house for more because of the hot tub,
who will get that excess? These questions make the distinction between
different kinds of expenditures (to preserve the title, necessary repairs,
or elective improvements), different forms of liability (in personam or
in rem), and different collection proceedings (contribution, accounting,
or partition).
4. Income
Finally, and perhaps appropriate only in community property jurisdic-
tions, is the treatment of income that is generated simultaneously from
116. Should. I try to get her angry enough to throw me out, so that I can claim
an ouster?
117. Also, as subsidiary questions: What if I die while my tenant is there? WiU his
lease terminate on my death? Since it is a joint tenancy, how wiU Fiona's right of
survivorship and my tenant's rights under the lease mesh? Is executing a lease a
good way to sever our joint tenancy?
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a separate property source (a separate asset) and a community property
source (efforts in managing the asset during the marriage). I own and
also manage an apartment building nearby. AU of tlwse rents are my
separate income, aren't they?1I8 The whole situation can be made
hopelessly circular by having the received rents applied directly to the
mortgage, which would make the ratio of community to separate
change each year.
E. Settlement Agreements
By way of closing, What if we don't really like all the consequences
of anyone clwice of title? Can we make our own rules as to these
matters? The class can discuss what public policy issues are involved
when unmarried persons (gay couples who cannot marry or straight
couples who elect not to marry) attempt to create forms of property
ownership equivalent to marital and community property regimes, or
when married couples seek to change rules, perhaps solely in order to
make it easier to get divorced later.
m. LANDLORDlfENANT
Landlord/tenant involves exciting opportunities for introducing new
dimensions to lawyering roles. Transactions frequently involve drafting
or reviewing lengthy legal documents, which requires that an attorney
not only knows what the provisions mean, but also appreciates what
underlying rules are being altered by them. Here, often for the first
time, the students are forced to consider not only what the background
rules are, but also, whether and how to modify them by contract. As an
additional dimension, in the residential field, the rules have moved from
the status of gapfilling, modifiable standards to welfarist policy edicts
that the parties may not be free to alter by conventional drafting tech-
niques. Students can consider what role an attorney may appropriately
perform as "freedom of contract" gives way to "public policy. "119
118. If this question is going to be raised, Beam v. Bank of Am., 490 P.2d 257 (Cal.
1971), included in Haar, is a good case to assign. Fiona asks her attorney which
fonnula profits her the most, and I ask my attorney how our accountant should tes-
tify regarding the value of my services at the building.
119. What is not covered here is the case of the government as landlord, which
provides a very different role for an attorney to play.
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At the same time, there is an enormous amount of substantive law
and heavy organizational problems inevitably confronted by students
when attempting to assimilate this knowledge. Distinctions abound120
and much class effort needs to be spent reminding students which pi-
geonhole is being covered that day. 121
A. The Tenancies and Their Termination
The conventional way of beginning landlord and tenant is to start
with the distinction between the various types of tenancies, Le., tenancy
for a term, periodic tenancy, and tenancy at will. But since the distinc-
tions are important only insofar as they matter; students are likely to
more readily appreciate the differences between the tenancies if they
are confronted with a situation in which the outcome differs according
to the leasehold estate involved.
I present the following problem to my attomey:122 I just received a
letter from my tenant, Tina, saying that she has vacated her apart-
ment (or store). Under our lease, she is supposed to pay me $1000 a
month rent for seven more years, and I can only get about $700 a
monthl23 if I have to put it back on the market. Can she get away
with not paying the promised rent? Furthermore, she has missed
some back rent payments, which I also want to coUect.
A preliminary matter the class should appreciate is the essential con-
nection between rent liability and the existence of a tenancy. In order
for Tina to owe me rent, she must be my tenant; i.e., some form of
tenancy must exist between us. If there is no landlord/tenant relation-
ship, she might still have some liability for possessing my land, but then
the amount sought is use value ($700), rather than the rent reserved
120. The most common error I perceive in examination papers is the application of
a correct rule to the wrong situation; the students have a much easier time memoriz-
ing the rules than remembering where they fit
121. The diverse approaches of the casebooks illustrate the absence of any univer-
sal organizing principle for this field. About all that they can be said to share is a
150-300 page treatment of the topic. Although it generally appears relatively early in
most casebooks, Donahue, Goldstein and Singer each put it towards the end, after
conveyancing, servitudes, and land use, respectively. Both Bruce and Rabin, on the
other hand, begin their books with this topic.
122. Throughout this topic, I take on the role of landlord as against a student or
students identified as tenants ("Tina" in this part of the article). Students are clearly
better able at identifying themselves as tenant's counsel, making it easier for them to
challenge and attempt to thwart my ambitions. The questions put forth by the in-
structor could be phrased as tenant rather than landlord queries, but it is harder to
generate opposition to problematic answers that way.
123. This is my way of indicating the fair rental value of the premises, making it
$300 less per month than the rent reserved.
,.
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($1000). Furthermore, now that Tina is no longer in possession, there is
no basis for recovering future use value at all, making rent the only
possible theory. To recover rent, I must be able to show that Tina was
(and still is) my tenant. 124
Larry should want to see the lease to which I referred. I can either
have a form ready for class distribution,t25 or I can tell him that it
gives Tina possession of the premises for ten years at a rent of $12,000
a year, payable at $1000 a month on the first of each month. I add that
she and I agreed on these terms three years ago, but that we never got
around to signing the lease. Thus, there is an unsigned lease creating a
term long enough to come within the statute of frauds. Is it so impor-
tant that it wasn't signed; if we had signed it, what would be my
relationship with Tina? Since it isn't signed, does that mean that
Tina isn't my tenant? What was she these past three years? Was she
just a trespasser who I could have kicked out on a moment's notice?
Can she demand back the extra $300 she paid me each month for the
last three years because she wasn't a tenant?
Larry will ultimately figure out that Tina's consensual entry and regu-
lar payment of rent under an unsigned lease made her a periodic ten-
ant,126 and that she owed the stated rent under it. The question adds
the point that periodic tenants owe rent the same as term tenants do:
She did miss one payment last year; can I sue her for that?127
And she missed a payment in the second year; can I get that? Was
Tina still my tenant after the first year ended? This introduces the
automatic renewal nature of periodic tenancies, which distinguishes
them from term tenancies. Larry must explain to me that Tina owes
rent for the second year, since she was a periodic tenant in her second
year of possession because neither one of us took any steps to termi-
124. Some rhetorical questions to the student lawyer usually bring this out, e.g.,
Suppose I found X living in one of my apartments without my permission. Apart
from ejectment, can I recover $/000 or $700? If X refuses to pay and immediately
leaves, can I recover damages for the future or only for the time X was there?
These questions should bring out the fact that trespassers and tenants are different.
125. If a form lease is used, it can also serve as a foundation for discussion in all
later issues.
126. Under this scenario, Tina is a periodic tenant rather than a tenant for a term
under a signed lease.
127. This query ignores any statute of limitations problems.
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nate the tenancy after the first year. 128 The same is true for any un-
paid back rent during the third year.
What about rent coming due after she sent the letter to me inform-
ing me of her departure? This introduces the question of how periodic
tenancies are terminated and the requirement that the notice comply
with certain formalities,129 one of them being a requirement that the
notice be given a certain time in advance, unlike the rule for tenancies
at will. l30
How much advance notice should Tina have given me? Or, When I
want to terminate a periodic tenancy, how much advance notice do I
have to give?131 The answer to these questions requires a determina-
tion of the duration of the period involved. Under the lease we didn't
sign, did we create a tenancy from month-to-month (because of
monthly payments) or from year to year (because of annual calcula-
tions)? Which position should I take? Tina, would you rather be a
month-to-month or year-to-year tenant, now that you want out?
The timing of the notice of termination can be raised through a series
of questions to the tenant's lawyer: Laura, if Tina is a month to month
tenant and wants to quit as soon as possible, what should your notice
to me say? If today is the tenth of the month (and the rent is payable
on the first of the month), can the notice terminate the tenancy as of
the first of next month? Can the notice terminate the tenancy as of the
tenth of next month? Can the notice terminate the tenancy before the
128. At this point, it is useful to introduce to the class the broad array of periodic
tenancies so as to disabuse them of any assumption that the discussion relates only
to long-term unsigned leases. Why do you caU Tina a periodic teMnt when she
never signed an agreement saying that a periodic teMncy was created? If this es-
tate arises "by implication" out of some other factors (e.g., failure to sign a lease
containing a valid termination date), when else might it be implied? What would
we cau Tina if she signed an agreement that stated a rent but not a termination
date? What if she signed an agreement that contained a termination date, but that
date came and went some time ago and she is still there paying rent? What if her
agreement expressly stated that it was a tenancy from month to month? Are each of
these forms of periodic teMncy the same or are there different rut.es for their termi-
nation?
129. When instinctively protenant students want to dispense with these requirements,
you can ask them whether they are currently more concerned with properly tenninat-
ing their own tenancies or with keeping their landlords from doing so, especially
around exam time.
130. This is an appropriate time to cover the estate at will, if it has any signifi-
cance in your jurisdiction.
131. The question Are the notice requirements the same on both sides? will let the
students consider the comparative needs for notice and the amount of time landlords
may require to obtain replacement tenants versus the time tenants should have in
order to locate and to move to new premises.
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first of the foUowing month? If the tenancy were determined to be year
to year, how far in advance would your notice have to be?
If Laura gets any of these "wrong," my lawyer will be asked about the
consequences, e.g., Larry, if Tina sent me a notice on the tenth saying
that she was quitting on the first, did that terminate the tenancy on
the first? Did it terminate on the tenth or on the first of the foUowing
month, if that isn't what it said?132
The continuation of rent liability after a defective notice of tennina-
tion ties the entire topic together. If Tina has not sent a proper notice
of termination to me, what about next month's rent? What about next
year's rent? What about rent in the eleventh year? (If the lease had
been signed, would she owe rent in that eleventh year?y33
1. Other (Non)tenninating Events
The underlying theme of the above discussion was that the chief
distinction between the tenancies is how they tenninate. A different,
but related, point is the significance of other possible terminating cir-
cumstances, even though they do not serve to distinguish the tenancies
from one another. I can introduce these by considering with my lawyer
the assertion of various defenses to rent liability raised by the tenant,
all based upon her contention that the tenancy has ended.
Tina told me that she no longer owes 'rent because the store was
damaged or destroyed by a fire; is that true?l34 If the common law
rule has been displaced by a policy pennitting a tenant to leave when
the premises are destroyed, the role of the background rule in negotiat-
ing can be introduced: Laura, do you want a clause in the lease letting
Tina quit if there is a fire? Are you wiUing to pay an extra $25 a
month rent if I agree to such a clause? Students are more appreciative
of the value of knowing the background mle (i.e., the law) when they
discover that they have been offering to pay for a right their client al-
132. This question raises the issue of who generally profits from fussy formalities
about termination.
133. One factor not yet discussed is Tina's departure.
134. Frustration is a related variant: She said that she left becaWle a city inspector
told her that the zoning laws prohibit her from (Ingaging in that kind of bWliness
on that block. For both these issues, the distinction between periodic tenancy and
tenancy for a term is not central, although a monthly tenant's ability to terminate on
30 days notice significantly reduces the impact of destruction of the premises on
continued rent liability.
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ready has. l35 A good lawyer is not one who simply makes demands for
her client; it is one who knows what needs to be demanded and what
does not. If the law already lets the tenant quit on destruction, she has
no need for a clause to the same effect; indeed, it is the landlord's at-
torney who should recommend a clause going the other way (and per-
haps offering a rent reduction in return).l35
B. Abandonment
The rules regarding abandonment naturally flow out of the discussion
of termination, since they were largely implicit there all along. If Tina
did not terminate the tenancy by sending me a letter, did she termi-
nate it by leaving the week (or month) after she sent the letter? The
negative answer means that abandonment does not terminate a lease-
hold and that an abandoning tenant continues to owe rent. My attorney
has already effectively advised me that when a tenant abandons, a land-
lord can sue for the rent as it falls due, because that was merely anoth-
er way of saying rent is due so long as the tenancy has not been termi-
nated.
Exploration of the rent remedy follows: If I sue Tina for the rent,
must I file a new complaint each month? Can I let some months accu-
mulate and then sue for all the back rent? Must I wait until rent is
already past due, or can I sue for the future rent immediately under
some kind of anticipatory breach theory?137 Can I have a clause in
my lease accelerating the rent?l38
The other forms of relief are introduced by pointing out the draw-
backs of the rent remedy. But I don't want to leave the premises va-
cant and hope that Tina wiU stay around to be sued or remain solvent
135. If the common law rule is still in force, it is too early to employ this negotiat-
ing issue; the point is most dramatically made when you have trapped the student
lawyer into malpractice through advising the client to pay for rights she already has.
136. From here you can go into the question of what the provision might say, de-
pending on who wants what. A lesser point that can be hinted at is that we may
have to determine whether the background rule is only a gap filler that can be dis-
placed by a contrary agreement, or whether it is a policy statement that the parties
are not free to alter. But a full discussion of that point should wait until a true poli-
cy rule is on the table.
137. I limit these questions to rent, without mentioning alternative damage theories,
since it is not yet time to introduce the question of mitigation. If there is a judicial
or statutoI}' measure of damages in the casebook or the jurisdiction, this is one
place to cover it. Because lost profits intrinsically include mitigation-the landlord's
award automatically subtracts recoverable rents from the rent reserved-this discus-
sion can be postponed until after a duty to mitigate has been discussed.
138. As a way of introducing this topic, you can also ask: Can I apply her security
deposit to cover the unpaid back rent?
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enough to pay a judgment. Can I go into the place and rent it to
someone else?l39 If the market has gone up so that I could collect
$1100 a month from anew tenant, can I teU Tina that her lease is
over and that I am going to rent the premises to someone else?" Stu-
dents will want to explain this common sense result as a fonn of con-
tract tennination or rescission, unless the casebook or you explain how
the estate concept of property requires a reconveyance of the leasehold
from tenant to landlord and how the fiction of surrender by operation
of law satisfies that demand.
Reletting on the tenant's behalf follows from reducing the rent that
can be obtained on a reletting. If I get only $700 a month from a new
tenant, can I sue Tina for the $300 difference? How can I say she
owes that rent difference if we say h£r leasehold was surrendered to
me? If Tina's leasehold is stiU in effect, how do I explain that I am
renting it to a third party?
1. The Duty to Mitigate
The dangers of the reletting remedy serve as an introduction to the
question of mitigation. Can I relet for Tina's account if my lease does
not provide for it? Do I have to notify her first? Do I have to get her
consent? Can I remodel for the new tenant? Can I give the new tenant
a longer lease than Tina had? My attorney cannot categorically give me
certain advice as to what I can and cannot do; so, If a court decides
that I went too far in reletting and was not acting as Tina's agent,
what wiU happen? If the judge says that my acts worked a surrender
of her leasehold, what about her future rent liability? In light of that
danger, why don't I skip trying to relet on her behalf and just aUow
the premises to stay vacant for the next seven years, suing her for the
rent aU that time or as long as she remains solvent? We are back at
the rent remedy, but now approaching its availability to a landlord in a
jurisdiction that imposes a duty to mitigate damages.
139. There is also the threshold question of whether the tenant has truly abandoned
or is merely absent and delinquent. That matter can be raised by asking, What if
Tina's rent check was lost in the mail and she had not abandoned but merely gone
on vacation? Am I free 10 go inlo the place and remove the things she still has
there or 10 change the locks? To make the uncertainty more reasonable, Tina's tenni-
nation letter can be replaced by a sudden disappearance (and removal of some be-
longings) after a missed rent payment.
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I respond to my attorney's admonition that I am obliged to mitigate.
How much do I have to do to mitigate? Is it enough to put an adver-
tisement in the SunrJ,ay paper? Can I rent it out only after I take care
of the other vacancies in the building? Can I ask for the same rent
that I am asking for in the other units? Can I impose the same re-
strictions-e.g., no commercial activity on the premises-that I im-
posed on Tina?140 If I try to relet and fail, can I recover the costs in-
curred?
In terms of sanctions, If I do not relet Tina's premises, what wiU
happen?141 WiU I have to prove that I could not find a replacement or
wiU she have to prove that I did not try hard enough? If the judge
finds me at fault, wiU I lose the entire rent or just the amount I
should have saved by mitigating?142
C. Transfer of the Leasehold
Assignment and sublease can be treated as an aspect of mitigation.
While discussing what I must do to mitigate my loss, I tell my attorney,
I have been contacted by Trent, who told me that Tina told him to see
me about taking over the premises now that they are empty; if I refuse
to let him move in, wiU Tina be able to say that I did not properly
mitigate my loss? When Larry tells me that I must accept Trent (unless
I have legitimate objections to him), I counter, But my lease says Tina
cannot assign without my assent, and doesn't the law say that I can
unreasonably withhold that assent? The tenant's right to assign and the
140. The casebooks rarely cover use restrictions, although Kurtz includes some
problems on them, but such restrictions are certainly common enough in the real
world. The topic can also be introduced in the context of being asked to consent to
an assignment or sublease involving a different use of the premises.
The latest edition of Cribbet includes Piggly Wiggly Southern v. Heard, 405
S.E.2d 478 (Ga. 1991) on the question of whether a duty of continuous operation is
implied against a tenant operating under a percentage lease. That topic would also go
here.
141. Another aspect about this policy can be raised by asking, Can I include a
provision in the !etule stating that I do not have to mitigate? Can there be a provi-
sion stating that one Surulay advertisement is suJficient? How about a clause to the
effect that it is up to Tina to find a replacement? The connection between this last
question and the next topic of assignments is plain.
142. This leads naturally to an analysis of a damage remedy (rent reserved less
rental value) as opposed to a rent remedy, since a mitigation component is inherent
in the damage formula. Thus, in California for instance, where there is a statutory
measure of damages following a tenant's abandonment, the landlord who is not offi-
cially forced to mitigate might as well do so since what could have been collected is
subtracted from the rent reserved-whether the landlord actually relet the premises
or not.
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landlord's duty to mitigate become merely different perspectives on the
same issue. 143
When there is no duty to mitigate, the right to assign becomes an
issue in its own right. This issue can be raised through questions to the
tenant's lawyer. If we are in a state tlmt does not make me mitigate I
can let the premises remain vacant if Tina has to quit early . ...
Laura, in negotiating Tina's lease with me, do you want her to be able
to transfer it to someone else if she has to leave? What do you want
the lease to say on tlmt issue? Would you recommend tlmt Tina pay
an extra $25 a month to get tlmt clause included in the lease? How
much is it worth? For Laura to suggest any price is bad lawyering on
her part, since she should know that a leasehold is freely alienable
unless the lease says otherwise. Just as was said before with a tenant's
demand for a clause terminating the tenancy on destruction in a juris-
diction where that is already the rule,l44 a good lawyer appreciates
what does not need to be demanded because she knows that the law
already provides it to her client.
To deal with no-assignment clauses, the focus returns to the landlord,
since he is the one who will suffer if the lease is silent on the issue of
transfer. If the proposed clause was "badly" drafted--e.g., refers to
assignments but not subleases, or vice versal45-I ask, If I demand
tlmt the clause go in the lease, Laura, would you advise Tina to ac-
cept? Mer someone has pointed out to Laura that the clause does not
prohibit subleases, I ask her, How will you structure a transfer from
Tina to Trent to make sure it is a sublease rather tlmn an assign-
ment? Is it enough to just label the document a sublease if Trent is
getting the entire balance of the term? Is it enough to Imve him pay
his rent directly to Tina or to make it a higher rent tlmn she pays me
or to Imve her reserve the right to evict him if he fails to pay her?146
143. The other side of this point can be raised by pointing out that, with regard to
transfers, the tenant does not need to have a clause forcing reasonableness on the
landlord when the landlord has a duty to mitigate. In that case, a sensible strategy
for a tenant whose proposal to transfer has been turned down by her landlord would
be to abandon and then propose the same transferee as a way of mitigating damages.
144. See discussion supra and text accompanying note 136.
145. If the student's clause is too well drafted, I may ignore it and propose my
own ineffective clause to Larry: What if we insert a clause saying "Tina may not
assign without my written consent?"
146. The question of whether Trent or Tina should prefer a sublease or an assign-
ment should be raised only if covenants running with the land is discussed as a part
of the landlord/tenant relationship. Even then, it comes up more realistically as a
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A second line of discussion deals with my right to withhold assent to
an assignment. Does the clause we drafted force me to be reasonable?
Do I have to accept Trent if I don't like his looks? Can I say that I wiU
accept him only if I get a share of the higher rent he is paying Tina?
The landlord's right to be arbitrary, the enforceability of rent recapture
demands, and the relationship to a duty to mitigate damages are rciised
by these questions. 147
The right to be arbitrary is also an appropriate place to introduce fair
housing and tenant selection questions: l48 Can I reject Trent because
he is black? Gay? Jewish? Disabled? Poor? Accompanied by a minor
child? Intending to live in sin with his girlfriend? What can happen
to me if I turn Trent down for the wrong reason and he complains to
the authorities?149 It is also a suitable place to cover use restrictions
in the lease: If Tina's lease limits her to (or prohibits her from) using
the premises for a law office, can I insist that Trent be similarly lim-
ited? By the way, was I entitled to put that kind of limitation in
Tina's lease? The two topics tie together by asking If Tina's lease pro-
hibits children, can I reject Trent because he has afamily? Can I evict
decision for a landlord to make in deciding whether or not to approve a transfer. See
irifra note 147.
147. The running of covenants in leases can be raised in the context of the land-
lord deciding whether to give the required consent under a no-assignment clause: If I
do permit Tina to transfer to Trent, slwuld I teU her that I want him as an assign-
ee or as a subtenant? Which is better for me? If I let Trent sublease and no one
pays the rent next month, can I sue him? If I can't sue him, can I evict him? If
he takes by assignment and no one pays, can I sue Tina? The converse aspects can
be raised by saying to Trent's attorney, If I don't care whether there is an assign-
ment or a sublease, do you? Which arrangement slwuld your client want if he is
concerned whether I wiU Iwnor my covenants in the lease (e.g., not to rent to a
competitor)? Asking Tina's attorney if Tina should care raises the point that an as-
signor remains responsible, even if the assignee assumed the lease obligations.
148. The tenant's right to share her apartment with a roommate can also be taken
up here.
149. This is traditionally covered by having students prepare an action in favor of a
rejected tenant against a discriminatory landlord. This is much less productive as a
teaching technique because: (1) it does not bring the attorney into the picture until
after the transaction is over, making the real estate lawyer a litigator rather than
counselor; (2) it eliminates all the opportunities for reshaping the client's behavior
into a pattern that attempts to both comply with the laws and satisfies his needs; (3)
it eliminates all the hard ethical questions from the transaction-filing suit against a
greedy landlord with God on your side is nowhere near as challenging as attempting
to persuade a fee-paying client to alter his rental practices and still retain you as his
attorney. Forcing the students to confront how they will deal with clients who ask
them to do things they do not like may compel the professor to play the role of the
unprincipled client, but serious coverage of professional responsibility may require
that you make the podium more than just a pulpit from which to make easy exhor-
tations for morality.
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Tina if Trent and his children move in with her? Can I evict them if
Trent marries her, moves in, and then they have a child?
Finally, there are the consequences of a wrongful assignment. What if
Tina transfers to Trent without getting my consent or despite my
legitimate objections to him? Can I sue one of them for damages?
How much wiU I get? Can I make Trent move out and force Tina to
return? Can I terminate the lease? Can I raise the rent?
D. Holdovers
Although the holdover tenant is the exact opposite of the tenant who
abandoned early, the fact that the landlord has an election of remedies
in both situations causes many students to confuse the two and to mis-
apply rules from one case over to the other. l50
1. As Trespasser
The remedy of eviction is the simplest and most intuitive option.
Tina's lease ended last week, but when I went by the premises to clean
it up, I found that she was stiU there. I want her gone. Can I caU the
police and have them make her leave? Can I go in and throw her out?
This discussion begins with the civil and criminal consequences of
self-help and forcible entry. If I do break in, can Tina do anything
besides caU the police? Can she sue me for damages? How have I com-
mitted a trespass if it is my property and her lease has ended? If she
wins, what wiU she get? Can she claim damages for mental distress
as weU as moving expenses?
There are also other forms of conduct having the same effect to be
explored: What if I wait until she has gone out and then go in and
change the locks? If the door is not locked, can I just push it open?
Can I shut off the electricity? What if I just stop paying the electricity
biU?
The dangers of self-help are an obvious lead-in to the legal remedies
available for removal of a wrongfully possessing tenant. Larry, if I hire
you to get Tina evicted, how are you going to do it? Are you going to
bring one of those ejectment actions covered in adverse possession that
150. This is especially common when there is a factual overlap, as where the land-
lord elects to treat the holdover tenant as a new periodic tenant who then quits
without properly tenninating the new tenancy. (Such a situation is not the place to
begin if the goal is to help the students keep the pigeonholes separate.)
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takes several years? Is there anything faster? Summary dispossess
proceedings then involve a review of the relevant materials in the case-
book.
In determining whether such proceedings can be brought against
Tina, the point should be made that most evictions are brought against
nonpaying tenants who become holdovers after an appropriate notice
was sent. Must I send a notice to Tina demanding that she pay rent or
quit, in light of the fact that her lease ended and I do not want to let
her stay on-even if she is willing to pay rent? When is a notice to
quit required, and when is not?151 Is that notice the same as the no-
tice of termination ofperiodic tenancy we covered earlier? These ques-
tions lead to an explanation of the initial difference between the rent
defaulter and the holdover,152 as well as the differences between the
kinds of notices. Once the students have mastered the role of notices in
terminating tenancies, they should appreciate that any tenant still there,
after the termination of her tenancy, is a holdover tenant-regardless of
whether termination occurred naturally or because of a default. 163
Next, we focus on the summary dispossess action itself. After you
have sent the proper notice, what kind of lawsuit will you file? How
will the lawsuit get the property back to me faster than an ejectment
action would?" Discussing these questions should cover the nature of
this special proceeding, the statutory techniques designed to expedite it,
and tenant strategies for prolonging the litigation.
The question of monetary relief highlights the special status of the
holdover tenant. If I win, will I only get possession back or will Tina
also owe me money? How much? Will I recover the unpaid rent for the
time before the tenancy ended? Will I recover for her continued posses-
sion thereafter? How much will I get if I can show that I could have
151. A further distinction can be made, if appropriate, between an alternative notice
to pay rent or quit and an unconditional notice to quit following a noncurable
breach.
152. If students are already familiar with the common law doctrine of independent
covenants in leases, then some explanation is needed as to how a landlord is entitled
to ingore his covenant of quiet er\ioyment merely because the tenant has failed to
honor her rent covenant (in the absence of a lease clause making the tenancy sub-
ject to a condition subsequent of rent default).
153. This is similar to the tenant who becomes a periodic tenant for anyone of a
number of reasons.
Here is where you can also introduce some banlauptcy law. Section 362(a)(3)
automatically stays eviction proceedings if the tenant files in time, and § 365(a) lets
her trustee thereafter assume or reject her unexpired lease. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(3),
365(a) (1988). A good introduction and background to this topic (and to "banlauptcy
mills") can be found in In re Smith, 105 B.R. 50 (C.D. Cal. 1989). In California, "un-
lawful detainer assistants" have gotten popular enough as to warrant special statutory
regulation and passing mention in my class.
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rented the premises for twice as much to someone else if she had quit
when she was supposed to? Is it rent or damages I am getting? Once
her tenancy expiredl54 and Tina had not left, was she a tenant or a
trespasser? Reversing the numbers raises troublesome variations on
this issue. If I evict Tina for nonpayment but then cannot rent out the
premises to someone else,155 can I recover anything from her for the
fact that her lease stiU had seven years to go? What if I heard her say
that the rent was too high, and that she was intentionaUy going to
stop paying in order to get herself evicted and thereby freed from hav-
ing to pay?l56
2. As New Tenant
The other half of the holdover picture is introduced by expressing
dissatisfaction with the eviction remedy and seeking other options. If I
don't know whether I can find another tenant who will pay as much
rent,157 are there any other remedies available to me? Can I make
Tina stay until I find a new tenant? Can I do this even though my
lease doesn't say so?
The answer, that I do have such power, triggers questions about the
nature of the new relationship between us: It is now the tenth of the
month; how long wiU she have to stay? Can I make her stay next
month too? Suppose I want her out after that; could I do that? Or,
What will she "have to do to terminate this new tenancy? Can she move
out at the end of this month? When can she move out? Does she have
154. This expiration may occur by natural expiration of the lease tenn, proper no-
tice in a periodic tenancy, or failure to comply with a three day notice after a de-
fault.
155. Or I can relet only at a lower rent.
156. There can also be questions as to the finality of the judgment, the tenant's
right to seek relief from it, and how that affects the tenant's willingness to resist:
Suppose Tina withlwlds rent from me on the ground that . . . and I sue her and
prevail, can she then offer to pay the withheld rent and keep from being evicted?
Tina, if you get into a dispute with me over how much you are supposed to pay,
how likely are you to refuse to pay the amount demanded if the consequence of a
lawsuit could be not only a judgment that you owe the difference, but also that
your tenancy is terminated?
157. Or, Because the premises weren't available when her old lease was supposed
to end, I lost my intended new tenant and now I don't know if I can find another.
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to send me any notice first?l58 If she does just move out at the end of
this month without giving proper notice, what can I do about it?
The nature of tenancy at sufferance is raised through questions about
the tenant's liability for past wrongful possession. If Tina is forced to
stay, do I coUect rent or damages for her possession? How can she owe
rent for the past ten days since it is omy today that I might decide to
declare her a tenant rather than a trespasser? If I decide to have her
evicted instead, would she owe ten days damages rather than ten days
rent? Until I make up my mind on what to do, is she a tenant or a
trespasser?
There are many subsidiary issues that can be included as part of this
decision-making. One is waiver: If I cash the rent check that Tina sent
me for this month, can I stiU elect to have her evicted? Can I elect to
make her stay even though I did not cash (or she did not send) the
check for this month's rent? A second consideration is the freedom to
change positions: If I sent Tina a notice to quit159 and she didn't do
so, can I change my mind and decide to make her stay instead? A
third issue is the function of inconsistent terms in the original lease or
in statements made by the landlord before or after the end of the tenn:
Can I do this even though the lease says that any holding over is at
double rent for the time she holds over? If she advises me that she
might not be able to move out on time at the end of the lease, 160
should I reply that holding over wiU be at double rent? If she is al-
ready holding over, can I teU her that the rent is doubled as of now?
As of next month?
3. The Effect on an Incoming Tenant
A landlord's duties to new tenants can be treated as one consider-
ation in dealing with a potential holdover tenant. How should my
choice about Tina be aJjected by the fact that I signed a lease with a
new tenant (Newt) to take effect the day her term ends? If I make
Tina stay, or let her stay because she is offering more than the new
rent I would coUect from Newt, can he sue me? Students may initially
think the answer depends on whether the American or English rule
applies, ignoring the fact that it is the landlord's act that has made the
new tenant unable to enter. The scenario fits those rules when the
158. These questions are especially appropriate if the topic began with a periodic
tenant's blundering attempts to tenninate her tenancy.
159. Instead, either party could have previously sent a notice tenninating a periodic
tenancy.
160. This is where you can also cover the threshold question of whether a holdover
has really occurred if the tenant has merely slept over one extra night or left a few
suitcases on the premises.
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question is revised to ask, If I tell Tina that she cannot stay, but she is
stiU there when Newt's lease takes effect, can he then sue me?
This can also introduce the obligation of quiet enjoyment. If Newt
has moved in and Tina later returns and kicks him out, am I liable?
What obligations do I have to protect my tenants from outsiders (and
neighbors)? Alternatively, it can lead to questions of any implied duty
of continuous operation on the tenant by asking If I go to all this work
to get Newt into possession, can I be sure that he will have to stay the
entire term and not quit early, even though he is willing to pay the
rent? If his rent is calculated as a percentage of his gross sales? If he
is the anchor tenant in my shopping center?
E. Condition of the Premises
The issue of premises that are defective or in disrepair or out of
compliance with the law (for which I shall frequently use the shorthand
of "broken") depends upon more variables than students are usually
able to hold in their minds at anyone time, making good organization
in coverage imperative. By way of introduction, I tell the class that an
outcome may depend upon:
1. what is broken (e.g., a window, a light, or the building itself)
2. how it broke (conduct by the tenant, by the landlord, act of God
or government, or just old age)
3. when it broke (before or after the tenant moved in)
4. what sort of premises are involved (commercial or residential)
5. whether the lease covers the problem (e.g., covenants to repair, to
insure, or to comply with code requirements)
6. what remedy is sought (cost of repair, termination of tenancy, rent
withholding or reduction, damages for personal injuries).161 This
is the variable around which the classes are organized.
1. Repair Costs
The "cost" remedy (making the other party pay the repair bill) is the
simplest one to begin with and introduces the question of basic duties
as to repairs. Tina just called me to say that her closet door62 is bro-
161. Be prepared for the fact that, no matter how assiduously the students write all
these variables down, most are forgotten the moment a concrete question is asked.
162. This example is indicative of a component whose disrepair does not render the
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ken; she wants to know whether I am going to fix it or whether she
should have it repaired and deduct the cost from the next rent
check. l63 Can she do that, Larry? Larry's appropriate response-which
may need to be prodded out of him-is to ask me about the variables
just listed. In answer to such questions, I disclose that the premises are
commercial, that the lease is silent as to repairs, and that I did not
break the closet door. As to when it broke, I don't know, but does it
matter? Suppose it was broken before Tina moved in. Was I warrant-
ing the condition of the premises to her?!&! What if the door broke af-
ter she moved in?
Mer forcing a grudging admission from my attorney that a landlord
has no general common law liability for either pre-existing or subse-
quent disrepairs, the tenant's possible converse duty is explored. If I do
not have to fix the door, can I teU Tina that she has to repair it her-
self, and if she doesn't, I wiU send someone over to do that and add
the cost to her rent? Students often seem shocked at the notion that
neither party may owe any duty to the other to pay for repairs in the
absence of "special circumstances," such as changing some of the vari-
ables. l65
Permissive waste is introduced by changing the broken item from a
closet door to a window or roof. Does that mean that Tina does not
have to take any steps to keep my floors and carpets from getting ru-
ined when it starts to rain if aU it takes is putting a board over a
broken window!66 or a bucket under a leak? The time variable can be
explored as a subissue of permissive waste. What if the roof leaked
before Tina moved in, but she discovered it only when it started rain-
ing? Does she have to put a bucket under it in that case?167
premises untenantable or risk future waste.
163. It does not hurt to show how a tenant's deducting the repair bill from the rent
is economically equivalent to sending the bill to the landlord for payment.
164. Since some of the old cases in the casebooks state that the landlord has no
liability even when there is an affinnative concealment of a pre-existing defect, it
may be necessary to mention the modern liability rules for fraud and to exclude that
issue from further consideration for the time being by asserting that there was no
active concealment. Such discussion should be brief because liability for nondisclo-
sure is much better when raised as an aspect of personal iI\jury damages.
165. For instance, if I broke the door, I might be liable to Tina the same as any
third party tortfeasor would be (ignoring the tenant's limited interest in the damaged
property). Conversely, if she broke the door, she would be liable to me under a the-
ory of active waste.
166. Unlike the closet door, the window is a component whose continued disrepair
can generate significant further damage (via rain coming in). Thus, failing to board
up the window might be waste, whereas failing to repair the closet door would not
be.
167. This can be treated as the baseline condition: neither party has a direct duty
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From this duty-free starting point, one can ask how much freedom
these parties have to create duties for one or the other. Can I agree
with Tina to make repairs in return for a higher rent? If I do, does
that mean she does not have to board up (! window in a rainstorm?
Conversely, If Tina covenants to repair, wiU she have to fix the closet
door if it was broken before she moved in? If the entire building is
destroyed in an earthquake or hurricane, wiU she have to build a new
one? WiU she have to remove aU of the asbestos in the waUs if the local
building department comes up with new rules requiring that?l68 WiU
she have to widen the bathroom doors for wheelchair access if the
Americans With Disabilities Actl68 requires it? Does she have to
make major structural changes? How should the clause read if I want
to be sure she does have to do aU these things? Finally, If she has cove-
nanted to repair, and does not, when do I sue her for breach-now or
at the end of the term? Can I use her security deposit to pay for the
repairs?
The last major variable on this question is brought in when the pre-
mises are converted from commercial to residential and the same issues
are considered. How much does a repair-and-deduct statute change
what you previously told me, Larry? Is the statute limited to preexist-
ing defects? Does it exclude disrepairs caused by Tina? How often can
Tina assert this right, and how much can she deduct each time? Can
she and I negotiate a different arrangement (and must it be in any
certain form to safely escape the statute)? What about disrepairs not
covered by the statute?
2. Termination
The students already know that (for commercial premises) destruc-
tion of the premises does not terminate a tenancy since that topic has
already been covered. They can also readily reason that if there is some
disrepair that neither party is obliged to correct, then neither can use
to repair, but the landlord has a duty not to commit fraud and the tenant has a duty
to avoid waste.
168. It is appropriate to include in the reading materials any local environmental
regulations which relate to landlord-tenant questions and to discuss the effect of a
covenant to comply with all laws.
169. Subsections of Title 42 of the United States Code should be assigned, but the
real landlord/tenant issue involved-whether the tenant can elect not to comply with
the Act (or any new environmental regulations), quit the premises, and be excused
from further rent-eomes up later. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), (b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v) (1988).
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the other's failure to repair as a ground for terminating the leasehold.
The students will also see, when residential premises are involved, that
repair-and-deduct statutes give a tenant the alternative right of quitting,
and thus terminating, the tenancy. Other areas need more discussion.
With regard to repair-related obligations imposed on the tenant, the
question, If Tina does not lwnor her covenant to keep the premises in
repair or commits waste, can I evict her or am I limited to suing her
for damages? introduces the doctrine of independent covenants. If I
want to be able to evict in such cases in the future, what slwuld my
leases state? will remind the class about estates subject to condition
subsequent.170
Constructive eviction is introduced by asking, If, on the other hand,
the lease contains a covenant that I am the one wlw must make re-
pairs, and I do not lwnor it, can Tina quit or is she limited to suing
me for damages? Since students tend to ignore the substantive require-
ments of this doctrine in their enthusiasm over the remedy afforded,
those matters are reached by saying I just double checked the lease, and
I do not have to make repairs or even supply heat in the winter; there-
fore, if I don't do anything, what do I have to fear? How can Tina
claim that I breached my covenant of quiet enjoyment if I had no
underlying duty in the first place?17I The dangers of the remedy (and
a review of abandonment) are brought up by asking Tina's attorney, If
Tina thinks that she has been constructively evicted, what slwuld she
do? If you teU her to quit, and it later turns out that I was not at
fault, won't she have wrongly abandoned? What wiU her liability be in
that case?l72
3. Rent Withholding (Receivership, Implied Warranty, and Rent
Control)
Unlike constructive eviction and repair-and-deduct statutes, rent re-
ceivership statutes and the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability
170. If the summmy dispossess statute pennits eviction for waste, then the covenant
of quiet er\ioyrnent has already been made dependent and nothing more needs to be
done (except to make the students perceive that it is unnecessmy to draft a clause
in the lease stating the same thing).
171. When the students grasp this point, it will probably make them forget-and re-
quire you to remind them-that a repair and deduct statute moots the issue entirely
for residential premises.
172. Retaliatory eviction can be added as a footnote to this discussion by treating it
as a penalty to the landlord for terminating the tenancy of a tenant who has made
or demanded repairs. Other doctrines dealing with tenant departure rights, such as
illegality or frustration, implied warranty of (commercial) suitability, or illegal lease
can also be covered here if they were raised in the book or deemed important by
you.
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save a tenant from having to move out when the landlord does not
make required repairs. These concepts are explored in terms of the
potential dangers they present to a noncomplying landlord. 173
Receiverships are considered by asking: A member stood up at our
last landlord's meeting and said that the tenants in his building went
to court and had a rent receiver appointed; can Tina do that to
me?174 If one is appointed, does that mean the tenants can just stop
paying rent? Can the receiver make repairs I do not want made? WiU
I get any funds meanwhile? If I do make the repairs, wiU I get aU of
the back rent that was withheld? (Even if aU withheld rents are to be
unblocked after repairs are made, how wiU J make my mortgage pay-
ments in the meantime?y75
Implied warranty is rife with issues, both as to mechanics and eco-
nomic effects. If, instead, Tina asserts the implied warranty of habit-
ability against me, what happens? WiU she sue me? If she stops pay-
ing rent, can't I bring eviction proceedings against her? WiU she be
aUowed to clutter up my summary dispossess action with a defense of
uninhabitability? While the action is pending, wiU she have to pay the
rent to anybody? What wiU she have to prove to prevail in that action?
Can I defend on the ground that her lease says that she took the pre-
mises "as is" or that she promised to keep them in good repair? Can I
show that I told her about the defects before she signed the lease (or
that the defects appeared after she signed the lease)?
The economic effects of implied warranty are illustrated by the fol-
lowing questions: What happens if the judge finds that I did breach the
implied warranty? WiU I get any rentfor the past? How much? If the
rental value of the apartment is $1000 with hot water and $750 with-
out it, how much wiU I get if I was only charging her $750 a month
(or less) anyway? If the judge merely sets the rent at the rental value
($750 in both cases), is there anything to worry about? If the judge
instead subtracts $250 from the $750 I am charging, I wiU surely fix
the boiler, but won't I be able to then raise the rent to match the rental
173. Logically, these two remedies would best be explored and compared by making
them available choices for the tenant, who has her attorney counsel her as to their
respective merits. But that puts the questions somewhat beyond your control (unless
you have scripted them for an alert student to ask).
174. This question considers whether Tina is the right kind of tenant with the right
kind of grievance under the relevant statute.
175. This is an obviously rhetorical, rather than substantive, question to be asked in
order to make sure students appreciate the economic impact of rent withholding.
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value of a hot water apartment (or to cover the cost of replacement)?
Can I then evict Tina if she can't atford to pay the new increased
rent? Since a new boiler wiU atfect aU of the apartments in the build-
ing, can I also raise the other tenants' rents? What if they say they
would rather have lower rents and cold water than higher rents and
hot water?
Rent-increasing repairs present a natural lead in to rent control. Can
I decide to repair the boiler (or replace it with solar panels) and raise
aU (periodic) rents, even if Tina hasn't sued me? Even if the other
tenants have asked me not to do so? Under our local rent control ordi-
nance do I have to get the approval of the rent board in order to make
these improvements?
If rent control has not been mentioned before, it requires some pre-
liminary introduction before the issue of repairs and rent increases is
actually discussed. Is Tina's apartment subject to the rent control ordi-
nance? What about the vacant apartment next door? The store down-
stairs? The bedroom occupied by a lodger in my single family house?
My luxury apartment building across town? The apartment building I
may build across the street next year?
Each of these questions can be considered in its broader political and
economic context. Renee, as the tenant representative on the city
counselor rent board, do you think that there should be control of
commercial premises? Of lodgers? Of new construction? Al, as the
representative of other real estate owners in town, how wiU your peo-
ple behave if Renee has her way?176 If single rooms in private houses
are controUed, wiU owners stiU rent them out? WiU investors and spec-
ulators stiU build apartment buildings?177 If future construction is
exempted, wiU they change their minds?
Vacancy decontrol, just cause eviction, and condominium conversions
are corollary aspects of rent control. Renee, do you want the rent con-
trol ordinance to cover vacant units? Are you worried about what
might happen otherwise? How do you propose to prevent landlords
from evicting tenants in order to raise rents? On what grounds wiU
you permit them to evict?178 Al, if you don't like having your apart-
176. These questions are put to a student, rather than answered by me, in order to
resist the accusation that it is not merely the sinister law professor-landlord who
might respond adversely to rent control restrictions.
177. All these questions ask whether housing supply is elastic. You can explore the
elasticity of demand by asking, Tina, if your rent is substantially increased, lww
will you handle it? Will you take in a roommate, move to a smaller apartment, go
back lwme, or give up taw sclwol?
178. When termination of periodic tenancies was originally discussed, students may
not have appreciated that the entire concern was the form of the notice of termina-
tion and not its substance, i.e., the reasons for terminating. Only in rent control (and
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ment buildings subject to aU of these regulations, can you think of a
way of getting out from under them? Renee, how do you propose to
stop Al's people from converting their buildings to condominiums,
converting them to commercial use, or just demolishing them?
The mechanics of calculating a controlled rent are also provocative.
How do I determine what my base rent is? If I raised rents last year
just before the ordinance took effect (after I read in the papers that it
was coming), can the rent board roU them back? Can I have the rents
increased by showing that I am losing money every month? (If so, can
I assure a loss by getting a new mortgage with higher monthly pay-
ments?) Is a fair return on investment calculated on what IoriginaUy
paid for the building, what it was worth the day before the ordinance,
or what it is worth after the ordinance?
Finally, rent control is tied back in to housing disrepairs. Do I have to
continue fixing the building if rent control has eliminated my profit?
Can the rent board punish me for lowering my costs by not making
repairs or reducing existing services? If I do make repairs, wiU the
board permit me to pass on those costs to the tenants? What about
repairs not ordered by the rent board or demanded by the tenants, but
made because I want to upgrade my building; can I get approval to
raise the rents because of them? Can the tenants stop me from im-
proving my building?
4. Tort Liability
Liability for personal injuries resulting from unrepaired premises is a
critical financial consideration, because a one million dollar injury can
result from a one dollar defect. Legally and academically, this is more
of a tort than a real estate issue and is easier to teach from the per-
spective of a personal injury attorney dealing with an injured plaintiff
than as a real estate attorney advising a landlord how to avoid potential
liability, since most issues are best handled by comparing landlord lia-
bility with tenant (possessor) liability in tort. All the variables can be
covered together if we assume that George, a guest of Tina, has been
injured (e.g., scalded by hot water from a faucet in her apartment) and
retains Peter as his personal iI\iury attorney.'79
retaliatory eviction) contexts does that become relevant. One can discuss here wheth-
er a landlord should ever be permitted to tenninate an existing tenant who is not in
breach and is willing to pay market rent or to match other offers.
179. Laura and Larry remain as Tina's and my attorneys.
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In good personal injury fashion, Peter should consider suing every-
body who might be liable, in this case, both tenant and landlord. Peter,
is Tina potentiaUy liable? What would the Torts professor say about a
possessor's duty of care to an invitee? If you allege that Tina was
negligent with respect to George, wiU you at least get to a jury (and
therefore be able toforce Tina's attorney to talk settlement)?
Can you say the same about me, since I was not in possession of
the apartment? Peter is forced to fit me into one of the exceptions to
the general rule that a landlord is not liable, in order to keep me in the
lawsuit. As a good personal injury attorney he should go through each
of the exceptions to see whether he has (or can find) the facts to put
me within one or more of them. Of course, that requires a consider-
ation of all of the theories of landlord tort liability. ISO
a. Latent Defects
Peter, can George recover from me under the latent defect exception?
What facts do you need to fit me there? If I can show that I had no
actual knowledge that the water was too hot, am I safe; or can you
contend that I should have known that fact?IBl Larry, if I can be sued
in such cases, what should I do about defects that I am aware oj? Do I
have to repair them, or is it enough if I inform aU the tenants? Is it
sufficient to teU them now, even though their leases are already in
effect? If I warn the tenants, does that protect me against their guests,
or do I have to warn the guests too? If Tina discovered the condition
on her own and caUed me to complain about it, is a warning stiU
necessary?IB2 Does my duty cover subsequent defects or only those in
existence prior to leasing to Tina?
The nature of the latent defect principle is brought out more clearly
by testing its effect on Tina's liability as a possessor. Peter, if this was
a latent defect that I had not disclosed to Tina, does that automaticaUy
insulate her from liability to George on the ground that she didn't
180. For each of these exceptions, a shadow set of questions should be asked (or
covered by lecture) as to what would happen if the victim was also the tenant rather
than a guest.
181. Specifically, did I have a duty to inspect? Students want to make landlords
automatically liable for defects if they either lrnew or should have lrnown of them.
This converts the exception from fraud (nondisclosure) to negligence. The distinction
between a duty to disclose conditions you already lrnow and a duty to inspect for
conditions you do not lrnow comes up both here and in the vendor-purchaser con-
text.
182. A tenant might be able to terminate the tenancy because the landlord belatedly
informed the tenant about a concealed defect. Termination, however, is not the issue
here.
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krww of it, or can you argue that due care required her to inspect the
premises more thoroughly before aUowing her guest to turn on the
water? Once Tina did know (whether by me informing her or by find-
ing out on her own), was her duty to George to warn him or to fix the
faucet before letting him use it? If she is liable to George for negli-
gence, does that mean I am not liable to him? If I am liable for rwn-
disclosure, can she also be liable for negligence?
b. Common Areas
This is an equally fertile exception. Since the water came out of the
faucet inside Tina's apartment, is the common area exception useless
in this case? What if you can show that the water was heated by a
central boiler or controUed by a central thermostat? Why does a
nonpossessing landlord become liable for injuries that arise in com-
mon areas or from common facilities? To compare this exception with
the latent defect exception, I ask my attomey: Larry, what if I didn't
krww about the defective boiler? Why do I have to inspect the common
areas when you told me earlier that I didn't have to inspect Tina's
apartment for latent defects? If my inspection reveals a defect in the
boiler or common haUway, is it sufficient for me to merely warn aU of
the tenants about it? How about a sign in the haUway saying ''Look
out for broken steps"? What if I put a covenant in my lease obliging
Tina to keep the common areas in good repair?l83 Is it sufficient to
inspect the common areas at the beginning of the lease, or do I have to
look for subsequent defects too? Tuming to the tenant's liability, Laura,
if George was injured by a common facility or in the common haU-
way, is Tina also liable? Did she have a duty to warn him about a
bad step in the outside stairs or hot water from the common plumb-
ing?
c. Dangerous conditions to outsiders, including public places of
public admission and furnished roo'rns
The previous questions lead to the exception for dangerous condi-
tions to persons outside the premises. Peter can you fit George within
183. Somewhere along the way, the class should recognize the inability of parties to
delegate away their general tort responsibilities and the difference between exculpa-
tion and indemnification. If Tina's repair covenant doesn't insulate me from liability
to George, will it at least let me recover from her whatever I have to pay George?
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this exception? Why must the accident happen outside rather than
inside the building? Why must he be an outsider rather than an insid-
er to be in the protected class? On behalf of the landlord, Larry, why
am I liable for these matters? Does my liability for external dangerous
conditions extend to problems that arise after Tina rented the premis-
es? Can I get out of liability by warning Tina about the defect or by
having Tina covenant to take care of these matters? (WiU that make
her liable to George? Would she be liable to him otherwise?) Would I be
liable to Tina, if she was the one who got hurt? If Tina is the one who
broke the faucet, do lowe George a duty to fix it? To force her to fix
it? These same questions can be reformulated to fit the related excep-
tions for places of public admission and rentals of furnished rooms.
d. Contracts to repair
Peter, what evidence do you need to fit George under this exception?
How can you get past the fact that my promise was to Tina, rather
than to George, to repair the faucet? What if Tina never notified me
that the faucet needed fixing? Can you sue Tina on the ground that
once she knew of the defect, she owed George a duty to make me fix it
or at least to warn him not to use it until I did fix it? Does my con-
tractual duty to repair eliminate Tina's tort duty of care? What if I
had no repair covenant, but I promised Tina that I would repair the
defect anyway?lPA
e. Code Violations
This important exception can be derived from the prior one. Peter,
can you impose a duty on me to make repairs if there is no covenant
in the lease? Can the building code supply such a duty? Is George a
member of the protected class, which can recover for personal injuries
arising from noncompliance with the code? What if no building in-
spector ever told me to repair. the boiler? What if Tina is the one who
caused the premises to violate the code? What if her lease obliges her
to repair code violations? Can you use the implied warranty of habit-
ability as the source of a duty owed to George, or is that limited to
Tina? Is Tina liable to George for code violations?
184. Alternatively, What if the lease imposed the duty to repair on Tina, but I had
nevertheless agreed to peiform the repair in this case? If that works as a defense,
what if I always put such a provision in my leases, not because I really expect my
tenants to make repairs but in order to escape liability for personal injuries result-
ing from disrepairs?
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f Negligence and strict liability
Peter, if you cannot fit me within any of these exceptions, can you
argue that the courts of this jurisdiction should adopt the new stan-
dards of simple negligence or strict liability, which some other states
now impose upon landlords? Larry, if that comes true, what will I
have to do to protect myself? WiU it be sufficient to inspect apartments
only when they are vacated? If I see disrepairs, can I avoid fixing
them? Can I pass the repair costs on to the tenants through higher
rents?
g. Assaults on tenants and guests
This theme can be assimilated under some of the previous rules, but
has enough special features to warrant separate treatment. Suppose
George was injured in an assault while visiting Tina Peter, to recover
from me, must you show that the injury occurred in a common area?
Must you show that I had promised tenants that the building was
safe, or that I had created a false sense of security there? Must you
show that I knew the neighborhood was dangerous and did nothing
about it? Can you sue Tina? What if the assailant was Tina or her
dog? Am I liable if I knew that Tina had dangerous propensities or
owned a pit buU? Do lowe tenants and their guests a duty not to rent
to drug dealers or pit buU owners? Do I have a duty to evict them? Do
I have a duty to inspect to see if that is happening?
These last questions often make students uncomfortable. When an
accident has already happened, they naturally want the landlord to be
liable to the injured party. But they are no less naturally reluctant to
require the landlord to take precautionary steps to avert the outcome-
such as inspecting premises, prohibiting certain activities, and rejecting
or evicting certain types of tenants.
Ill. CONVEYANCING
Many first year Property courses do not cover this topic;l85 when it
is included,l86 it is often treated as a miniature Real Estate Transac-
185. Berger's casebook candidly states his belief that conveyancing does not belong
in basic Property (and devotes only 100 pages at the end of his 1200 pages to it).
Donahue and Chused should say the same, since they are both similarly skimpy,
confining this topic to about 10% of their books; Singer is even stingier, with only 80
of his 1300 pages devoted to conveyancing!
186. Most books allot 200 to 300 pages, with Rabin (350 of 1100) and Cribbet (450
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tions course. 187 In addition, it is difficult to distinguish-except for
page counts-between the coverage conveyancing gets in the Property
casebooks and the Real Estate Transactions casebooks. l88 This section
of the Article can be applied to either kind of treatment.
Coverage here is organized in the usual fashion: an overview of the
legal issues that crop up along the way as one moves from the initial
stages of dealing with a broker, negotiating a sales contract, closing es-
crow, obtaining title insurance, and finishing with the subsequent dis-
covery of hidden defects (including toxic contamination), with mort-
gage and income tax considerations plugged in along the way.
Pedagogically, conveyancing is easier to cover than most other topics
in the course. Unlike landlord/tenant, conveyancing involves no real
economic imbalance between the parties, no lengthy contractual dura-
tion requiring complex regulation, and no initial hostility between the
parties to interfere with voluntary cooperative behavior. l89 History
plays too slight a role to force much concern on old livery of seisin
procedures, and there seem to be no serious economic or philosophical
considerations involved in most aspects of this topic. Most of the learn-
ing is on a "how-to" basis.
To give a consistency to the topic the same two students should be
buying and selling the same house every week. All supporting roles
(brokers, escrow agents, etc.) and all other variables (price, location,
etc.) should also be uniform.
The Decision to Purchase a House
For poor and young students, the thought of buying a house may be
as remote from their experience as the concept of a fee tail special.
Thus, it is useful to soften the impact of this new topic by edging into
it. Pearl, you just won the lottery (or inherited some money); what do
you think about using the money to buy a house? Laura, can you
counsel Pearl on this question, or is that question entirely outside the
knowledge of a lawyer? Perhaps a lawyer is not really the person Pearl
of 1450) at the generous end. Goldstein puts conveyancing at the front of his book
while both Kurtz and Rabin put it at the end. Conveyancing is sufficiently different
from the other elements of a Property course as to fit almost anywhere.
187. Donahue treats deeds and recording as distinct from modem land transactions,
separating them by estates and concurrent ownership. All of the other books keep
the entire topic together.
188. Indeed, Nelson and Whitman, in the Preface to their Real Estate Transfer, Fi-
nance, and Development casebook, state that its first six chapters could be used for
a first-year, three-unit conveyancing course. See GRANT NELSON & DALE WHITMAN,
REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVEWPMENT (4th ed. 1992). That is probably
also true for Berger and Johnstone's Land Transfer and Finance. See BERGER ET AL.,
LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 1993).
189. This often makes it a kind of bread and butter practice for lawyers.
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ought to see about this question, but it is one commonly put to attor-
neys. Opinions can be solicited from the entire class, What are the pros
and cons of home ownership?
Some student will mention the tax advantages of ownership, and two
advantages are worth translating into comprehensible notions for inex-
perienced first-year student tenants: 100 (1) mortgage interest and prop-
erty taxes are deductible, whereas rent is not;191 and (2) the house
may appreciate in value over the years, but none of that financial gain
is taxed until it is sold later (or never, if the house is held until death).
Other students will volunteer nontax economic considerations, such
as the traditional general appreciation of real estate vis-a.-vis the dollar,
the advantage of (fixed-rate) mortgage payments against generally rising
rental payments, the different effects of making improvements to prop-
erty one owns rather than to property one rents, and the end results of
twenty years of mortgage versus rent payments.
You can get other students to name downsides to ownership. There
may be a deflation of real estate values, which destroys equities and
makes Pearl wish she had rented instead. Her funds might have been
better invested into a vehicle that would generate periodic income to
her, rather than one requiring periodic mortgage payments on top of
her down payment investment. Pearl's future may be too uncertain to
warrant settling down at this time. While it is nice to be free from a
landlord's power over one's lifestyle, Pearl may not be ready to handle
the responsibilities of having to care for property. She may not have the
funds to make a down payment (which can lead to consideration of
government devices for alleviating this problem).
Finally, to raise issues of policy, Do the rest ofus care whether Pearl
buys or continues renting? Nora, as a homeowner, would you rather
have Pearl owning or renting the house next door to you? Are you just
being emotional and prejudiced in thinking that owners take better
care of their property than tenants do? Pearl, would you be more like-
ly as a tenant or as an owner to want to improve or repair or main-
tain the house? How do you feel about improvements to the general
neighborhood? Do you welcome them if they wiU gentrify the area and
190. A separate class on tax considerations of property is described later. Insofar as
real estate acquisitions are so tax driven, however, it is not inappropriate to begin
conveyancing with that topic.
191. Imputed income is probably of equal importance, but seems to be better under-
stood as part of the tax topic than here. See irifra notes 299-309 and accompanying
text.
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make rents rise? Is that why Congress gives tax incentives to owners
and not to tenants?
A. Real Estate Brokers
Since most of the legal issues relating to real estate brokers are con-
tracts and torts questions, it is understandable that a view of the Prop-
erty course as one concerning the rules that are unique to land and
other assets would omit this topic. On the other hand, since any com-
prehensive review of the law affecting real estate transactions inevitably
goes outside those lines, concentration on the most common (and most
litigation-prone) participant in those transactions is certainly appropri-
ate. 192
The most common legal relationship involved here is when the bro-
ker acts as an agent of the vendor. Since class so far has focused on
the purchaser, there should be a transition from her to the person who
owns the property that she will ultimately purchase. Pearl, now that
you have decided to buy, how should you begin? What about walking
down the street and knocking at the door of any house that appeals to
you to see if it is for sale? Since that is wasteful compared to looking
only at houses that are already for sale, it makes sense to ask how
owners effectuate their decisions to sell. Suppose that Van decided to
seU his house (because he got a job transfer, or a bigger family, etc.);
Van, how are you going to go about seUing? WiU you just post a for
sale sign on the property or wiU you go to a broker? What do you
think a broker can do for you? This question is intended to lead to a
consideration of the value of using such "middlemen" in these transac-
tions.
1. Function and Qualifications
Even if Van pleads that he is simply too inexperienced to sell on his
own, he could read a book or get help from friends rather than pay a
broker. Brad, you are a broker. 193 What can you do for Van that
192. This topic receives extremely disparate treatment in the casebooks. Browder
. and Donohue do not cover broker matters at all, except by way of a little text
Dukeminier and Rabin have only some disclosure cases elsewhere in their books
which incidentally involve brokers. Casner, Chused and Johnson each have one case
(commission issues in Casner and Johnson, and negligence in Chused). The remaining
books each contain two cases. On the other hand, it is a large topic in most of the
Real Estate Transaction casebooks.
193. The student who is Brad should not actually be a broker because that will
force you to spend too much time disposing of the misinformation with which he is
probably filled. Class is more interesting when pure beginners are designated to play
the roles of both broker and seller.
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makes it worth it for him to hire you? Make a sales pitch to Van. Ulti-
mately, and with help from others in the class, Brad ought to be able to
contend that a broker can: (1) save the seller time by performing servic-
es that he would otherwise have to do himself (especially in screening
out nonserious buyers); (2) enable the seller to get a better price by
virtue of his expertise in the field; and (3) assist the seller in making
important decisions by virtue of being a loyal ally (fiduciary).l94
The broker's qualifications come up next. Brad, what entitles you to
caU yourself a broker? Do you have a license? How did you get it? Do
you need to have a license to work for Van? If the reading materials in-
clude a statutory or judicial definition of brokers, class can examine
whether or not the activities Brad intends to perform constitute
broker's activities and thus require a license.
. In terms of earning the license, the point to bring out is that Brad
had to pass some kind of examination, which means that he had to
learn some real estate law. Van, what do you (or the rest of the class)
want Brad to have learned in order to be an effective broker? Should
Brad's exam be like the bar exam in Property, that is, do we want him
to know real estate law? Should it cover construction? Surveying? Fi-
nance? In addition to education, there are probably other statutory
requirements for good character and competence, which Brad must
meet. This leads to the point that brokers are subject to a regulatory
agency that supervises their behavior and can revoke their licenses
when they misbehave (and when customers complain about them).195
The licensing requirements surely increase costs and force brokers to
charge more than nonbrokers. Thus, Van may be able to fmd someone
else to do the same work for him more cheaply. Asking, Brad, how do
you propose to fend off such unfair competition? should lead to cov-
erage of the general requirement of having a license in order to collect
a broker's commission. 1OO The finder's exception is raised by asking,
194. You can observe that the public has apparently accepted these arguments,
since most sellers use brokers.
195. Along the way, the professor can add background terminology. Sally, working
in Brad's office, is a salesperson rather than a broker because she may have taken
an easier exam than he took. Both of them may call themselves "agents." Brad may
call himself a "realtor" if he has joined the National Association of Realtors and has
paid his dues. It is also worth mentioning, if you know, the extent to which attor-
neys in your jurisdiction can act as brokers by virtue of their own licenses (and
collect commissions rather than fees).
196. To this you can add that a nonbroker may be prohibited only from suing to
recover an unpaid commission, but can keep any compensation already received. Is
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Does that mean none of the rest of us can do anything (for hire) to
help Van? Would it be iUegalfor Van to agree to pay me $1,000 if I
find someone interested in buying his house and merely introduce the
parties to each other? Do finders need licensing as much as brokers
do? How should we separate finders from brokers?
2. Commission Agreements
The listing agreement is an excellent vehicle for analyzing the servic-
es a broker will perform and the compensation he will receive under it.
To get to it, we move to the broker's office. Brad, when Van comes in
saying he wants to seU his house, what are you going to do first (be-
sides asking a lot of questions about the property)? The first signifi-
cant step should be to have the owner sign a listing contract. If the
reading materials include one, Brad should use it; otherwise, he should
draft such an agreement. 197
Class should now focus on the effect of the listing agreement. Van,
don't sign it until you have had Larry review and explain it to you.
Larry, what kind of agreement is this?198 A likely response is that it
is a sales contract, which triggers the question, Is Brad reaUy agreeing
to buy Van's house, like a used car salesman does? If the answer is
that it is a contract for Brad to sell Van's house for him, you want to
know, Van, do you expect that Brad wiU caU you up one day and say
that your house has been sold, and that you should move out?l99 Van,
if you don't want to give Brad the power to seU your house on his
own, what is it that you do want him to do? The goal is to make the
class realize that we are talking about an employment/agency contract,
not a conveyancing contract or even a contract that authorizes the
agent to execute a conveyancing contract. The contract is merely one
that authorizes the agent to solicit offers to purchase the property from
that sanction severe e'lWugh, or is it too severe? How is the public served by pro-
hibiting Van from making an enforceable agreement with a nonbroker if he knows
that is the case and wants to do so anyway?
197. A fonn listing has the advantage of including additional clauses that are useful
for covering other aspects of brokerage law. Bruce, Chused, Goldstein, and Johnson
all contain such fonus.
198. It is even better to first send Van to Brad's attorney for a review of the listing
agreement, to see if she recognizes the conflict of interest involved and handles her-
self accordingly. In re Lanza, 322 A2d 445 (N.J. 1974), included in Goldstein, Haar,
and Kurtz, involves a comparable problem in the buyer-seller context and makes ex-
cellent background material for this issue.
199. Goldstein actually includes a case on this point (citing Forbis v. Honeycutt, 273
S.E.2d 240 (N.C. 1981)). The fonn listing that Goldstein uses gives the broker the
"right to sell at a price to which 1 consent· Does that empower a sale without fur-
ther consent if made at the asking price?
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the owner.2OO As such, it is not automatically subject to all the real es-
tate rules, such as the statute of frauds provision covering conveyances
of real property. The contract may require a writing only if the statute
has been enlarged to cover such contracts.201
Finally, as a way of examining the broker's duties under the listing:
Laura, would your Contracts professor caU this a unilateral or bi~t­
eral contract? If you can't teU from looking at it, what does Brad prob-
ably want it to be? Would he want a unilateral contract, which Van
could revoke at the last minute? Since this is Brad's form, is it likely
that it would create that danger? To be a bilateral contract, Brad must
promise something; what should that be? If he promises to seU the
house for Van and then fails, would that be a breach? Can you have
Brad promise something he can surely and safely perform? What is
Brad's real obligation if he promises to use his "best efforts" or "act
diligently" on Van's behalf?202 Van, is that good enough for you? Do
you think Brad's promise means that he is obliged to advertise in the
Sunday paper or to hold open houses? Laura, if Brad does absolutely
nothing after taking the listing, what can Van do about it? Can he sue
Brad for lost potential sales or is he limited to firing him?203
200. This analysis may be at odds with what the caption of the document (e.g.,
"Exclusive Right to Sell") implies.
201. Other questions to ask when a writing is required are: Brad, if you can't get
Van to sign a listing, can you still claim a commission uruler a part performance
exception if you actually do procure a buyer? Didn't you learn about the statute of
fraud.s in order to get your broker's license? If so, slwuld you be allowed to plead
part performance (or waiver or estoppel) as an excuse for noncompliance with the
statute?
In addition, there are these optional minor points, which may be covered now
or later: Laura, if Van refuses to pay Brad his commission because the listing was
not signed, can he at least sue Peart for teUing Van not to pay him (and thereby
intentionaUy interfering with an advantageous relationship)? If Van does pay Brad,
can Brad refuse to Iwnor his agreement with Sheila (the slwwing broker) to split
the commission with her if that agreement was oral?
202. Goldstein's form states that the consideration is listing the property. -Johnson's
form states that the consideration is putting the property into the multiple listing
system. Bruce's form is the most imaginative, making the consideration $1, using the
Multiple Listing Service (MLS), and agreeing to "try to find a purchaser."
203. You can also ask, If Van seUs the Iwuse himself, can he refuse to pay Brad a
commission? but the students may not be able to answer that question yet.
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a. Earning a commission
Brad, what promise do you want Van to make to you? If Brad an-
swers that he wants Van to sell when he (Brad) finds a buyer, you re-
spond, Do you reaUy care if Van seUs his house, so long as you get
paid? After the class appreciates the essence of this contract-an agent
promising to render services and the principal promising to pay com-
pensation for them-the class can discuss the various ways a commis-
sion may be calculated and whether the commission is negotiable or
fixed (and subject to the antitrust rules).204
3. Ready, Willing and Able Purchaser
Van, when wiU you have to pay any commission that Brad earns?
The intuitive answer that he need pay only when the deal closes is
probably at odds with the language of the listing agreement.205 By us-
ing a form that requires payment as soon as a ready, willing, and able
purchaser has been procured,206 you can begin with a discussion of
that concept as a baseline (and postpone consideration of the other
compensation provisions of the contract). Larry, if Van has not yet
signed the listing, is that provision acceptable or should Van insist on
changing it? The answer depends on how the provision operates in
different situations.
Suppose Brad procures Pearl, who offers to pay Van's entire asking
price in cash (and has the money to do so)? What are Van's obliga-
tions? The phrasing of the question is intentionally ambiguous and
204. Haar includes Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), on this point.
This is also an appropriate place to discuss any other protective restrictions that
state law may impose on listings, especially residential ones. In California, for exam-
ple, our code requires that some listings include a tennination date. CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 10l76(f) (West 1987).
It is also worth comparing the listing form used in class against the statutory
requirements. There is a fair chance that it will not comply, and you can discuss
what to do in that case.
205. Tristram's Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 327 N.E.2d 727 (Mass. 1975), which recites the
contrary rule, is the most common case in the books on this issue. Five of the
books use the case. Kurtz has Dworak v. Michals, 320 N.W.2d 485 (Neb. 1982), which
says the same. Only Johnson has a case that follows the traditional rule, Fearick v.
Smuggler's Cove, 379 So. 2d 400 (F1a Dist. Ct. App. 1980), which adds coverage of
tortious interference with contract, but is terribly brief. Although Tristmm's Landing
sets forth both the ml\iority and minority rules (as well as the factual alternative of a
special contract), students too easily read it as setting forth a ml\iority rather than a
minority rule; the case is better covered after the traditional rule.
206. The listing agreements in both Bruce and Johnson are so worded; the forms in
both Chused and Goldstein appear to require a sale as a condition to earning the
commission.
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often produces the answer that Van must now sell his house to
Pearl.207 The students must get accustomed to dealing with two differ-
ent legal relationships simultaneously: (1) the existing contractual rela-
tionship between Van and Brad, which may obligate Van to pay a com-
mission, and (2) the unfonned legal relationship between Van and
Pearl, which enables him to turn down her offer to purchase. If Pearl's
offer makes her a ready, willing, and able purchaser, Van owes Brad,
even though Van is free to reject Pearl's offer.
Suppose Pearl offers $1 less than what Van was asking for? The
significance of this variation is that, in addition to being free to reject
Pearl's offer, Van can reject the offer without owing Brad a commission
because Pearl is not a willing purchaser. But suppose Van decides to
accept Pearl's offer? also has the dual consequences of leading to a
sales contract with Pearl and earning a commission for Brad. This is
true, however, only as of the date Van's acceptance converted Pearl
into a willing purchaser.
Suppose that Pearl offers to pay Van's fuU asking price, subject to
the condition that she seU her own house first (or qualify for a bank
loan, etc.)? If the response is that Brad has earned a commission, then
What happens ifPearl is then unable to seU her house (or qualify for a
loan)? Someone should recall the concept of conditional contracts from
their Contracts class to help on this question. Then, What if Pearl is
able to seU her house (or get the loan)? goes to the last variable, when
the commission entitlement arises neither from the offer nor the accep-
tance, but from the subsequent elimination of the condition.208
This line of questioning leads to What if Pearl later changes her
mind and refuses to go through with the deal; does Van owe Brad a
commission?209 In light of the foregoing, this fact should be irrelevant,
since a commission has already been earned. Tristram's Landing, how-
ever, now becomes appropriate.210 Larry, is there any reason for Van
207. Students forget that Pearl has only made an offer to purchase and that nothing
in the law of contracts requires that offers must be accepted, even good ones, or
that Van's promise is only to pay Brad a commission, not to sell his property. Nor is
it likely that the parties intended Pearl to be a third party beneficiary of the listing
agreement.
208. A fourth possibility-an offer that is both lower and conditional-needs little
more than a mention after the main three possibilities have been covered.
209. The text of the listing will complicate matters if it states that payment may be
delayed until the contract closes. Such a statement will require you to distinguish
between a delayed time for payment and a condition precedent to payment.
210. See Tristram's Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 327 N.E.2d 727 (Mass. 1975).
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to refuse to sign Brad's listing if Tristram will overrule it? Is this
property subject to that rule? Is Brad free to negotiate a different ar-
rangement (e.g., like the arrangement that the majority rule gives
him), if the contract is explicit and refutes any implied contrary ar-
rangement? Is loss of commission (rather than loss of license) the best
way toeriforce this public policy? Conversely, Suppose this is com-
mercial property and Tristram's Landing does not apply, is Van free.
to negotiate a different arrangement? How should the listing be
amended so that Van need not pay Brad unless and until Pearl com-
pletes her purchase?
a. Procuring cause
Laura, what about this provision in the listing that provides that
Brad gets a commission if the property is sold by him, Van, or any-
body else?211 Will you explain that to Van? If we delete that provi-
sion, what would Brad have to do to claim a commission? Procuring
cause is at issue and, by switching to an open listing, hypotheticals can
be put to measure that concept. If Pearl first noticed the house while
driving to work because Brad's sign was on it, but she didn't do any-
thing until after his listing had expired, was he the procuring cause?
Suppose she didn't even start thinking about buying it until then
(when she won the lottery)?212
Finally, as a prelude to raising agency questions, multiple listing ser-
vices and cooperating brokers can be brought into the picture. This can
be done by challenging the value to Van of an exclusive listing: Brad,
does it help Van to have you as his only broker? Is this likely to pro-
211. To cover the point this way, the listing obviously needs to be an "exclusive
right to sell" or an "exclusive agency."
212. If the listing contains a clause protecting the broker as to later sales made to
prospects with whom he had earlier negotiated, further questions can be asked: Is
Van giving away anything by leaving in this clause? Wouldn't Brad earn a com-
mission anyway for a later sale to anybody he had procured? In fact, isn't Van bet-
ter off with this clause included, because it seems to tet him avoid paying a com-
mission by waiting out the safety period before agreeing to seU to Brad's customer?
Then, when the provision seems silly, Suppose Brad talked to Peart but had not done
enough to be caUed her procuring cause; in that case, is Van better or worse off
under the clause if he seUs to Peart? Then, after that seems to give a reason for the
clause, But since Brad's listing is exclusive, is there any need for him to show that
he was the procuring cause anyway?
You may also call attention to any provision calling for payment of a commis-
sion under other circumstances, such as when the property is withdrawn from the
market. Is that provision valid, or is it an unenforceable liquidated damage or pen-
alty clause?
This is also a place to note the distinction between "exclusive right to sell" and
"exclusive agency" listings.
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duce the best price? Wouldn't he be better off hiring several brokers to
find a buyer for him? Someone will point out that if Brad has an ex-
clusive listing and puts it into the multiple listing service it will be seen
by all the other brokers and shown to their prospects, thus providing
maximum exposure for the listing.213
4. Agency
Agency issues are best raised through focusing on the cooperating
broker. Suppose this is how Pearl was found: Sheila, a broker, met
Pearl several months earlier at an open house on a property she~
listed; thereafter, Sheila drove Pearl around every weekend to show her
new houses coming on the market. Sheila saw Van's house in the mul-
tiple listing service and showed it to Pearl; she then helped Pearl pre-
pare her offer for Van's house, which Brad presented to Van. Sheila,
can you advise Pearl to reduce the size of her intended offer Van's
house? Who is your principal?214 Who is paying you? As Van's sub-
agent, is it your duty to get the lowest price for Pearl or the highest
price for Van? Did Pearl know that you were working for Van when
you and she were discussing how much to offer for his house?215
Dual agency and dual legal representation logically follow. Brad, if
Sheila were not involved could you be Pearl's agent as weU as Van's?
Can you serve both of them fairly? (Should you advise a higher or a
lower price?) Larry, as a lawyer, what would you do if Van and Pearl
both came to you and asked you to draft the contract or to supervise
the closing for them?216 Brad, how can you do what lawyers are not
aUowed to do?
5. Liability
The purpose of the following questions is to raise the different theo-
ries under which sellers (as principals) and buyers (as third parties) can
sue brokers.217 Sellers are easier to begin with. Larry, if Brad gives
213. The economic advantage to both the listing broker and the showing broker can
be observed by asking each of them-once a showing broker has been named in
class-what they expect to payor be paid from tills arrangement and why that is
satisfactory to them.
214. Peart, do you think that Sheila is your agent or Van's agent?
215. If the state has an agency disclosure law, this is when to discuss it.
216. In re Lanza, 322 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1974), is in many of the casebooks and is ex-
cellent on this issue.
217. Along the way, there can be appropriate modifications when the broker is the
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Van bad advice-like not advising him to have Pearl sign a mortgage
for the price218-can you make Brad pay for Van's loss? On what the-
ories can you pin liability on a broker? Is there anything in the con-
tract Brad didn't do or did wrong, which will enable you to sue for
breach of contract? Did Brad breach any of his fiduciary duties to
Van? Did Brad owe a duty of care to Van? What is the standard of
care: simple or professional negligence?219 If you contend that Brad
should have told Van to get a mortgage from Pearl, can't Brad argue
that would have been practicing law without a license? What should
Brad do when Van asks him to explain what a mortgage is or asks
him to prepare one?220
Laura, suppose Brad's actions harmed Pearl-or suppose Brad did-
n't tell her that the house had termites221---does Pearl have the same
theories available as Van? Can she sue for breach of contract even if
she had no contract with Brad? Can she sue for breach of fiduciary
duties (if he was not her agent)?222 What would you need to prove to
make out a case offraud? Did Brad have an affirmative duty to speak
if he knew about the termites?223 If Brad asserts that he didn't know,
buyer's agent or a dual agent instead.
218. This is the situation dealt with in Lanza, 322 A.2d at 445; therefore, that case
is an easy bridge to this issue by having the broker commit the malpractice rather
than the attorney.
219. Additionally, Does the fact that society required Brad to pass an exam in
order to get his license mean that he should be held to a comparable level of compe-
tence?
220. Bruce has Culturn v. Heritage House Realtors, 694 P.2d 630 (Wash. 1985), Haar
has Chicago Bar v. Quinlan, 214 N.E.2d 771 (lll. 1966) and Cribbet has State ex rel.
Indiana State Bar v. Indiana Real Estate Association, all of which have good discus-
sions of this issue (although Cribbet oddly puts this topic after vendor and purchas-
er). Wherever the class draws the line of practicing law, you can then test to see
how easy it is for Brad to stay on the right side of it. "Can he have the parties sign
anything? Can he fill in blanks? Can he use printed forms? Is he sate if aU of his
forms provide that they are subject to an attorney's approval?"
221. Alternatively, using Lanza, Could the buyer have sued the seUer's broker for
not warning him of the water problems on the property?
222. The concept of fiduciary duties can be treated separately, rather than as one
of several theories available only to the principal. A question that presents the issue
from both sides is, Suppose Brad gets Pearl to offer $500,000, but teUs Van that the
offer is only for $400,000, persuades him to accept it, and then pockets the differ-
ence. On what theory can Van sue him? Can Pearl use the same theory? What if
Brad was Pearl's agent rather than Van's?
Another issue to discuss is Van's right to cancel when Brad purchased the
property himself at the full asking price, but without informing Van.
223. Johnson and Kurtz both have cases involving broker fraud. However, Johnson's
case, Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 409 (lll. App. Ct. 1986),
appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d 129 (lll. 1987), is included in post-transfer remedies, rather
than under brokers. Dukerninier and Rabin both have sections on the duty to disclose
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can you argue that he owed Pearl a duty of care even though he was
Van's agent rather than hers? Can you argue Brad owed Pearl a duty
to inspect? SpecificaUy, can you argue what duties he owed to
Pearl?224
To get to the countervailing considerations of disclosure, Larry, what
should Brad do when he has adverse information about the property?
Should he teU Pearl voluntarily? What if he knows that Van has
AIDS.225 To get into broader social issues, Should Brad teU Van that
Pearl is black? Should he even show the hou,se to Pearl if Van said that
he wants to seU only to a white person?226
B. Vendor and Purchaser27
Real estate contracts begin their lives as offers. Learning about con-
tracts for the sale of land by the case method is misleading since appel-
late decisions inevitably involve the interpretation of already completed
contracts. Attorneys spend only a small percentage of their time giving
legal advice about what an already executed contract means; they
spend far more effort on creating the contract through formulating
offers, negotiating with the other side, and drafting appropriate clauses.
defects, which include Starnbovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (App. Div. 1991) (non-
disclosure by seller and broker that the house was haunted; Dukeminier includes a
photograph of the house), and Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1983) (non-
disclosure of previous multiple murders in the house).
224. Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ct. App. 1984), is California's unique
affrnnative answer to this question and is mentioned in several of the books, al-
though it is reprinted only in Chused. You can have the attorneys for Brad and Pearl
argue whether Easton should be accepted in your jurisdiction as a way of raising the
policy and scope issues involved.
If your jurisdiction enacted a transfer disclosure law, some of its details can be
reviewed here-at least in terms of the duties and sanctions imposed on brokers. The
rest must wait for discussion of vendor and purchaser issues.
225. This is a natural question to ask if the class has read Reed v. King, 193 Cal.
Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1983), which deals with the duty to disclose prior multiple mur-
ders. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
226. Blockbusting and racial steering can be brought up at this point.
227. Most casebooks cover this topic at the start of conveyancing. Goldstein almost
begins his entire book with this topic, but Rabin puts it after deeds, and Browder
puts it after deeds, recording and title assurance. In Haar, the authors spread it be-
tween several of these topics. Donahue covers this entire subject with only 13 pages
of text. If conveyancing is to be treated as part of modern commercial real estate
transactions, locating the vendor-purchaser topic towards the beginning of conveyanc-
ing perfectly fits its role in the real world, since the contract always comes first.
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Good real estate attorneys put deals together and do so in ways intend-
ed to avoid litigation and the hazards of judicial interpretation. This
skill requires full knowledge of the relevant rules. Thus, most class time
will be spent on helping the purchaser make an offer or helping the
seller to respond or make a counteroffer.
If Pearl is interested in buying Van's house, her broker will either
take her to an attorney or himself draft an offer for her to sign.228
Even when custom dictates that the contract be drafted by the broker,
he can advise Pearl not to sign it until her lawyer has reviewed it.
The legal issue of the necessity of a writing can be raised even before
Pearl consults with an attorney. Brad, why do you have to bother with
a complicated form; won't a telephone call to Van be just as good?
How about just having Pearl and Van get together and shake hands on
the deal? If you insist on a writing, how big does it have to be (really,
how small can we afford to make it), i.e., what are its bare essentials?
How precarious is Pearl's situation if she moved into the house fol-
lowing an oral contract? How precarious is her situation if she also
paid Van some of the price? Do those acts take the case out of the stat-
ute offrauds ?229
Most of the casebooks contain a form contract, providing an easy
starting place for discussion between Pearl and her lawyer.23o The fIrst
questions should deal with the function and role of this document. This
can be difficult for students, as it is often difficult for fIrst-time buyers,
because the heading or text may be misleading.231 Furthermore, stu-
dents rarely believe that their Contracts course has much to do with
228. If the point was not previously covered as part of brokers, you can ask wheth-
er Brad is practicing law when he fills out the fonn or explains it to Pearl.
Dukeminier has State v. Buyer's Servo Co., 357 S.E.2d 15 (S.C. 1987), which deals
with the general question of how much such assistance constitutes the practice of
law). See al.5o supra note 220.
Also, if not covered earlier, you can raise issues of legal ethics by having Brad
take both parties to one attorney to draft their contract and give them legal advice
to see how quickly that attorney spots the conflict of interest involved. In re Lanza,
322 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1974), is a case on this point In re Lanza is good here and in-
cluded in both Haar and Kurtz.
229. Most of the casebooks devote a little attention to these questions through a
case or brief text, although the statute of frauds is given an astounding 40 pages and
7 cases in Cribbet.
230. I found fonus in all books except Cribbet, Dukeminier, and Rabin. Donahue's
fonn is almost too short to use. Haar and Singer both have a short binder and the
full-featured agreement intended to replace it.
231. Specifically, it is misleading if it is labeled "Deposit Receipt" and its text be-
gins with references to the broker's receipt of a deposit. Some California fonus do
this, postponing any reference to the making of an offer until the end of the
multipage document
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the real world strategy of creating a contract. Laura, what wiU happen
if Pearl does sign this document? Does signing it mean that she has
bound herself to buying the property?232 If she has already signed it,
is it too late for you to do anything to change the situation?
.This last question is designed to bring out that this is an offer that
will lead to a binding contract if Van accepts it, but that Pearl can nev-
ertheless revoke or revise the offer before he accepts· it-even though
.she may have already signed it. Furthermore, Pearl's offer can say any-
thing she wants it to say. This is a difficult proposition for many stu-
dents to accept. They are so imbued the with principles of the interpre-
tation of fully executed contracts that they often believe that· Pearl
cannot demand some particular benefit because it is contrary to some
rule or is not reasonable. Students are more comfortable having a court
write the contract than in helping the parties to negotiate it.233 Laura's
job at this stage is not to fatalistically interpret the provisions of this
offer as if that were immutable, but to help Pearl determine whether
those provisions are good for her and where not to replace them. This
will be a class in.how lawyers help clients make offers.
The form employed will dictate the structure of much of the remain-
ing class time. The provisions that relate to marketable title,. risk of
loss, and remedies on default should be reserved for separate discus-
sion, but a quick run through of the other provisions can convey many
useful points. These matters can generally be discussed in the order
employed in the form, with some combining when helpful. The next
paragraphs mention a few of these matters.234
232. The actual offer in the California fonn usually appears only in the final para-
graph. See supra note 230.
233. The legal regime in residential leasing supports this attitude, allowing little
freedom for the negotiating terms. You can ask whether we, the public, care enough
about the terms of the contract between Pearl and Van (or think that one has. so
much more bargaining power than the other) as to impose the same kind of system
here.
234. Some provisions, such as those relating to escrows and prorations, may be ex-
plained fleetingly and then deferred until the class addresses that topic. If the con-
tract fonn also deals with payment of the broker's commission (as do all of the
casebook forms except Donahue's), you can examine to what degree that fonn
changed the arrangement created in the earlier listing.
With regard to title in the grantees, How should Pearl and her husband take
title? affords a refresher of the. previous coverage of concurrent ownership. (indeed,
that entire topic really boils down to the filling in of this provision.) Nominees and
rights to assign can also be covered here.
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• Deposit. The earnest money proVISlon is a good opening
gambit for escaping the tyranny of the form. Must Pearl make a deposit
just because the form has a provision for one? Can she make an offer
without accompanying it with a deposit? Should she? When the re-
sponse is that Pearl does have to do so, ask: What law says that offers
must be supported by deposits? Did your Contracts professor say that?
It may be the case that Van will not take a sporting offer seriously, but
that does not make the offer invalid or not in Pearl's best interests.
• Contingencies. Should Pearl make her offer conditional on
anything (e.g., qualifying for a loan, seUing her own house first, or
being satisfied the soil is not contaminated),?-35 Explain to Pearl
what could happen if the contract does not so provide and the condi-
tion does not occur. If Van does accept a contingent offer, do the par-
ties have a contract or not?236 What happens to Pearl's deposit if
there is a loan contingency and she can't obtain a loan? Can she get
out of the contract by never applying for a loan?237
• Personal property. WiU the dishwasher come with the
house? Does that apply to the toilet bowl as weU? What should the con-
tract say if you aren't certain whether something is a fixture or
not?238
1. Marketable Title
The clause in the form regarding the condition of title may be diffi-
cult to understand.239 Laura, what does this provision about condi-
tion of title mean? How essential is it? How much good does it do
Pearl? What if there were no such clause in the contract? Would Pearl
be better or worse off? All of the books have cases establishing that a
purchaser has a common law right to marketable title, so that the provi-
sion probably reduces rather than enlarges Pearl's rights. 240
235. As always, Laura must be admonished to get the answers from Pearl, rather
than deciding them herself.
236. Additionally, Has Brad earned a commission yet pursuant to his listing con-
tract?
237. Goldstein and Cribbet both have cases dealing with this question. Bruce has
four cases on offers subject to financing, but includes them in a section on financing
rather than in the section on contracts.
238. Rabin includes an entire chapter on fixtures.
239. Every casebook form has one or more provisions regarding the seller's title,
although with significantly different effects.
240. This episode also reinforces the point that an attorney has to first know the
rule in order to appreciate the significance of a contract provision and who benefits
from the provision.
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The elements of the marketable title doctrine can be analyzed
through a comparison of Pearl's rights under the contract with and
without the clause. For example, If the title turns out to be subject to
an easement, can Pearl complain about it if there is a clause? If there
is not a clause? What if the problem is that a name in the chain of
title was misspelled?
The usual form provisions requirement that the buyer must make a
timely objection can be used to illustrate the logic of flyspecking. Sup-
pose that a record search shows that some name in the chain of title
was spelled in different ways at different times; Laura, if Pearl isn't
personally bothered by that fact, is it all right to just let it go? What
wiU you say when Pearl later wants to sell the property and the next
buyer's attorney is not as liberal as you were? Should you start acting
as mean now as that next lawyer may someday do?
Considering the inefficiency of the options introduces the rationale
for marketable title. Laura, are you going to search Van's title for de-
fects before or after Pearl makes her offer? If you search before she
makes her offer, what happens to that expense if Van rejects the offer?
If you don't search until after it is accepted, what happens if you then
discover a title defect?241 How would you have to handle this if there
were no doctrine of marketable title protecting Pearl?242
Next, there is the practical application of the doctrine. Laura, what
if the title search you make (after Van accepted Pearl's offer) shows
that a neighbor has an easement over the property? The urge is to act
immediately through suing or canceling the contract.243 But if you
withdraw today what will happen if Van buys up the easement from
241. Here is another place where students know the rules but do not think to ap-
ply them. It is not uncommon for the same student to tell me, on the one hand, that
a purchaser has a right to a marketable title, and on the other hand, that Pearl
should examine title before she makes an offer so that she can withdraw if title is
bad.
242. The doctrine can also be explored from the buyer's or broker's positions.
Brod, if you know that Van's tiUe is subject to an easement, is there any sense in
obtaining an offer that calls for a marketable title? Is there a way to lock Peart
into the contmct and to not let her escape because of the easement? From a practi-
cal point of view, can you and Van afford not to know about the easement before
Peart makes her offer? If you know of the easement in advance, what do you do
about it in Peart's offer?
243. Laura may also propose suing the neighbor. This gives you the opportunity to
review interests that run with the land to detennine whether Pearl will be bound if
she completes the purchase.
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the neighbor before the scheduled closing? Who wiU be in breach?244
Should you do anything before the close of escrow? Can Pearl keep it a
secret and spring it on Van on closing day, in order to back out at
that time? What if the contract says time is of the essence?
Finally, What if on closing day Van says that he has almost worked
out a deal with the neighbor to cancel the easement. Can Pearl close
now and then later sue Van for breach of covenant of marketable title
if the easement isn't removed?245
2. Risk of Loss
The same kind of questions also work for risk of loss issues. Does the
form clause improve Pearl's position or should it be stricken?246
Pearl's lawyer needs to know whether her jurisdiction uses the majori-
ty, minority, or uniform rule as a background. The question can there-
fore be asked three times.
Because the majority rule is counterintuitive and works against Pearl,
Laura needs to explain its rationale to her. Laura, teU Pearl why the
risk of loss is on her, since it stiU is Van's house. The technical expla-
nation of equitable conversion seems arbitrary, and some justification
of it should be sought. The logic of the minority and uniform rules are
much easier to explain. Each is distasteful to one party or the other,
and his or her attorney should draft a clause reversing that situa-
tion.247
Students tend not to really appreciate what they mean when they
speak of allocating the risk of loss. What would happen ifPearl moved
in early (in a uniform state) and the house then burned down? The
temptation is to say that Pearl has the duty of rebuilding it, rather than
that she still owes Van the price. Raising the same issues when the risk
is on the vendor, What would happen if Pearl did not move in and the
house burned down before close of escrow?
244. If installment contracts are also being covered, it is certainly worth exploring
the plight of the purchaser in that situation. Although an installment contract is more
a mortgage than a contract, several books include cases on it in the ven-
dor/purchaser chapter.
245. Both Bruce and Haar cover this issue in their chapters on deeds. It certainly
fits there, especially as an introduction to title covenants, but it is also worth men-
tioning here.
246. There is a risk of loss provision in all of the form contracts except Browder's.
247. This not only lets the students treat it is a background gap-filling rule, but it
also provides an example of the usefulness of legal advice if Laura has to explain to
Pearl the consequence of taking possession early in a jurisdiction where the Uniform
Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act is applicable.
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There are related insurance questions: In which jurisdiction should
Pearl purchase fire insurance? Does Van need to keep his existing
policy inforce if Pearl buys her own policy? Should the contract state
who will carry the insurance? WiU such a provision amount to stating
that the insured party agrees to be the risk bearer? What happens to
the proceeds if Van carries insurance, but the risk of loss was on
Pearl? What if it was the other way around?
3. Defective Premises
The related, although less frequently covered, issue of discovering
defects in the premises during the escrow period can be covered
here. 248 Suppose, after the contract has been signed, Pearl discovers
that the electrical system is defective and calls you. What can she do?
Can she refuse to complete the deal? If so, on what theory? Did Van
impliedly warrant the condition of the house? If there is no general
implied warranty of quality in sales of real estate,249 on what basis
can Pearl withdraw? Did Van have a duty to disclose the defect to
Pearl?250 What if he didn't know about the defect himself? Did he
have a duty to look for defects prior to seUing?251
Derivative questions cover Pearl's need for contractual protection.
Laura, since Pearl does not have the same luxury of a postcontract
inspection of the property as she has with regard to the title, is there
anything she can do to protect herself when making her offer? In addi-
tion to the obvious advice to inspect first, Pearl might consider making
248. Questions relating to the discovery of defects after the close of escrow are
covered later in this article, since the legal issues are not the same. Browder in-
cludes Caceci v. DiCanio here, although the discovery of defects in that case oc-
curred many years after title had passed. Layman v. Binns in the Casner Supplement
does not even state whether the fight occurred before or after delivery of the deed.
249. In contrast, the rules applicable to leasing of residential premises, sales of
goods, and perhaps sales of newly constructed houses, do imply a warranty of quali-
ty.
250. Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla W85) (fraudulent concealment of a
leaky roo!), illustrates this point well and is included in both Dukeminier and Singer.
Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (App. Div. 1991) (a haunted house), provides
an even better illustration and is included in Dukeminier.
251. if there is a transfer disclosure statement statute in your jurisdiction, the ques-
tions should cover what rights the one purchaser has (against the vendor and the
broker) when she is given no such statement or one that fails to disclose a defect.
Additionally, nice comparisons between sellers' and brokers' duties regarding defects
can be made.
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her offer contingent on satisfactory reports from appropriate inspectors
or demanding a warranty from the seller.252
4. Breach of Contract
One way to introduce the issue of remedies on default is to return to
a situation where the seller is unable to perform, thereby eliminating
any significant benefit of the bargain damages. Laura, if Van can't per-
form on closing day (because his title is defective or because the house
was destroyed by fire where the risk of loss feU on him), what can
Pearl do? Is withdrawal her only remedy? Can she get her deposit
back? Can she recover damages over and above return of the deposit?
Is there any difference between English and American rule outcomes
when the property is worth less than the contract price? What must
Pearl prove about the value of the property to recover benefit of the
bargain damages for Van's breach? Suppose that Van withdrew be-
cause prices had risen and he believed he could seU to someone else for
more. What are Pearl's damages then? Instead of damages, can she get
specific performance of the contract?253
Consequences of a buyer's default should also include the liquidated
damage254 alternative. If Pearl is apprehensive that she may be unable
to complete the deal, should she include or delete the liquidated dam-
age clause in the contract? If Pearl removes the clause and defaults,
how much wiU she owe? Larry, how much wiU your client claim as
damages? How wiU you calculate them? What wiU Van have to prove
regarding the value of the property at the time of breach?255 If the
house has not faUen in value, can Pearl get back her deposit even
though she defaulted? Is there a risk that Van can bring a specific
252. Kurtz has Mallin v. Good, 417 N.E.2d 858 (TIl. Ct. App. 1981), on whether such
clauses survive the closing. This is an issue that can be raised here: If the contract
has a provision requiring Van to repair the wiring, can Pearl afford to close before
he has done so? Later, If Pearl has already accepted Van's deed, is it too late to sue
on unpeiformed clauses in the earlier contract? This same issue arises with regard
to title defects.
253. Cribbet, Goldstein, and Kurtz all have cases on the purchaser's measure of
damages; Rabin has an entire chapter on specific performance by the purchaser.
254. All except Goldstein and Donahue have liquidated damage clauses. in their
forms. Chused's form appears more to assume than to state one. See CHUSED, supra
note 3, at 789-92.
255. Students are uncomfortable having the seller testify that the property was
worth less than the selling price, because that sounds so much like fraud. Neverthe-
less, it illustrates an efficient breach. If Van was seUing a Iwuse worth $100,000 for
only $90,000, Iww much did he suJJer from Pearl's default? Isn't that the best thing
that could have happened to him? Is seUing the Iwuse for more than it was worth
different from Macy's seUing a camera for $100 when it paid only $60 for it?
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performance action against her'f56 What if the contract contains a
liquidated damage clause? WiU Van be able to keep her deposit even
though he reseUs the house for more thereafter?257 Can anyone argue
for Pearl that the clause is invalid? With luck, you can get students to
say that actual damages were not that hard to ascertain or that the
amount chosen (what Pearl paid so far) was not a reasonable forecast,
but was rather a penalty, which increased as Pearl perfonned more.256
C. Mortgages
All of the casebooks except Browder59 cover this topic.2OO The
authors are divided on putting the topic before or after deeds.
Transactionally, it can be viewed as the usual way by which the pur-
chaser performs her contract duty of paying the price to the vendor, so
that locating mortgages near contracts and deeds is appropriate. The
pedagogical inconvenience is that mortgage law is made more compli-
cated when mortgaging is made a part of a purchase transaction in
which the incipient mortgagor is not yet the owner of the property. The
purchase contract can serve as a lead in to mortgages, but it is easier
thereafter to separate mortgaging from purchasing property (Le., to act
as if the purchaser were already the owner of the security) and later tie
it all together. It may be better to start with some other property. al-
ready owned by the purchaser as the collateral: Suppose Pearl intends
to get the money to pay Van by borrowing on a piece of land that she
owns in the country, and she comes to me to ask for a loan. 261
256. Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag, 320 A.2d 194 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), is
applicable to this question and is in both Chused and Kurtz.
257. Rabin has an entire chapter on this point. Goldstein and Kurtz both have cases
on it.
258. This point certainly is worth mentioning if the course addresses installment
contracts. Even in the noninstallment situation, this principle should lead Laura to ad-
vise Pearl to consider the size of her deposit when the contract provides for liqui-
dated damages.
259. The omission from Browder is all the more surprising given that Nelson and
Whitman-our best lmown mortgage writers-are two collaborators in that work.
260. The usual page range covering this topic in the books is 10 to 30, although
Johnson gives the topic 50 pages.
261. You can also lead up to mortgages by first converting the sales contract previ-
ously reviewed into an installment contract. Lauro, suppose Peart lacks sufficient
cash to buy Van's property, but Van is in no h'urry to get the cash anyway; can
you redraft the sales contract to give Peart enough time to pay? Could they stretch
out the closing time from 30 days to 30 years? (Both Skendzel v. Marshall, 302
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1. The Lender's Perspective
Mortgage law is best understood by making students appreciate how
a lender or lending institution thinks and understand its desires and
fears, because it is those attitudes that drive the transaction and gener-
ate its consequences. When the loan is first made, the lender structures
the entire transaction and strictly for its own interests.262 Later, when
the loan is in default and there is litigation between the parties, the
lender's real antagonist is not the borrower but the judge or chancel-
lor-who sees the judicial role as one of redressing the initial imbal-
ance by creating superior equities in favor of the debtor in order to
deny the lender the ostensible benefits of its mortgage contract. Finally,
it is the lender's reactive steps to avoid future judicial intermeddling
that gives the situation its special dynamic. This overall perspective
comes out clearly from a brief re-enactment of the history of mortgage
law.
Larry, this is the first time I have ever been asked to make a loan,
so I need your advice.263 What risks do I run if I just give Pearl the
money she wants and wait for her to pay me back?264 I force my at-
torney to advise and protect me in numerous ways: First, he needs to
tell me to make Pearl sign a written promissory note rather than to
accept her oral promise of repayment.266 Second, he should warn me
N.E.2d 641 (Ind. 1973), and Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979)-the cases
most used in the casebooks-include the relevant numbers to illustrate the financing
features involved.) Do they need to change any of the other provisions to fit this
new arrangement (e.g., possession, installment payments, or interest)? Is a liquidat-
ed damages clause still appropriate? What if Pearl pays for the next 29 years and
then misses her last installment; can Van really take the land back (which has
probably appreciated in value) and also keep all that she has paid? Then, Could
Van do that if he had taken a mortgage instead? This is one place to cover install-
ment land contracts, but the transition to mortgages is jerky, and the real comparison
between the two devices will not occur for a long time.
262. As the stereotypically necessitous debtor, Pearl has no role to play at this
stage, except to sign the documents that are put in front of her.
263. Having surplus funds to loan, I can afford to hire an attorney, whereas the im-
poverished debtor cannot
264. My student lawyer usually prefers telling me, dogmatically, what steps to take
or e.g., get a note, get a mortgage-rather than warning me of what dangers I face if
proper steps are not taken. Consequently, it is necessary to challenge him at each
step as to what might happen if I do not follow his advice: What if I don't make
Pearl sign a note; won't my testimony that I loaned her money be enough? The
lender's overreaching behavior is more intelligible when one appreciates how much it
is dominated by fears of default and peljury.
265. Students will often confuse the statute of frauds-which mayor may not ap-
ply, depending on the length of the loan-with the evidentiary problem of proving
that a loan was made. I want my lawyer to caution me that a debtor who later dis-
honors her promise to repay me is also likely to deny that such a promise was ever
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that the note is not equal to payment if Pearl defaults because it enti-
tles me only to a judgment in court, which is not cash. Third, if Pearl
has no assets when I do obtain a judgment, I will have nothing to reach
by execution. Fourth (when I counter by asking Pearl whether she
owns property), he should point out that there is no guarantee that her
property will still be available for execution in the future if and when I
have to sue her.266 So, fifth, I need to fmd a way to assure that the
property that Pearl has now will be available later if she does not repay
the loan. Larry has to make Pearl give me some "security" by figuring
out how I can get my loan paid from Pearl's house if Pearl fails to pay.
Okay, Larry, in addition to making Pearl sign a note, I'll make her
sign another document saying that I get the house if she doesn't pay
the note. Will you draft it for me, please?
Since the point to be demonstrated is how the mortgage arose out of
the conveyancing rules then in effect, I will not let my student attorney
write a document that says "Pearl mortgages to Roger" because that is
too recent and sophisticated. What would you have said 500 years ago
before mortgages were invented?
This is less terrifying than it seems to the students, since the legal
system was simpler then, and we only need to comply with rules of
conveyancing and estates in land, probably already covered in class. To
satisfy the conveyancing requirements, the document must be a deed
because that is how parties transfer interests in land. With regard to the
appropriate estate, How about having the deed say, "To Roger when
and if Pearl later defaults on her note?" If the students accept that
idea, asking What kind of estate did I get? will usually get someone in
the class to figure out that it created a springing interest, which would
be invalid prior to the Statute of Uses.267
made, if she can get away with it.
Most of the casebooks do not have a form promissory note, and those that do
often have one that is more complicated than it need be. You can help your student
draft a simple, one sentence IOU, omitting all but the parties, the amount, and the
due. date, with wavy lines on the blackboard for all the "fine print" that other stu-
dents want to add. As for the due date, a one year flat note is easiest to work with
at this stage.
266. Other students may be able to warn that. in the meanwhile the house may be
destroyed, fraudulently conveyed, seized by other creditors or by the bankruptcy
trustee.
267. You can comfort the drafter by observing that, for most attorneys, the fa<;t that
the legal system complicates matters is often a cause for delight at the challenge it
presents (and the excuse it provides for charging higher fees).
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As is often the case, the lawyer has to be indirect; rather than having
the document state forthrightly what the client wants, he must instead
fit the transaction into the nearest existing acceptable pigeonhole. Can
you have Pearl convey an estate to me that the common law judges
wiU uphold? Someone will propose a fee simple subject to condition
subsequent, which you can get the proponent to draft by providing "To
Roger (now) but back to Pearl if she pays her debt on the date speci-
fied in the note. "268 Such a document creates an estate that the system
recognizes.
A lender wants economic protection as much as legal protection. The
document must not only be upheld in court, it must also make collec-
tion on default relatively simple and cheap. If I have Pearl sign this
document and then she doesn't pay the note when due, what wiU I
have to do to get her property? Much to his own surprise, my attorney
realizes that since a fee simple subject to condition subsequent enlarges
into a fee simple absolute automatically and instantaneously on de-
fault,269 I will not need to wait, nor go to court, to acquire the prop-
erty if Pearl defaults because it is already mine.270 The document is
effective as weU as valid?
Another advantage of the mortgage will serve as an introduction to
the equity of redemption. Suppose Pearl's payment was due on April
268. This is an odd condition subsequent, which the grantor (borrower) hopes will,
rather than will not, occur. Furthennore, its effect appears to make the lender the
immediate owner. When students make these observations, however, the response
should be to ask whether those features impair the usefulness of the estate from the
lender's point of view, since his perspective is the only one that his attorney should
take into account in the negotiations. And to students' protests against the unfairness
of such an arrangement, you must remind them that this is a history lesson being re-
enacted, and the fact is that lenders "retain" attorneys who look out for their inter-
ests exclusively in preference to those whose consciences get involved in the transac-
tions. Had loan documents been written to benefit borrowers, we would have
vifgages instead of mortgages today.
269. The impossibility of the condition subsequent (timely payment) to thereafter
occur is another reason for my lawyer to charge a high fee since his document
spares me the cost of rehiring him to collect later.
270. It is generally easier to treat the property as vacant during the life of the
mortgage. Possession can be considered if some student observes that an ejectment
action will be necessary to evict the mortgagor if she was living on the property.
You can ask that student the following questions: W1w is entitled to possession of the
property 'during the loan if the deed gave me a fee simple subject to condition sub-
sequent? Does the right to possession have any (financial) attraction to me if I al-
ready have a better house of my own to live in? Could I rent out Pearl's house for
the life of.the loan and keep the rent? Could I rent it to Pearl and thereby earn as
rent what I might have been barred from earning as interest under medieval church
law? These considerations only increase the desirability of the mortgage as a loan
device.
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1;271 what should I do if she caUs me on April 2 offering to pay? Is
there any reason not to accept the payment (other than Shylockian
malice)? What if the house is worth $100,000 and the loan is only
$60,000? Can I teU her it's too late? This potential windfall (which can
be built in to the deal through an appropriate loan-to-value ratio) con-
vinces me to accept the idea of a mortgage and to instruct Pearl to sign
one if she wants the loan.
2. Judicial Relief on Default
Now attention shifts from the loan execution stage to the default
stage. Laura, suppose the lender rejected Pearl's payment yesterday
because it was late and now she comes to you; is there anything you
can do for her~72 After Laura's pleas to me (as lender) for mercy
fail/73 Laura must decide to sue. Where wiU you file your case? A
common law court is sure to uphold the transaction, since aU of the
rules of that system were foUowed; you will have to find some court
where the judge doesn't abide by the common law rules. Is there such
a place? Chancery is the obvious answer to these rather forced ques-
tions (combined with a brief professorial explanation on the nature of
equity jurisdiction).
After deciding on the right court, the next issue is: What argument
wiU you make to the chanceUor? The student's temptation is always to
contend simply that the agreement is invalid on the ground of uncon-
scionability.274 Although technically inaccurate, this argument is more
or less what the chancellors stated when equity first began to intervene.
More useful is to get Laura to argue that the documents are not really
what they appear to be: that this is a loan transaction masquerading as
271. Use of a single payment note makes this point easier to illustrate; an install-
ment note requires an acceleration clause to get to the equivalent situation.
272. Laura can be told that she works for Medieval Legal Aid. Alternatively, the fact
that Pearl has funds (the rejected late payment) makes feasible her retention of an
attorney.
273. As lender, 1 prefer the windfall of retaining property worth $100,000 in lieu of
a $60,000 payment.
274. The debtor protection cases in the casebooks must be used with caution here,
since students tend to treat the doctrines stated there as timeless, which makes mort-
gage law much too static. Forcing the debtor's attorney argue for relief before the
chancellors decided to grant it automatically is the equivalent of making the lender's
attorney invent a mortgage before the system provided one, a process that still goes
on for both sides today.
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a conveyance, and that the relationship is really borrower-lender rather
than seller-purchaser. If fonn is disregarded in favor of substance, a
lender should not be allowed to keep the collateral if the borrower is
willing to pay the debt.275
The next question is: What relief do you want the chanceUor to give
your client based on your theory? The reflexive response is that title
should revert to Pearl, but it is easy to show that solution is too greedy
since the debt has not been paid. Laura must figure out that what Pearl
needs is judicial permission to pay after the date when the conditional
estate became absolute at common law. So you want a court of equity
to aUow Pearl to redeem herselffrom her earlier default, i.e., give her
a right to pay late?276
To appreciate the impact of the creation by equity of the right of
redemption, class attention should switch back to the lender's perspec-
tive. Larry, it is April 3 and Pearl has neither paid nor asked for
additional time; is the property mine? If you say that I am now the
owner, wiU you buy it from me for $90,000, a bargain price since its
market value is $100,000?277 How long do I have to wait until some-
one wiU pay me the fuU market value of ''my'' property-a month, a
year? How long is laches? What happened to your assurance that my
mortgage would get me the coUateral promptly on default?
The mere prospect of an equity of redemption-even when unexer-
cised-is a significant economic fact and forces the lender to take the
next step. What can I do, now that Pearl defaulted and knows the
chanceUor wiU give her extra time whenever she asks for it? Can I sue
her? If so, where? (There is no sense in suing in a common law court,
because as far as the judge is concerned the title is already mine.)
How wiU you argue to the chanceUor, considering how sensitive he is
to debtors wanting to pay late?
With assistance from others, Larry should be able to propose that if I
go to equity and offer Pearl even more time, the chancellor will decree
that if she fails to pay within the extended time she will then be fore-
275. And be willing to compensate for the delay with interest on the amount
loaned.
276. Alternatively, the court could give Pearl an "equity of redemption," the value of
which depends on how much the market value of Pearl's property exceeds the debt
on it.
277. If Larry does not yet get the point, How wiu you feel if you do pay me
$90,000, and then Pearl redeems from you fOT $60,000?
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closed from being able to pay after that.278 Thereafter the property
will be mine, equitably as well as legally: a strict foreclosure.
Sale foreclosure is introduced by my asking Laura, How much more
time do you want for your client? If I give her six months (even
though you only asked for three), wiU you stipulate that if she doesn't
pay by then, her right to redeem therea/ter is reaUy over? You won't be
upset after that, even though the property was worth $100,000 and her
debt was only $60,000? As Laura appreciates the forfeiture involved in
strict foreclosure even after a delay, asking How do you propose to
avoid that consequence, in light of the fact that time has reaUy run
out? forces her to argue that a sale of the collateral will make the lend-
er whole and at the same time preserve the debtor's equity (further
undoing the terms of the mortgage document).
To introduce the failure of the sale foreclosure mechanism, there
should now be a public foreclosure auction.279 Students are invited to
bid, but are deterred from doing so by the demand that their bids be all
cash and unconditional, i.e., no offers subject to obtaining a loan or
subject to inspecting the property or to obtaining a preliminary title
report. 280 As the sole remaining bidder, I enter a bid of $1,000.281
Laura, can you object to my getting a deficiency judgment of
$59,000? What sort of restrictions do you want the legislature to im-
pose to further protect Pearl against my underbidding and double
recovery strategies? A lecture or discussion of foreclosure moratoria,
post sale redemption, fair value or upset price requirements, and
antideficiency prohibitions can follow. 282
278. To dramatize the process, But what happened to your representation that the
mortgage would make the property come to me instantly and witlwut a lawsuit if
ever Pearl defaulted? This question can be asked repeatedly as mortgagor protection
principles are developed as superior equities.
279. Underbidding is covered at great length in Dukeminier and more summarily in
Goldstein.
280. The professor should also insist that any student bold enough to enter an over-
bid demonstrate his immediate ability to produce the cash.
281. At this time, I also wait for some student to be brave enough to ask me to
display my cash in order to give me the opportunity to explain credit bidding.
282. Goldstein contains Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 542 P.2d 981 (Cal. 1975), on these
issues, but it is too easy for students to read that case as involving the law of waste
rather than the esoteric policies of California antideficiency law. A much more help-
ful case is First State Bank v. Chunkapura, 734 P.2d 1203 (Mont. 1987), in Johnson.
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3. Clogging
The judicial and legislative successes of debtors' attorneys have un-
done all that was initially accomplished by lenders' counsel through
artful drafting. Yet, lenders are as unwilling to accept these restrictions
as the judges are to let them have their way; lenders may not make the
rules but they can structure the transactions (with the assistance of
high-priced lawyers) to evade the rules. As a result, mortgage law is
always circular and transient. To illustrate this point, I admonish my
attorney not to let Pearl's disaster recur. What can you do for me to get
around these rules when the next borrower approaches? The solutions
I want the class to consider often have to be proposed by me.
What if I make the next borrower waive aU of these rights Pearl got?
Should freedom of contract be allowed to prevail over superior equi-
ties? Equity cannot pennit debtors to have their equity of redemption
clogged through boilerplate waivers included in every mortgage. This
means that equity must make its rules nonwaivable, and Larry will have
to artfully camouflage any such waiver included.
Hidden security is a more interesting device. If the judges won't let
me have my way whenever a mortgage is involved, why do we caU it a
mortgage? Can you draft something that wiU look different but do
pretty much the same? Students will inevitably need help. What if, in-
stead of loaning Pearl Junior $60,000 for a year, I purchase the prop-
erty from her for $60,000 and give her an option to buy it back from
me at the end of the year for $66,000? That wouldn't be a mortgage
would it?283 At the end of the year if she didn't exercise her option,
wouldn't the option just expire? Laura, would you agree? How would
you argue that Pearl Junior should stiU have extra time, etc. ?284
If the installment sales contract was not covered earlier, it fits here
by asking whether a vendor should be able to obtain different results
283. If possession of the property has not been previously considered, this is a
good place to introduce it. Win there be any diJJiculty in saying this is a true sale
if Pear! Junior continues living in the house? Is there some way to explain her
staying? Can I rent the property back to her ajter SM has sold it to me? If I
charge her $6,000 in rent jor the year, I could even reduce her option price back to
$60,000 (or recover usurious interest by caUing it rent). With this background, the
sale-leaseback is considerably more intelligible to students.
284. Many of the books have cases on this issue. Duvall v. Laws, Swain & Murdoch
(in Johnson) has the added advantage that the creditor is a law finn who took the
deed as payment for legal services. Kawauchi v. Tabata (in Chused) is an extremely
difficult case, but there is very helpful commentary in his teacher's manual. Mid-State
Investment Corp. v. O'Steen (in Haar) adds the dimension of showing how a mortgag-
ee would like it to be-forcibly taking the property-but the opinion itself is not very
illuminating. Johnson v. Cherry (in Rabin) and Keonig v. Van Keken (in Goldstein)
are both comprehensible and policy oriented discussions of this theme.
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according to whether he uses a purchase-money mortgage or an install-
ment land contract.
Hidden security is a dramatic way to illustrate the unstable nature of
mortgage law. Judges impose rules that lenders evade through new
documents, which endure only until the judges catch on to them, while
meanwhile the lenders are working on new devices anyway. Both insti-
tutions seem well matched in their struggle over debtors' purses. If time
forces you to stop here, the students have been given a valuable insight
into this energetic field. 285
4. Transfers of the Property
Consideration of the effect of a sale of encumbered property permits
a review of many' earlier rules. Suppose my mortgage is 'on Van's
property and he wants to sell it to Pearl; can he? Does he have a mar-
ketable title? Does the existence of the mortgage mean that nobody will
purchase the property? Will a conveyance to Pearl eliminate my
mortgage? Will Van or Pearl owe the mortgage? What incentive will
Van have to pay once he sells? Can he terminate his potential defi-
ciency liability by getting Pearl to "assume" the debt?286 Will Pearl
have any incentive to pay if she doesn't assume it? Do I gain any-
thing by insisting that Pearl assume the mortgage?2B7
5. Second Mortgages
This topic is useful as an introduction to priorities. Suppose Pearl
needs $90,000 but I am willing to loan only $60,000 to her; since her
house is worth $100,000, can she borrow the remaining $30,000 from
somebody else?288 Suppose Jerry loans her $30,000 and takes a sec-
285. You can close by mentioning that the current round of the struggle is in the
banlauptcy arena, as lenders seek to insulate their foreclosure sales from automatic
stays, cramdowns, and fraudulent conveyance or preference attacks.
286. Assuming and nonassuming grantees can be explained by a quick comparison
to assuming and nonassuming assignees of leaseholds.
287. You can give yourself leverage to make this demand by supposing that you
have a due on sale clause in your mortgage and explaining to the students how such
clauses work.
288. Alternatively, if this is being tied into an acquisition, Suppose she has omy
$10,000 herself as a down payment, and my loan of $60,000 still leaves her
$30,000 slwrt. Can she borrow t1w.t somewhere else? Can Van loan it lo her by de-
ferring payment of t1w.t much of the price?
Regardless of the structure, the amount of the second mortgage ,should be large
1185
ond mortgage on the property, i.e., one that comes after mine. What
happens if Pearl doesn't pay Jerry? After working out that a junior
must foreclose in the same manner as a senior, we conduct a foreclo-
sure sale on the junior's behalf.28ll Each of you assume that you want
this house and be prepared to bid the most you can safely offer for it.
How much wiU you bid for property being foreclosed on to satisfy a
second mortgage of $30,000 (when the property is worth $100,000 and
is also subject to afirst mortgage of $60,000)? Some student will gen-
erally bid the entire market value of the property ($100,000), which al-
lows another student to point out that the title conveyed is still subject
to my unforeclosed senior mortgage, making such a bid $60,000 too
high. A working out of the disposition of the $40,000 that should be bid
will let the class appreciate the economic logic involved and how the
mortgagor's equity is thereby preserved. An explanation by the profes-
sor of how the bidding and fund disposition would go if the property
declined in value to $95,000, $90,000, and then $85,000 demonstrates
lenders' concerns with loan-to-value ratios and why it is better to hold a
first, rather than a second, mortgage.
Next is treatment of a senior foreclosure sale. Suppose that I am
foreclosing on my first mortgage and the numbers are the same as
they were originaUy ($60,000 first, $30,000 second, $100,000 market
value). How much wiU you bid at my foreclosure sale? Some student
will probably bid $70,000, thinking that the amount of the second mort-
gage should be subtracted, as was done at the junior sale, but you can
demonstrate the fallacy of using symmetry by showing what his bid
would be under that logic if the property value were only $85,000.290
Although confusing at first, the numbers do persuade the class that eco-
nomic consistency requires that a senior sale eliminate junior liens.291
enough to consume most of the remaining value of the property to make the need
for an equity cushion more apparent. It should also be a nwnber that avoids duplica-
tion with any other one used in discussion (e.g., not a $20,000 second, which stu-
dents will confuse with the debtor's $20,000 equity).
289. The different accounting treatments of senior and junior foreclosures are easier
to understand if the junior sale is analyzed first.
290. If a senior sale transferred title subject to the junior mortgage, the top bid at
that sale would be only $55,000 ($85,000 value, less $30,000 mortgage), meaning that
the first would suffer a deficiency, while the second would be paid in full (when it
was later foreclosed).
291. Accounting for sales proceeds at values of $100,000, $95,000, $90,000 and
$85,000 follows easily and enables students to see how the consequences match those
derived from a junior sale. The fact that senior sales eliminate juniors also warrants
mention that juniors are therefore given rights of redemption similar to mortgagors.
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Since federal income taxation is the engine that drives many real
estate transactions, it ought to be addressed in any Property course
covering conveyancing, notwithstanding its fearsome reputation. Having
a tax colleague in for a guest lecture is better than nothing, but tax pro-
fessors too often complicate rather than simplify matters, which is the
last thing unconfident fIrst-year students need. For purposes of merely
introducing some concepts and jargon to demystify the tax aspects of
real estate transactions, the necessary fundamentals can be learned and
taught by a normal, nontax Property professor.
Real estate taxation can be taught at the beginning,292 the end,293
or the middle of conveyancing. Goldstein294 and Haar,295 the two
books that fully cover tax, put it at the end of the topic.296 (Most of
the casebooks only make passing references to the fIeld. )297 The prob-
lems arising from lack of casebook material can be generally overcome
by reprinting the fIrst sentence or paragraph from the relevant Internal
Revenue Code sections, which is all that the students need for the level
of coverage presented here.298
There are two different sets of real estate activities to explore: (1)
those relating to current income and deductions (and subsidiary ques-
tions of timing), and (2) those relating to gains and losses from sales
(including treatment of mortgages). The current income aspects are
292. When put first, the approach would be to ask whether there are any advantag-
es in buying real estate, rather than investing one's money in the bank and renting
an apartment to live in.
293. If last, the questions would review the tax consequences of the transactions
previously covered.
294. Goldstein is the only book containing any tax cases. Estate of Franklin v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976), is a grand way of
showing how income tax considerations once used to dominate real estate law. But
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983), although important
to tax lawyers, is too hard for most first-year Property students.
295. The text treatment of the topic in Haar, however, is now useless because it
has not been revised since the 1986 Tax Reform Act changed most of the rules.
296. Casner also has 40 pages of text on taxation, but it includes property and
estate and gift taxes as well; furthermore, the income tax discussion is devoted more
to personal property than to real property.
297. The casebooks that mention this topic usually do so as part of concurrent
ownership (where some of these considerations should also be mentioned).
298. The text of this Article will always indicate the Internal Revenue Code section
that fits the discussion.
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easier to cover first, even though they are not directly related to the
purchase and sale transaction involved in the previous classes. The
questions can be put to Pearl as the new buyer of property (or to her
attorney) or to another student who is appointed to work for the Inter-
nal Revenue Service and to protect its interest in maximizing collec-
tions.
1. Current Income and Expenses
Suppose Pearl is buying Van's building in order to become a land-
lady. Once she becomes the owner, what income tax consequences will
she have, i.e., will she have to pay tax on the rents she receives? Is the
rent income? Even though she didn't work to earn it? (Can income be
derived from property as weU as services?y99 These questions are to
introduce the scope of section 61(a) and the notion of economic bene-
fit.
Must Pearl pay tax on the entire $10,000 of rents she receives this
year? Suppose she had to pay a property manager $1,000 to handle
matters for her? Section 212 shows that the tax is on net, rather than
gross income.3OO
Can Pearl deduct the rent she pays for her business office down-
town? For her house in the suburbs? Section 262301 is compared to
section 212 to illustrate the distinction between deductible business
expenses and nondeductible personal expenses.302
The distinction between personal and business expenses can be fol-
lowed up with borderline problems and examples of classic tax-driven
behavior. If Pearl also has a home in the suburbs, can she claim it is
business property and deduct expenses relating to it if she rents it out
in summer while she is away or if she uses the garage as a business
office? The formulas of section 280A303 are too complicated for class
discussion, but the principles of restricting and quarantining deductions
can be stated separately from them.304
What if Pearl makes a deal with her suburban landlord to give him
a rent free apartment in the city in return for not having to pay rent
on the house in the suburbs? Mer barter and noncash income have
299. See I.RC. § 61(a).
300. See I.RC. § 212.
301. See I.RC. § 262.
302. The comparison also illustrates the asymmetrical treatment of inclusions and
exclusions. Income is a broad concept, whereas deductions is a narrow one, because
the government wants to maximize revenues.
303. See I.RC. § 280A.
304. It is also possible to use the concept of losses to distinguish between personal
and income property, comparing §§ 165(c)(3) with 165(c)(l) and (2). See id. § 165.
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been discussed, If Pearl lives in an apartment in her own building,
shouldn't she be treated as paying rent to herself? introduces imputed
income and the preferential tax treatment its nonrecognition gives to
homeowners.
Returning to expenses, Can Pearl ded~tct mortgage interest and
property ta;x;es on her apartment buildingf05 On her house? Why are
these personal expense deductions aUowed to homeowners? Why don't
tenants get equivalent deductions? These questions allow discussion of
the political and economic considerations as to who bears the burden
of a tax, and how tax policy can be subordinated to housing policy and
used to alter behavior by distorting economic choice.306
Capitalization of expenditures comes next. If this is income proper-
ty, can Pearl deduct the repairs she has to pay for? This question is
easy enough. A more difficult question is, Can she also ded~t the cost
of the new roof on her apartment building? Why does section 26~07
deny a deductionfor capital expenditures? Infact, why can't Pearl de-
duct the entire acquisition cost of the building in the year she pur-
chases it, so long as she actuaUy spent that much? The concept of
basis as a vehicle for accounting for return of capital needs to be intro-
duced here, probably by lecture.308
Cost recovery (depreciation)309 is introduced by considering a clear-
ly wasting asset (e.g., a business vehicle) and asking how a taxpayer
can be expected to recover her investment in the asset on resale after it
has been driven to disintegration. Students readily understand that the
cost of such assets should be depreciated over time, while you explain
the notions of asset life,310 salvage value, and depreciation method.
305. See l.R.C. §§ 163(h), 164.
306. Goldstein has excellent materials on these provocative questions.
307. See I.R.C. § 263.
308. E.g., Suppose Peart bought land for $100,000 and sold it five years later for
$125,000. If she was not allowed to deduct the $100,000 as an expense when she
paid it, would it be fair to say that she had income of $125,000 when she sold it?
Tax lawyers would say that only $25,000 of the $125,000 received is income, and
the other $100,000 is return of capital (the investment for which a deduction was
previously denied) or "basis." Peart could not deduct the $100,000 price when she
purchased the lot, but that expenditure gave her a $100,000 basis in the lot. If she
later added a new pump on the lot costing anot/u..,. $6,000, her basis increased to
$106,000, because she was also not allowed to dedll~t that capital expenditure.
309. See l.R.C. § 167.
310. You should point out that the determination of asset life could be either a fac-
tual calculation or a political decision, based upon how much Congress wants to en-
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Two consequences of depreciation need to stressed: first, basis is
reduced every time a depreciation deduction is taken (in order to avoid
a double deduction), and second, the depreciation deduction is allowed
every year even though no funds are actually expended in those years.
These consequences will become significant later.
2. Timing and Deferral
The following adds another dimension: Must Pearl also report as
income this year the fact that her property appreciated in value by
$5,000 (since she is plainly better off economically than she was the
year before)? Students generally intuit the concept of "realization,"
although often lacking the word for it.
The fact that one policy behind this principle is that taxes ought to
be deferred until the taxpayer has the funds to pay them affords an
introduction to tax planning. Pearl can control when the tax on her
appreciation will be paid by deciding when to sell the building, which is
not an option she has when her funds are deposited in a bank account
instead.
Timing can then be taken up in its own right. Since Pearl will ulti-
mately be taxed on all of the appreciation of her house, does it really
matter that it occurs at the end when she sells rather than along the
way? Is she any better off for deferring? Once students comprehend
the time value of money, they can appreciate that tax deferral is itself
tax avoidance.
That leads to deferral devices. Is there a way for Pearl to continue to
defer paying tax on the appreciation in her house if she no longer
wants to own it? Suppose she sold it and then promptly purchased
another house? The principle behind section 1034311-that the new
house remains Pearl's personal residence even though at a different
location-makes the concept of (non)recognition manageable to stu-
dents. It can be followed by a quick lecture on related involuntary con-
versions,312 like-kind exchanges,313 and installment sales.314
Finally, What if Pearl keeps the house until she dies? brings in the
stepped up basis principle of section 1014315 and the policy question of
why society permits so much wealth to escape taxation.316 The death
courage people to purchase that kind of asset.
311. The fonnula itself, however, is too complicated for the Property course.
312. See I.R.C. § 1033.
313. I.R.C. § 1031.
314. I.R.C. § 453.
315. l.R.C. § 1014.
316. Section 1014 can also be compared with the carryover basis rule of § 1015 for
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tax considerations of joint tenancy and community property-even if
covered earlier as part of concurrent ownership-are appropriate for
review again here.
3. Gains and Losses from Sales
For convenience, these next questions deal with Van rather than
Pearl. Does Van owe any tax on his sale Pearl'f17 How is it calculat-
ed'f18 How much ''gain'' does Van have (under section 61(a)(3))?
Section 1001(aY19 distinguishes taxable gain from economic profit
(e.g., whether Van got more or less than the house was worth); the
class will have to think along different lines and use different terms to
answer tax, rather than financial, questions.
The components of section 1001(a) have been covered indirectly and
now need merely be brought into the calculation. Section 1011320 pro-
vides that adjusted basis is cost basis per section 1012,321 as adjusted
per section 1016.322 Having Van tell us what he paid when he pur-
chased the property gives us his cost basis and also his adjusted basis if
(for the time being) there are no adjustments to it. The amount realized
(for the time being) can be taken as the price he will receive from
Pearl. Thus, if Van bought the house ten years ago for $60,000 and now
sells it for $100,000,323 he has a taxable gain of $40,000.
Capital gains issues are raised by asking What if Van's house just
appreciated without any effort on his part; if he didn't earn this in-
come, should it be taxed324 (or should it be taxed more heavily pre-
cisely because it was unearned)? Suppose that the only reason Van
was able to seU for $100,000 was because of iriflation and the pur-
inter vivos gifts. The senior citizen exclusion of §. 121 can also be described here.
317. Asking, Even if the property was his personal residence?, reminds the students
that the distinction between business and personal expenses is not applicable when it
is income, rather than a deduction, that is involved.
318. Inexperienced students often confuse income taxes with sales and property
taxes and may base the tax on the value of the property sold or the selling price,
rather than on the gain on sale.
319. See I.R.C. § 1001(a).
320. I.R.C. § 1011.
321. I.R.C. § 1012.
322. I.R.C. § 1016.
323. The numbers should be the same as used in calculating damages for breach of
real estate contract.
324. There is an instinctive tendency, even on the part of progressive students, to
limit the income tax to earned income.
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chasing power of that $100,000 is the same as or less than the
$60,000 he originaUy paid-is that reaUy income?
4. Mortgages and Tax Shelters
The final theme to be covered is how mortgages affect basis, depreci-
ation, and amount realized. The starting point is Van's original purchase
of the house for $60,000. But Van didn't pay $60,000 in cash; he put
up $12,000 cash and borrowed $48,000 from the bank? Is his cost
basis $60,000 or only $12,000? (Should the mortgage be included in
Van's basis?y25
Next is adjustments to basis. Since Van's mortgage was included in
his original basis, should it also be included in calculating basis ad-
justments, i.e., depreciation? Should Van be permitted to depreciate
according to his $60,000 cost or only his $12,000 equity in the build-
ing? Students may, for consistency more than anything else, allow Van
to include the mortgage debt in his annual depreciation deduction, until
you point out that by doing so they have just given Van a "tax shelter,"
i.e., an annual depreciation deduction for money he never spent.326
This can generate a tax loss on a building, which may in fact be pro-
ducing real income which he can deduct against his outside income. A
short lecture is then needed to show that the passive activity rules327
now confine such losses to offsetting passive gains, thereby ending
most of these stratagems.
The fmal question is How much is Van's amount realized if Pearl
assumes his existing mortgage as part of her purchase price? Consis-
tency with earlier statements, treating Pearl's assumption as if she bor-
rowed the funds elsewhere and gave them to Van (to payoff his mort-
325. Since Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983), is in
Goldstein's book, this is an easy question to ask those readers. Other students have
to be led to it. Students can grasp the logic of including the mortgage in basis if you
separate the borrowing from the buying, e.g., if Van had borrowed the $48,000 the
day before buying the house and then used the borrowed funds to pay the price.
Two subsidiary points can be added, or omitted, depending on how lost the
class has gotten. When Van borrows money, is that a taxable event? Does he have
income? When a student figures out that Van's promise to pay the loan back offsets
the receipt of the cash, you can ask, What if the mortgage was nonrecourse, so that
he did not have any legal duty to pay it back? But the question of inclusion of
nonrecourse mortgages in basis calculations tends to push the topic out of the range
of most first-year students' comprehension.
326. This can easily be made more dramatic by calculating Van's annual deprecia-
tion deduction as if he bought the building for $1,000 cash and a $999,000 mortgage.
Estale of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976), in Goldstein,
starkly demonstrates the strategy of buying a tax shelter rather than a building.
327. I.R.C. § 469.
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gage), and the principle that relief from debt is income328 all make it
easy to say that the amount realized on Van's sale to Pearl includes not
only the cash he receives but also the unpaid balance of the mortgage
debt. Some of the tax breaks Van earlier received will now be offset by
the larger gain produced through the inclusion of the mortgage Pearl
has assumed in the amount Van realizes.329
If kept simple enough, students can manage these concepts and gain
a better appreciation of the dynamics of real estate.330
E. Deeds
A transactional organization of conveyancing covers deeds after con-
tracts and before recording.331 In class we assume that the vendor
wants to perform his end of the contract and needs help in drafting,
executing, and delivering an acceptable instrument to the purchaser.332
Most of the issues relating to these steps are either simple or trivial,
allowing much to be covered by lecture.
1. Drafting and Descriptions
A statutory or casebook form of deed is always available, making it
easy to begin with a quick review of what features must be included333
and those that need not be.334 Since most of the casebooks treat
328. See I.R.C.§ 61(a)(12). But students should be reminded that an assumption does
not really relieve a mortgagor of personal liability, as a matter of mortgage, rather
than tax law.
329. You can close by asking whether the entire mortgage debt should be included
in amount realized if the mortgage was nonrecourse and the property was worth less
than the mortgage, i.e., the 1iifts question. Yet, most students will not have the faint-
est idea as to what you are asking. Along with nonrecourse mortgages, the reasons
for using partnerships as vehicles for these schemes might also be mentioned.
330. In fact, a few might even erijoy the topic enough to take Federal Income Tax
the following year.
331. Browder, Donahue, and Rabin all put the topic before contracts. At the other
extreme, Bruce and Haar both locate it after recording.
332. This approach almost automatically excludes the question of whether other
documents (or oral statements) can serve as" deeds. Although considerable space is
devoted to that question in both Cribbet and Rabin, it goes entirely unmentioned in
most of the other books. I also exclude here the nature of the estate to be conveyed
(covered in both the Cribbet and Goldstein deed chapters), since that was dealt with
as part of estates in land.
333. Cribbet is the only book with a case on the effect of the grantee's name being
left blank.
334. Examples of features that need not be included are consideration, witnesses,
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boundary descriptions as a worthwhile component,335 having a student
trace out a description found somewhere in the book affords an easy
glimpse into the vocabulary of surveying. The goal should be to make
the students able to understand what a description in a deed means
even if they cannot actually locate it on the ground.
Since the seller's lawyer cannot really answer the question of how to
fill in that part of the deed dealing with the description, the question
can be reversed to ask whether the description contained in the deed
Van received when he bought the property describes what he is now
conveying. Larry, if Van is conveying exactly the same parcel as he
previously purchased, why not use the description contained in the
deed he received. Then all you have to do is determine whether that
refers to this parcel. Suppose the parcel involved is the one described
in the casebook on page 99; where is that land located~ At the
blackboard a description involving the federal survey and metes and
bounds can then be mapped out.
Many of the books include a case involving conflicting deed calls,337
and those principles can be dealt with in conjunction with the descrip-
tion already employed. For example, if there is a reference to a stake
fifty feet north of a street corner: What if the stake turns out to be 51
feet from the corner-do we go to the stake or do we stop at 50 feet?
What if the deed says the stake is north of the corner, but it is reaUy
northwest; do we foUow the angle and go northwest or do we foUow the
monument caU and go to the stake? If the deed refers to the parcel as
five acres, but our lines enclose six acres, do we ignore the surface or
shrink the lines? If the deed refers to a map, and the map markings
coriflict with the actual calls in the deed, which do wefoUow~
notarial seal, clauses reading "to have and to hold" or "and her heirs," and references
to easements appurtenant or fixtures passing with the title. Asking students about
inclusion of these items can serve as miniature refresher lectures on them. Title cov-
enants are postponed until later.
335. Cribbet has four cases on boundaries, Rabin devotes a whole chapter to it On
the other hand, neither Donahue, Haar, or Singer cover this topic at all, and
Dukeminier makes it a part of the recording chapter.
336. Even if there is not a sample description contained in the casebook text, some
case or cases in the book should provide a location for you to appropriate.
337. Casner, Cribbet, Goldstein, Johnson, and Kurtz all do.
338. At this point, students should be able to appreciate (1) why lawyers are not
surveyors, and (2) how uncertain property owners must feel when they purchase
without a survey. One way to relieve some of the uncertainty is to make an agree-
ment with the neighbor about the location of the line, by way of an agreed bound-
ary, covered earlier in the course. Adverse possession is also a comforting compo-
nent, since even if Van has not stayed within the legal boundaries, his possession
outside of them long enough may have converted the actual lines into legal lines.
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Boundaries and monuments having width339 can be covered in the
same way. If the deed sets the northern boundary as Main Street (or
Fish Creek), do we go to the north edge, south edge, or middle of it? Do
we go to the middle even when the grantor owns the land beneath the
entire street and none of the land to the north of it? For water bound-
aries, What if the creek has changed its course in the past few years?
What if that happened suddenly rather than gradually? If the stream
or lake is tidal, does Van's boundary stop at the high water mark or·
low water mark? What if the body of water is navigable, even though
not tidal'f34°
2. Title Covenants
This topic can fit in several places. It can be covered as part of ven-
dor-purchaser,341 where it would be part of the bargaining over what
kind of deed the purchaser wants from the seller. It can go with title
insurance,342 where its usefulness as an alternative form of protection
would be considered. It also can be tied to deeds (as it is here), since
those are the documents where the covenants are contained.343
The opening questions relate title covemmts to the contract right to
marketable title. Laura, is it worth paying Van extra to get a warran-
ty deed from him~ Since Pearl made a search before closing, what
need has she for further protection afterwards 'f345 If Pearl takes a
deed without warranties and later discovers that the property is sub-
ject to a mortgage, which somehow was overlooked during the earlier
title examination, can she sue Van because of it? Can she sue him for
breach of the implied covenant of marketable title?
339. Cases on this issue are in Casner, Cribbet, and Kurtz. .
340. This is an appropriate place to cover the public trust doctrine: If Van's legal
boundary is at the low water mark, but the sfwre is subject to a public trust up to
the high water mark, what· uses can Peart make of the shorezone after she acquires
the property?
341. Johnson almost puts it here, locating it directly following marketable title.
342. Browder, Cribbet, and Kurtz all do this. Goldstein has it as in independent
section between deeds and title assurance ("Liabilities That Survive The Deed").
343. Which is where Bruce, Casner, Dukeminier, and Haar all treat it. Another alter-
native is to omit most of it, as Berger, Chused, Donahue, and Singer all do. Rabin,
on the other hand, devotes an entire chapter to title covenants.
344. If the casebook form is a warranty deed, Is it worth offering less for one
without the warranties?
345. Having Pearl, rather than her lawyer, do the search postpones malpractice is-
sues for the time being.
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Next is a comparison of the various covenants. If Pearl had a war-
ranty deed, which of the covenants would help in such a case? The
covenant of seisin? The covenant of good right to convey? What good
do they do? What about the covenant against encumbrances? Is the
mortgage an encumbrance? What if there was an easement instead of
a mortgage? Would the covenants of warranty or quiet enjoyment be
breached if the mortgage was not inforeclosure? When would the cove-
nant offurther assurances come into play?
Statutorily implied covenants follow. What if Van offers a statutory
deed rather than a warranty deed; would that help with respect to the
mortgage? Does it matter that the mortgage was put on the property
by Van's predecessor in title (Ursula) (If the implied covenants are
special rather than general)? Is it worth checking the language of the
deedfrom Ursula to Van?
For running issues, If Ursula's deed to Van was a warranty deed
(and Van's deed to Pearl was not), can Pearl sue Ursula because of the
mortgage she put on the property? Can she sue her for breach of her
covenant against encumbrances to Van? For breach of her covenant, of
warranty to Van? Why does the second one run and not the first'f346
Finally, there are issues of damages. How much can Pearl recover
from Van on account of this mortgage if she has a warranty deed?
What if Van moved out of town after seUing his house to Pearl? Even
if he is stiU here, what if he doesn't have any money? Can Pearl sue
you, Laura, for not discovering the mortgage beforehand? Must she
prove your search was negligent, or were you absolutely insuring the
accuracy of that search?
3. Delivery
A few of the casebooks give short shrift to the issue of delivery,347
but most of them treat it as a major topic. Its pedagogical drawback is
that its academic complexity requires more time than its practical sig-
nificance warrants. Probably ninety-nine percent of title transfers are ei-
ther commercial or testamentary, not involving delivery issues. Of the
remaining one percent of inter vivos gratuitous conveyances, probably
ninety-nine percent of those deeds are simply handed over without
346. Related to this, What if Ursula conveyed to Van 30 years ago, and the banJc
has not yet sought to foreclose the mortgage. Even if Van's cause of action for
breach of the covenant against encumbrances has been actuaUy or impliedly as-
signed to Peart, what about the statute of limitations? Conversely, Is it yet time to
claim a breach of the covenant of warranty if there has so far been no eviction?
347. Haar omits it entirely and Singer has one page of text Cribbet includes one
case only tangentially related to this topic.
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problem. Yet, the legal issues involve obscure distinctions and meta-
physical rules whose effect is to force attorneys to prove, and judges to
decide, relatively unlrn.owable circumstances. Since my goal is to get all
this done within as little time as possible, I present a series of small
vignettes, making myself the grantor as well as interlocutor, but saving
much time by answering as well as asking most of the questions.
I own property that I want to give to Gina, a student seated on an
aisle five or more rows away. I fill out and sign a deed to her and then
put down my pen. Am I done? Have I transferred title to Gina? Would
your Contracts professor say a contract has to be delivered in order to
make it effective? What is this extra requirement of delivery?
To cover what delivery requires, My back is too sore for me to take
the deed over to Gina; what if I just set the deed down on the table and
say ''Now, Gina the property is yours?" Can a delivery occur without
a handing over? Has a completed legal act occurred even though nei-
ther Gina nor I moved?
Then,348 Gina, this deed will make you the owner of the property as
soon as you come up and get it, but I tear the document up just before
she arrives at the desk. Has tiae passed? When, if ever, did I have the
requisite present intent? I then repeat the same statement to Gina, but
do not destroy the deed before she takes it from my desk. Is this dif-
ferent from before? When did my future intent become present?
The same statement is again repeated, but this time I collapse in
mock death just as Gina reaches for the deed. Is this different? Did I
ever have the requisite intent? What if I hand the deed to Gina, saying
that it will be effective on my death? How can a conditional death
transfer get around the intrinsic problem that, before a grantor dies,
his intent is futuristic rather than present, and that after he dies he
has no intent whatsoever? What if I put the deed in my safe deposit
box with a note saying that Gina is to take the property on my death?
Next I hand the deed to Gina, saying Take this deed, but don't record
it until after I die so that my wife won't find out (knowing that recor-
dation is not essential for title to pass). Was my intent present or
future? If there was a delivery, what about my injunction not to re-
cord until later,?,,9
348. I have a dozen blank deed fonns at my desk, crumbling up the old one and
signing a new one for each successive scene.
349. As students conclude that the deed is either Wldelivered or absolutely delivered
in these cases, you can remark that neither outcome was what the grantor wanted
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Finally, as a critique of these rules, Larry, why do you make it so
hard for me to give property away on my death? Is some policy being
protected? Couldn't I write a wiU to that effect? Couldn't I draft a deed
that conveyed a future interest and deliver that deed absolutely to
Gina now? Couldn't I make the future estate conditional-i.e., on my
dying before Gina? Why is it so important to put the condition inside
the deed rather than outside it (as a statement accompanying its de-
livery)?
Escrow transactions are then introduced for comparison. Why was a
conditional delivery upheld in A v. B in the casebook? or Can I give
the deed to you, Larry, to give to Gina on my death? Do I have to fiU
out the deed differently? What do you want me to say (or write) to
. you as I hand the deed to you for future delivery to Gina? I repeat
Larry's words, but adding, So long as I don't teU you otherwise later;
why can't I add that phrase? Won't you be able to carry out my in-
structions anyway if I haven't canceled them?
To explore the effect of reserving the right to recall, Larry, give this
deed to Gina in one minute unless I revoke, and I do not revoke before
he hands it to her. Did title pass? When? How? Suppose I died before
the minute passed? What happens to your authority as agent on my
death? If I had expressly waived any right of recaU when I handed the
deed to you, were you stiU merely my agent? Once I waived the right
to revoke, what can we say about my intent? Had a completed legal
act on my part then occurred?J5IJ
The irrelevance of delivery issues in commercial transactions may be
the most important lesson to convey. Ezra, as a commercial escrow
agent, when Van hands the deed to you pursuant to his sales contract
with Pearl, what should he say? In addition to stating that the deed
should be delivered to Pearl only when she has paid the price, should
Van also waive the right of recaU? Laura, should Pearl go with Van to
make sure he says the right thing? If Van reserved the right of recaU
and then revokes before escrow closes, is Pearl out of luck? WiU the
judge decline to order specific performance in favor of Pearl because
Van refused to have the right intent to pass title? Once there is an
eriforceable contract, does delivery reaUy matter?J51
and-being dead-there is nothing he can do now to rectify the situation.
350. Follow up observations can cover (1) the significance of the second delivery
and the effect of an improper second delivery when the fIrst delivery was condition-
al; and (2) the relation back of the second delivery to the fIrst and the effect of a
repudiation by the grantor when the fIrst delivery was unconditional.
351. Cases in some of books which say that if the escrow is commercial the con-
tract must be enforceable for delivery to occur are very confusing. They sound like
they mean that there must be a contract whenever the deal involves a contract (i.e.,
is commercial). Obviously, no contract was required in any of the donative situations
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Final questions on escrows are: What ~f Ezra absconds with the
money? Whose money was it? What if he runs off with the deed in-
stead, putting in his own name as grantee? What if he records that
deed and then sells to an innocent third person? What if he
fraudulently induces Van to insert his (Ezra's) name and deliver the
deed to him'f52
Lastly, If Pearl and Van do close escrow and then change their
minds, how does she get title back to him? Can she just give back to
him the deed he gave to her?
F. Recording
1. The Utility of Recording Acts
Every casebook covers recording acts.353 Chapters always consist of
a combination of text and cases, with cases dominating about half of
the books and text prevailing in the others. Cases are misleading mate-
rials for introducing this topic to students, because these opinions are
always written from the perspective of hindsight and omniscience, giv-
ing readers the complete history of everything that occurred.354 . But
since the purpose of the recording acts is to create a workable system
for prospective purchasers worried whether title is marketable, students
should really read opinions that describe the situation from her point of
view-from the "front end" perspective of a title searcher who knows
only what can be seen in the records, rather than from the "back end"
perspective of the judge who has heard testimony about everything that
happened.355
previously presented or the donative cases in the books.
352. Chused has Saxer v. Phillip Morris, on the nature of the escrow business itself,
which he includes in order to cover the issue of settlement costs. It is probably
premature here, if title insurance has not yet been covered.
353. Except Chused.
354. For example, "0 conveyed to A who did not record, and then 0 conveyed to
B who did record."
355. For this reason, I will not devote much time in this section to mentioning the
more or less standard recording cases in the books, except for a few interesting
enough to call to the attention of those of you who have not happened upon them.
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Suppose:
o to A on January I-not recorded;
o to B on January ll-not recorded;
B recorded on January 21;
A recorded on January 31.356
As between A and B, who would win at common law'f357 It is easy for
a student to say that A wins on the ground that 0 had nothing left to
give to B after January 1. Yet, that is not looking at it from a searcher's
perspective. Laura, if you are searchin[/58 Van's title on behalf of
Pearl in order to determine if it is marketable so that she can buy,
what do you do under this rule if your search shows that Van is the
owner and does not appear to have ever mortgaged his property,?59
Can Pearl buy? Can you conclude that her title is not subject to a
mortgage just because none was ever recorded? If you can't give Pearl
that assurance, what was the sense in your searching? What would
you have to do to be sure that there is no prior unrecorded mortgage
against the property? The unanswerability of that final question reveals
the functional uselessness of the common law rule of first in time, first
in right. The class all knew of A's mortgage, because it had been put on
the blackboard, but a real world Laura would not know that. The rule
that says A prevails over B because A came first is not fair to people
who could not find A in the records. More importantly, even if there is
356. As constants, 0 originally was the owner in fee simple absolute, both A and B
are innocent people who paid full value for their interests, and 0 is not to be found.
357. A common student response in difficult situations is to avoid the priority issue
by declaring that A (or B) should sue 0 for fraud, as if a fraud judgment is as good
as a title. Announcing that 0 has fled to Brazil forces attention back where it be-
longs. Patterson v. Bryant, 216 S.E.2d 847 (N.C. 1939), in Cribbet, and Martin v. Cart-
er, 400 A2d 326 (D.C. 1979), in Singer, deal with the related issue of whether A's
failure to record is a defense to his fraud action against 0 for having later conveyed
to B.
358. If students ask at this stage just what searching is, you may have to invent a
primitive recording system, but no details are yet essential, except that documents
are put into it and that other people can look through it for those documents.
359. Too many situations are given to the students as rival conveyances by deeds
from one grantor to two grantees, which means that theft is probably involved, and
the situation seems unrealistic. (Why is no one looking at the land?) Utilization of
lesser interests-e.g., easements and mortgages-makes the situation far more ordi-
nary and believable. When the 0 to A transaction involves an unrecorded mortgage
or easement, the question of whether a deed from 0 to B conveys a title subject to
or free from the mortgage is a perfectly respectable priorities issue.
If mortgages as a topic has already been covered, an even better variation is for
A and B both to take mortgages from 0 to determine who has the first mortgage. In
this typical situation, nobody may have done anything wrong at all.
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no A, Laura still cannot advise Pearl to purchase, because she does not
know that. Some alternative system is needed.
2. Recording Acts and the Title Searcher
Once the class appreciates that the role of recording acts is to enable
title searchers to do their job for purchasers, it is easier to generalize
about these statutes. For instance, suppose a notice statute applies to
the hypothetical scenario. One consequence is to reverse the former
outcome in the case of A vs. B; a more important consequence is its
impact on future searchers. Laura, under a notice act, what can you
teU Pearl about mortgages (and anything else you did not find in the
records)? When you find nothing, can Pearl safely pay Van the
price~
The role of the closing agent is also redefIned. Laura, is that aU you
have to do? If you search and then Pearl pays, is her title safe? What
about C~l How soon after Pearl buys does she have to record? By
searching before she buys (up to the last minute), Pearl beats Olga, a
prior mortgagee; by recording after she buys (in the next minute), Pearl
beats Queenie, a subsequent mortgagee, grantee, or whatever. Notice
acts enable attorneys to fully protect their clients.
From this perspective, the distinctions between the various types of
recording acts are not significant. What if this were a race jurisdic-
tion? Would you do anything differently (i.e., search up the last min-
ute and then record as soon as possible)~2 What if this were a race-
360. And if Laura does find the mortgage (because it was recorded), Pearl can then
withdraw or else pay a lower price and not lose her investment. Searching is now
worth the effort.
361. The state of ignorance of a title searcher is such that she does not know
whether there is an "A" (someone who came before) or "C" (someone who will come
after her client). She does not know whether her client is A, B, or C, but she has a
duty to protect whomever her client is.
362. It is true that the reasons for searching and recording differ under different
type recording acts, but the dual strategy is the same under all of them. Pearl may
record in a race or race-notice jurisdiction in order to prevail against Queenie rather
than Olga. As already noted, however, Pearl does not know her position in the situa-
tion anyway, so that the distinction is irrelevant.
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notice jurisdiction? Different acts may change the outcome of the
blackboard hypotheticals,363 but searchers and attorneys everywhere
follow the same search and record strategy for their clients.364
3. Mechanics of Recording and Searching
Although one searches before recording in the real world, recording
should be explained first in class, since searching is looking for doc-
uments that were previously recorded. Laura, how are you going to
have Pearl's deed recorded? After you hand it to the clerk in the
recorder's office, what do you expect him to do with it? When the clerk
returns it you with a recorder's stamp on it, does that mean that the
government has now certified that Pearl owns the property? Is a re-
corded deed like a pink slip from the department of motor vehicles?)
The recording operation generates questions commonly found in the
casebooks and makes the distinction between the records and the in-
dexes. What if the clerk accepts the deed and copies it into the records,
but forgets to make any index entries for it: Is Pearl in danger? The
question has to be resolved from the earlier perspective of the title
searcher: Larry, if Laura can say that it is not Pearl's fault that the
clerkfouled up and that Pearl's deed is nevertheless recorded, how will
you have to search titles for your clients in the future? How wiU you
go about looking for deeds that are in the records but not the indexes?
What if the clerk makes index entries but gets the names wrong?
Could a future buyer from Van find the deed to Pearl if it were in-
dexed under Dan instead of Van? Under Earl instead of Pearl? The
same point can be made about the "wild" deed.
Attention can then tum to the searching process. Laura, where are
you going to start? Since Van is the purported seUer (and the only
363. This is true either as to the identity of the victor or the date of victory as the
facts are shifted.
364. This is obviously a pragmatic rather than a policy perspective. In comparing
the types of acts, however, considerations of fairness and efficiency can be discussed.
E.g., The Uniform Commercial Code gets by with a pure mce system and the com-
mercial world seems to have lived with that arrangement, so is it really worth com-
plicating the real estate system by adding notice as a second consideration? If no-
tice is crucial to protecting reliance, why should. B-who bought without notice of
A's unrecorded interest-lose merely because he did not also record. before it in a
mce-notice jurisdiction? Does the mce component of race-notice make fOT simpler
trials and less dangers of pe1jury?
You can also explain to the students the legal apparatus at work here, i.e., the
idea that the recording act makes A's unrecorded title defeasible and gives 0, as
apparent owner, the power to divest A by conveying to the right sort of person.
Later examples will involve O's power to divest being transmitted to his heirs or
creditors.
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name you know), what index should you start with and for what
year? As Laura decides which book to go to, you supply the informa-
tion she will find in it in order for her to move on to the next step:
There is an index entry in 1962 showing Van as grantee from Ursula;
now where do you want to go? A search of the grantee indexes should
continue for three or four steps to get to a deed from the government
to a predecessor many years ago. Now that you have a chain of title
going all the way back, how can you be sure that .none of the· owners
ever encumbered the title while they were there? forces a search
through the grantor indexes from the past to the present.365
Curative acts and title standards can be introduced through old de-
fective documents: The acknowledgment on this mortgage payment
form from 1927 appears defective; does that mean that you should tell
Peart not to accept the title? For marketable title act issues: Is it is
really necessary to go back more than forty years? How much effort
are you saving if you have to look beyond then for old easements even
though you are permitted to ignore 'old mortgages? Where will you stop
if you have to worry about rival chains stemming from different roots
of title more than forty years old'fW'
Scope of search questions fit into the chronology already used. If the
grantee index showed that Ursula took title from Ted in 1955, who took
from Sam in 1948, Is it necessary for you to check Ted out in the
grantor indexes before 1948 when he got his title? But what if I tell
you that Ted borrowed money from Mel in 1947 and gave him a mort-
gage at that time on the property (because he knew he was later going
to acquire it), and that Mel recorded that mortgage in 1947? Since
that sort of thing can happen, should you search for it? If so, can you
stop at 1947? How far back in time do you have to go for each person
in the chain if you decide to look for those things? How much work is
that for you, versus how much effort would it be for Mel if the rule
says you don't have to look?
The same questions can be put with regard to searching in grantor
indexes after owners were divested of their titles to see if there were
documents executed during their ownership that were not recorded but
365. This search detours into the grantee indexes when the data you supplied in-
cludes, e.g., a mortgage, to see if it was paid and canceled or if it still exists.
366. You might mention here other sources of title information, such as tax and
judgment liens, bankruptcy filings and tract indexes. The Supplement to Casner has
. In re Walker, 861 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1988), dealing with the race between a bank-
ruptcy filing (and its attendant automatic stay) and a pending foreclosure sale.
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were !mown to successors and then recorded later. The lis pendens can
be introduced, in looking at the comparative efforts of the parties.
Suppose Ted gave Chris a mortgage in 1954 that was not recorded
until 1957 although Ursula knew about it; if the rule does not require
you to search for documents recorded otter ownership ends, what
could Chris do when he went to record it in 1957? If he sued Ursula
at that time (for a declaration that he had a mortgage on her proper-
ty), how should notice of that action be recorded, i.e., who should be
shown as grantee and grantor? If you find such a notice in the chain,
does that mean Pearl can't buyf367
Finally, for deeds out, If you see an index entry showing a deed
from Ted to Tyrone in 1950, but the entry shows that it refers to lot 2
and Pearl is purchasing lot 1, is there any reason to look up that deed
in the official records? What if it turns out that the deed also conveyed
an easement over lot 1 as weU as the fee to lot 2? If searchers should
check aU deeds executed by each grantor in the chain, what should
they do if they are buying a house in Levittown or Columbia, Mary-
land, where the grantor is the same for aU parcels?
4. Notice368
Recording acts require both that a document be unrecorded and also
that the subsequent purchaser be without notice of it in order for her to
prevail over it. Notice is therefore not important when the instrument
has been recorded, but it gains independent significance for instruments
that are not in the records as they should be. Since a buyer is defeated
by a claim she either !mows about or is charged with constructive no-
tice of,369 even if it was not properly recorded, that means that her at-
torney should search for any such claim, since it is better to actually
!mow about a claim (and make a judgment as to it) than to not !mow of
it, yet be charged with notice of it, and held inferior to it.
This scenario lets you illustrate that point in several ways:
o to A-a mortgage, unrecorded;
o to B-a deed reciting "subject to A's mortgage," recorded;
B to Pearl-who !mows nothing and makes no record search.
These conclusions follow:
• Even though Pearl has no actual !mowledge of the deed from 0 to B,
367. Broce has Kordecki v. Rizzo, 317 N.W.2d 479 (Wis. 1982)), the only case I
found in any of the casebooks dealing with a lis pendens.
368. These remaining topics are covered more briefly and partly by lecture.
369. Cribbet has Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kelton, 285 P.2d 168 (Ariz.
1955)), for the interesting proposition that contractors do not have constructive notice
of recorded claims of underground easements on property being excavated by them.
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she is charged with constructive notice of it since it was recorded. The
system pressures purchasers to search the records by treating them as
if they had searched and had seen everything that was properly record-
ed, whether or not they ever did so.
• Pearl is also charged with constructive notice of the contents of that
deed to B-because it is useless to require searches if searchers do not
have to read what is in the recorded documents. Thus Pearl is treated
as if she knew that the deed referred to A's mortgage, whether or not
she ever actually read it (or even looked for it).
• If Pearl had read the deed and had seen that statement in it (whether
or not she actually did so), she should have gotten suspicious about it.
"Who is A?" is a question she should have asked both herself and oth-
ers, and a court could charge her with inquiry notice of what she might
have learned had she asked.370
• Pearl should also look inside the property she is buying, because she
will be charged with constructive notice of that too. Was anybody
there? If so, was that person "suspicious," i.e., not a family member or




a to A-not recorded;
a to B-without notice of A, and recorded;
but both deeds are gift deeds.
Why does A win? Why must B give value? Why didn't A have to give
value~72 After exploring the reasons for the requirement of value
370. And if Pearl did not ask, she had better hope that Laura can persuade a judge
or jury that the unread reference was not suspicious (e.g., a deed that said, "subject
to all mortgages and other encumbrances, if any"), or that the unmade inquiry would
not have produced this information (e.g., a reference to a Mr. Smith living in Man-
hattan and unknown to anyone involved in the transaction).
You can also mention that, conversely, one may be entitled to ignore some doc-
uments in the record that are actually seen, which do not belong there, such as
unacknowledged instruments or self-serving claims, or which the system has said can
be ignored, such as defects subject to a curative or marketable title act or an ex-
punged lis pendens.
371. Tenants are "per se suspicious"; thus, they should always be interviewed.
372. To remind the students of a point earlier made, you can also ask What if B
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questions can go to whether value was given. Is it sufficient if Pearl's
deed recites consideration? Does it hurt if her deed was a quitclaim?
Did Pearl give value if she paid only eighty percent of the market
price? What if Pearl gave Van a note and mortgage (for the entire
price)? What if the note was negotiable and Van endorsed it to a hold-
er in due course? What if the note was half paid (and the property
consisted of two separable lots) at the time Pearl learned of the other
claim? What if the property was indivisible and she had paid only ten
percent at the time of discovery? What if she had paid ninety percent?
What if B were a creditor rather than a buyer? What if B took a
mortgage from 0 to secure a loan to him? What if B were an unse-
cured creditor (a merchant or an injured pedestrian); did B rely on
the records in getting her claim? What if B obtained a judgment
against 0 (on her unsecured claim) and recorded the judgment? What
if B then executed on the judgment and had the sheriff seU the proper-
ty to a third party?J73 What if B were high bidder at the execution
sale?
6. Limits of the Recording System
Students should appreciate that not all of the laws of property have
been replaced by the rules of recording. First, some interests are not
subject to the recording rules. Adverse possessors and prescriptive
users do not have to record, since their claims are based on actions
rather than documents.374 Short term tenants are frequently excused
from having to record even when they are not in possession.375
Second, the grantee from a real owner is not required to be a bona
fide purchaser. Suppose:
o to A-not recorded;
o to B-for value, without notice, and recorded;
B to C-who knows, pays no value, and does not record.
then conveys to C, woo does pay value? How can C prevail over A if B had noth-
ing (except apparent title and the power to divest)? A harder variation is to make C
know of A, so that the issue becomes whether 8's bona fides can be added to C's
value.
373. How could the sheriff'seU property that 0 did not own (and therefore was
not subject to B's judgment lien)?
374. Cribbet and Johnson both have Mugaas v. Smith, 206 P.2d 332 (Wash. 1949) on
this issue. You can add that this is another good reason for the title searcher to take
an actual look at the property. While looking for suspicious claims, she is also likely
to see signs of occupancy if an adverse possessor is there.
375. Students can easily convert this into thinking that short-term tenants therefore
need not search the records before making down payments to their ostensible land-
lords.
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Why does C win even though she is utterly out of compliance with the
recording rules? Students are often so taken by the recording system
as to want to apply it to everyone, even those sheltered by virtue of
taking title from a true owner.
Third, recording compliance does not automatically assure a good
title. The scenario:
o to A-not delivered (or not signed), but recorded
A to BFP-who records and pays value
illustrates that recording does not replace delivery.376 Asking how a
title searcher can guarantee that all deedg in the records were really
executed and delivered is a good bridge to title insurance.
G. Title Insurance
Title insurance is a wonderful way to illustrate recording principles
because the provisions of a title policy are really nothing more than
applied recording law rules. It almost perfectly demonstrates how statu-
tory and judicial rules have been converted into techniques of drafting
and behaving.
The chief reading material should be a title policy.377 Cases illustrat-
ing particular issues are interesting, but even their best use is to consid-
er how subsequent policy revisions responded to their holdings. Since
the class will walk through the policy, it would be mechanically easiest
to follow the structure of the policy itself; however, for pedagogic rea-
sons one must jump around in it in order to introduce concepts in an
intelligible order.378
376. Since the Unifonn Simplification of Land Transfers Act cures even nondelivery
and forgery (after 3 and 30 years respectively), this point has to be qualified if that
Act is covered. The distinction between an undelivered deed and one whose delivery
was fraudulently induced can also be mentioned here.
377. All of the casebooks, except Casner, Chused, and Singer, do contain such a
fonn. The omission in both Chused and Singer is not surprising, since the topic itself
barely appears; Casner has 20 pages of text and cases instead of a fonn. Neither
Donahue nor Haar include much on the topic, except a fonn.
378. A compromise can be made by systematically going through the entire policy
while reserving some points for later discussion.
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1. Coverage
Tyrone, a student, is appointed salesperson for a title company.
Tyrone, if Pearl purchases a policy from your company, what protec-
tion is she getting? What do you mean when you say you wiU insure
that title is vested as shown in Schedule A? How were you able to
decide to show Pearl as the vestee in your policy? The student must
figure out that in order to do so his company had to make the kind of
search of the grantee indexes that was discussed during recording.379
Your coverage also assures that the estate described is as shown in
Schedule A, i.e., a fee simple. How do you know that there aren't any
encumbrances on it? The company had to have searched the grantor
indexes (as we did) and found nothing there in order to say this. But
suppose you do find a mortgage while searching the records. Do you
then refuse to issue a policy? Getting someone to point out that such
an item will be shown as a special exception lets you observe that a
title company cannot wish away what it finds in the records and if a
record search shows a defect, it cannot be omitted. What Tyrone's com-
pany insures is that there are no other defects apart from those listed,
i.e., that it made a good search. (And if a good search showed nothing
else, then Pearl has nothing to worry about, since any other claims
should fail under the recording rules discussed in class earlier.)380
Your policy says that this coverage is subject to exclusions and
exceptions. Why do you exclude defects "attaching or created
subsequent" to the policy date? This answer will illustrate the difference
between title and most other forms of insurance which protect against
risks that occur after the purchase of the policy. Since the company
only insures the accuracy of its search, coverage must stop as of the
day the search ended. No insurer could cover the risk that Pearl would
go out the next day and put a mortgage on the house.381
379. Technically, if the search was made before close of escrow, it would show
Van as ownerlvestee, and the title company would have to ensure that his deed to
Pearl was properly executed, delivered, and recorded before insuring her. That issue
is better postponed until later.
380. If you want to go further on the question of basic coverage, you can analyze a
lender's policy. What must you do or krww to insure that the bank has a valid
mortgage on the property? To insure that it is a first mortgage? What wiu you do
if your search shows that there is a pre-existing mortgage on the property. Can you
stiU insure this 71Wrtgage?
The other items of lender's coverage are better treated elsewhere. Mechanic's
liens will come up in their own right shortly. Insurability of mortgage assignments
can go wherever and whenever secondary market activities are mentioned.
381. Many of the books include cases which hold that title insurance does not cov-
er certain particular problems (e.g., post-issuance defects). Asking Why does your
policy have this seemingly redundant exclusion in light of case law to the same
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Why do you also exclude defects "crea,ted, suJfered, assumed" or
"agreed to" by the insured? Why do you exclude defects "knoum to the
insured" and why do you exclude cases in which Pearl did not pay
value?182 How the recording acts operate is the perfect answer to
these questions, since instruments are valid against parties who created
or knew of them or did not pay value, even though they were unrecord-
ed and therefore not discoverable by a search. The scope of title insur-
ance protection is functionally identical to the scope of recording act
protection given to a bona fide purchaser.
The exclusion of possessors' rights illustrates a different aspect of
title insurance and recording law. Why do you except the rights of par-
ties in possession? The technical answer may be that the recording
acts do not protect against such claims, but the title insurance point to
get from the student is that his company does not have to· exclude
these items, since it could go out and look at the property. It is merely
more efficient most of the time for the title searcher to stay in his title
plant and to assume that the buyer will look at what she is buying and
make her own judgment about the presence of suspicious possessors.
But since the risk of possessors' rights is not as categorical as the earli-
er listed risks, the company can issue an extended coverage policy or
an endorsement covering this risk if the buyer is willing to pay the
company to inspect the property.383 Why do you exclude boundary
line disputes and claims of easement? is subject to the same re-
sponse-if Pearl wants boundary assurance, she can hire a surveyor
herself, or she can pay Tyrone's company to hire the surveyor and in-
sure the correctness of that survey in its policy.
Why do you exclude mechanics' liens? combines the previous con-
siderations. This may require some explanation from you as to how
such liens relate back in time so that Tyrone can figure out that he
would have to inspect the property for signs of construction in progress
at the time of policy issuance. The explanation of relation back also
effect? should prompt the consideration that the decision may be good only. in that
one state, whereas a policy exclusion is effective everywhere (and notwithstanding
changes in case law). Even when title companies win, they are motivated to revise
their policies to make the victory more permanent and universal.
382. I.e., "Loss or damage which would not have been sustained if the insured
claimant had paid value."
383. The question of physical defects in the property is postponed until the end of
this topic and is used as a lead-in to the general question of recovery for such de-
fects, which is taken up in the next part of this Article.
1209
makes understandable the exception for future property taxes and as-
sessments.
Why does your policy exclude land use regulations? Why does it not
exclude recorded notices of violations of them? These questions go into
the nature of the public records system and all of the offices where
information might be found relating to a parcel of land. Suppose Pearl
offered to pay you for a zoning endorsement, how would you find out
what the zoning was? Where would you look to find out whether any
governmental agency has voted to exercise eminent domain over the
property but has not yet recorded its exercise of that power?
If the class also considers lenders' policies, there should also be men-
tion of usury, truth in lending, and the new creditor's rights exclusion.
(Each of these, however, will probably require heavy doses of expla-
nation by you.)
Off-record risks are raised by asking, Tyrone, in light of the limita-
tions of coverage, does Pearl gain any real protection from your title
insurance policy that she couldn't acquire by having Laura search
Van's title for her? If necessary, you may have to follow this up with,
Laura, when you search a chain, do you check whether each deed was
in fact signed by a competent grantor and properly delivered to the
grantee? If there was a recorded but undelivered deed in the chain,
does Pearl, have good title? If not, can Pearl sue you for malpractice,
or did you exclude that from your opinion to her? Tyrone, does your
policy exclude those risks? Why not? Did your company take any steps
to investigate them? Why not?
2. Timing
A constellation of other questions deal with the integration of the
insurance into the purchase contract. To begin, Tyrone, when will you
be able to issue a policy insuring Pearl that she is the owner? intro-
duces the structural difficulties the insurer must confront. The insurer
can search now, but it must wait until the deed was delivered and re-
corded (by itself, probably) before it can say that the buyer rather than
the seller owns the property. Yet, the buyer needs to know before the
close of escrow (and the turnover of her funds) that she will be insured
after the close. Laura, is it satisfactory to you that Pearl's policy
won't be issued until escrow closes? What if the company declines to
write a policy at that time? Does this mean that Pearl wiU have to pay
you for a marketable title search beforehand and then pay the compa-
ny a second time for a title insurance policy afterwards? Tyrone, is
there some way you can assure Pearl before closing that Van currently
has a good title and that she wiU have a good (insurable) one after
closing?
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Once the students invent a preliminary title report, it can be explored
in its own right. Tyrone, wiU the preliminary report be an insurance
policy or just a report? Will you charge Pearl for it or give it to her
free as part of the overaU package? Laura, once Pearl has this prelimi-
nary report from a solvent insurance company, is there any need to
buy a title insurance policy thereafter? If the preliminary report fails
to pick up some defect, can't you just sue the company for negligence?
In fact, might not Pearl be better off suing on a negligence theory
rather than on an insurance theory, in order to get around the policy
limits and strict timetables in the policy?
At the other end of the time spectrum is the duration of coverage
after the issuance of policy. How long is Pearl covered under your
policy? Does that mean you will be charging her annual premiums in
addition to the initial fee? What happens once she sells the property?
Does this policy insure her buyer? What if her buyer later sues her
saying that the title was never any good; will you defend her? If Pearl
takes back a mortgage for part of the price and her title turns out to be
bad, is she still covered by you as a mortgagee even though she is no
longer an owner~
3. Remedies
The fmal areas of coverage are the company's duty to defend and the
options the policy allows it in responding to adverse claims. If a neigh-
bor claims an easement over Pearl's property that you did not list as
an exception, what wiU you do? Can you elect to do nothing and ig-
nore the neighbor if you think the neighbor is wrong? If you believe
the neighbor is right, what wiU you do?
H. Physical Defects Discovered After Closin!f85
The obvious transition from title insurance to the remedies available
to a purchaser following a post-closing discovery of defects in the prop-
erty is to ask whether such defects are covered by the title policy.386
384. And, in the case of lenders, Does coverage end if the mortgage is sold in the
secondary market?
385. Although not a major topic in the Property course, most of the casebooks do
give it some coverage, from 35 pages in Cribbet, down to 5 pages in Berger. Casner
covers it only in the Supplement, and Donahue 1Uld Kurtz both appear to omit it
entirely.
.386. E.g., Tyrone, if it turns out that Pearl's Muse was built on fill, does your
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Several of the books include cases holding against such a claim; even
without such authority, students should be able to figure out the dis-
tinction between marketable title and unmarketable property.387 In the
absence of title company liability, other defendants and theories must
be sought.
As a transactional matter, this issue may have been touched on dur-
ing the vendor-purchaser discussion (in terms of inspection, conditions
or express warranties). It is covered here as a litigation question: the
sale has been completed and the purchaser discovers that something is
wrong. The task of the purchaser's attorney is to help her to win a
lawsuit, not to close a deal. Laura, who can Pearl sue when she finds
out that her house was built on fiU (has termites, iUegal wiring,
etc.)'fSS The seller is the obvious first candidate.
Many of the books include a case on an implied warranty of fitness,
making it appropriate for the student to tum to that doctrine. This theo-
ry can be explored by seeing whether Pearl's case fits under it What
kind ofproperty does this have to be for Pearl to be able to sue Van on
an implied warranty theory? How new does the house have to be? Can
we claim this is new housing if Pearl is not the first owner? What if
someone else (a dummy) held title for a short time in between~
Further questions asswne that this is qualifying property. What wiU you
have to prove about the defect-that it violated some code? That it
didn't conform to the plans? WiU Pearl recover only the cost of repairs
or for personal injuries too? Should you worry about disclaimers in
the sales contract or deed'flOO
Making it an old house leads to other possibilities. If the house is
very old, can you stiU claim implied warranty? Can you argue that
the court should apply that theory to old as weU as new houses? If the
courts in this jurisdiction have limited that theory to new housing,
does Pearl have any kind of case? What if Van told Pearl that there
was no fiU, even though that wasn't written in the contract? If sellers'
duties of truthfulness and disclosure were covered before as part of
vendor-purchaser, no more may be required here than to remind stu-
dents of that,391 If not, Do we have to prove that Van knew he was ly-
policy protect her? Why not-since the Iwuse is not marketable any more?
387. You can also dispose of grantor nonliability under covenants of title at the
same time or defer it until the question of seller liability has been raised.
388. This query does not include toxic pollution, which will be treated separately in
the next section.
389. Cases raising the privity question are in Bruce, Dukeminier, Goldstein, and
Rabin.
390. Cases involving disclaimers are in both Cribbet and Rabin.
391. Browder treats this entire topic as part of vendor-purchaser, and Dukeminier
combines duty to disclose cases with implied warranty ones in the same section.
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ing when he said there were no termites? What if he knew there was
fiU, but never mentioned it to Pearl? Did he have a duty to disclose or
merely a duty not to lie? If we can't prove that he knew there was fiU,
can we argue that he should have examined the property before seUing
it, just in order to warn a buyer of that fact'flW
Finally, there is the liability of other parties. Is there anyone else
Pearl can sue? What about her broker or Van's broker?J93 Did either
of them have duties regarding truthfulness? Concealment? Inspection?
What about the contractor who originaUy created the defect? What
about the bank who financed the construction?J94 What if the bank
merely appraised the property prior to making a loan to Pearl? What
about the local building inspector? To close, What about the attorney
who handled the closing for Pearl, i.e., you?
I. Toxic Contamination
The few casebooks that treat this topic395 tend to cover it as part of
conveyancing. While it could also be covered as a problem for existing
landowners related to nuisance law,396 its practical import for attor-
neys is in terms of assisting buyers in making adequate environmental
audits as part of purchasing property in order to avoid being held re-
sponsible for later clean up costs.397 Portions of the Comprehensive
Cribbet makes the topic a part of title assurance.
392. Cases involving the duty to disclose are included in Bruce, the Supplement to
Casner, Dukeminier, Johnson, Rabin, and Singer.
393. This topic was covered previously in the section on brokers. The cases on bro-
ker liability in both Chused and Johnson are in this part of their books instead.
394. The liability of construction lenders is covered by cases in both Cribbet and
Johnson.
395. Rabin has a chapter which contains one helpful opinion, United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988). Cribbet has a short and uninformative
case, Sunnen Prod. Co. v. Chemtech Indus. Inc., 658 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
Dukeminier has a case dealing with the question of whether title insurance covers
contamination, Lick Mill Creek Apartments v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 283 Cal. Rptr.
231 (Ct. App. 1991), and an unrelated note in the section on disclosure duties. John-
son has a half page note. Chused has index entries for pollution, but no material
actually covering it that I could find. The other books (based on table of contents
searches under conveyancing and nuisance, and index searches under "CERCLA,"
"contamination," "hazardous," "pollution," and "toxic") appear to have nothing. The
Real Estate Transaction books, especially Goldstein, all include this topic.
396. Kurtz has a case involving a leaking underground gas tank, Mel Foster Co.
Properties, Inc. v. American Oil, 427 N.W.2d 171 (Iowa 1988), in the nuisance chapter
but the issue is analyzed only under nuisance principles.
397. The discussion could also come up in the context of advice to an existing
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Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA)398 are sufficient reading material to support an introductory
class discussion on this theme if it is not included in the casebook.
A natural bridge from postclosing discovery of defects to contamina-
tion is to ask Pearl's attorney, What remedies does Pearl have if the
defect she has just discovered is underground contamination rather
than improper construction~ That question is really just an intro-
duction to the topic of the special nature of the liability that a buyer
suffers in purchasing contaminated property. Is the poUution of the soil
on Pearl's property any differentfrom the termite infestation or iUegal
wiring in her walls, i.e., is it something that she can just decide to
put up with rather than fix while she owns the property? To put it
more in the context of the concern of a potential purchaser, If a visual
inspection doesn't show poUution and no neighbor has complained, is
there anything wrong with her acquiring property that may be con-
taminated? Suppose it later turns out that this property is poUuted,
but Pearl doesn't mind; can anybody make her do anything about it?
Although that is a question one would take to an environmental attor-
ney when and if pollution is actually discovered, it is also a question all
real estate lawyers must anticipate as potential dangers for all purchas-
ers.
1. Cleanup Liability
A walk through of CERCLA's provisions is one way to answer the
environmental question.4°O Section 107(a) reads (selecting out the key
phrases for the students), "the owner ... of a facility ... from which
there is a release . .. of a hazardous substance. .. shall be liable
for. . . all costs of removal."401 Laura, if Pearl buys this property402
and later discovers that it is poUuted,403 what does that mean for
owner of contaminated property, but the general question of landowner liability for
conditions of the premises is more a tort than a property question.
398. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). I will refer to the applicable sections at appro-
priate times in the text, using the Act's numbers rather than the codified numbers
(e.g., § 101 rather than § 9601). In addition to the federal statute, provisions from the
applicable state statutes can also be included, especially if their provisions go sig-
nificantly beyond CERCLA.
399. If title insurance was the previous topic, the question could be whether Pearl's
title policy covers contamination.
400. The students cannot possibly answer this question on their own. A good deal
of hand holding is needed to take them through the sections hereafter discussed.
401. See § 107(a).
402. If § 101(9) is included, you can ask, rather than declare, whether the house is
a facility.
403. You can also discuss which contaminants are covered by CERCLA and which
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her? The point to bring out is that the statute makes the current owner
a potentially responsible party for clean up.404
But Pearl wasn't the polluter; why would she have to clean up
someone else's mess? introduces the principle of strict liability and the
policies behind it. This leads to the innocent landowner defense. Would
Pearl be protected by any of the defenses under 107(b)? To answer this
and the following questions, the students usually need to be led clause
by clause, with frequent references back to the base point. Why is an
owner not required to clean up from a "release... caused solely
by ... an act or omission of a third party?"I05 Why does the defense
vanish if the third party is in a "contractual relationship" with
Pearl~06
If Van was the polluter, would his contract and deed to Pearl con-
stitute such a "contractual relationship?,,'07 Section 101(35)(B) reads,
"Contractual relationship ... includes ... land contracts [and]
deeds."408
When is a deed not a contractual relationship? If Pearl acquired it
"after the disposal" and at that time "did not know and had no reason
to know" of the release.409
How could Pearl prove that she had no reason to know? Under sec-
tion 101(35)(B), she had to make "all appropriate inquiry into the previ-
ous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commer-
cial or customary practice." That brings us back to the present: What
will you do in order to make sure Pearl qualifies for this defense if
are not. The definitions found in § 101(14)(F) exclude petroleum, and the exclusions
in § 104(3) of naturally occurring substances and products incorporated into buildings
mean that radon and asbestos are also not covered. This makes it worth asking
whether state statutes cover those contaminants.
404. You can ask if tenants, holders of easements, or others also qualify as owners
or operators. More sophisticated questions can relate to the liability of officers, direc-
tors, and strawpersons. Lender liability is discussed separately later. See inJra notes
412-22 and accompanying text.
405. That is, if a third party poUuted, Peart would rwt have to clean up.
406. Thus, if the third party poUuter was under contract to Peart, she does have to
clean up.
407. If it was, then Peart must clean up.
408. So Peart does have a contractual relationship with Van and therefore must
clean up. But, the statute then says, "unless . . . ." Sometimes a deed may not be a
contractual relationship; therefore, Peart would rwt have to clean up.
409. Peart purchased ajter the contamination, so if she could also prove that she
had rw reason to know of the previous poUuting, she was rwt in a contractual rela-
tionship with Van, and she would rwt have to clean up his poUution.
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contamination later turns up? What kind of questions are you going
to ask and of whom? What is an appropriate inquiry into previous
ownership? If a chain of title search shows that a former owner was
named ABC Chemical Co., what do you advise? How wiU you inquire
into previous uses? Are government records worth looking up? Of
what sort? Permit applications? Health violation reports? Nuisance
complaints? The section also requires an "appropriate inspection" of
the property. Does that mean Pearl has to hire specialists to take soil
and water samples whenever she is interested in buying property?
When is a "Phase 2" investigation required? Does this mean Pearl
must discover the contamination in order to claim that she made an
appropriate inquiry? These questions let you explore what constitutes
due diligence in an environmental audit.
If Pearl passes aU this, does she qualify for the defense or is any-
thing else required? The end of section 101(35)(A) refers back to sec-
tion 107(b)(3), which requires that Pearl also: (a) exercise "due care" as
to any toxies discovered, and (b) take "precautions against the "foresee-
able . . . consequences" of the pollution. Does that mean Pearl has to
clean up the property in order to avoid cleanup liability under the
statute?
Finally, If Pearl is an innocent landowner, is she safe? Under sec-
tion 101(35), she is also thereafter required to disclose the pollution to
the next buyer in order to retain the defense. How much wiU Pearl to
be able to seU the property for, if the next buyer knows that he wiU
have to clean it up (since the iriformation wiU certainly disqualify
him as an innocent landowner)? If so, is she economicaUy compeUed
to clean it up anyway'r IO
2. Vendor-Purchaser Issues
Questions of CERCLA coverage are really background material for
the real estate questions concerning how a purchaser should approach
the acquisition of potentially contaminated property. Besides advising
Pearl to hire a good environmental consultant, is there anything else
Laura should say about this in her offer to buy the property? The
answer should give Pearl both the right to inspect, in order to establish
an innocent landowner defense, as well as the right to withdraw if the
property is contaminated. Under the contract we drafted a few weeks
ago, is Pearl entitled to inspect before closing? Can she withdraw if
410. My students get interested in the question of whether cleanup liability is dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy, although I have no materials in the course dealing with
bankruptcy nor do any of the casebooks (except in the context of concurrent owner-
ship).
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she doesn't like the inspection results? With this extra legal knowledge
you now have, should you have drafted her offer differently? These are
questions all real estate attorneys worry about even if they are not
environmental specialists.
Obtaining inspection rights is important, but an extensive investiga-
tion can be more expensive than is warranted for a small purchase.
Instead it may be more sensible to negotiate over the consequences of
undiscovered pollution. Are there any provisions Pearl ought to in-
clude in her offer that will do her some good if it later turns out that
the land is contaminated? Can the contract provide that it will be
Van's obligation to clean up the property, rather than Pearl's, if the
government ever requires cleanup? This directs attention to section
107(eYll and the difference between the three sentences of subsec-
tions (e)(1) and (e)(2). More background may be required. If officials
order Pearl to clean up, can she tell them to sue Van instead? If she
has to clean up, can she thereafter sue Van for part of the costr12
With the answers to those questions as a foundation, How much does a
hold harmless clause help Pearl? If the contract with Van is silent,
would Pearl be unable to make him share some of her costs? How
would contribution be calculated under section 113Cf)? How about a
warranty clauser13
There are also the perspectives of the seller and the broker. Larry, is
there any advice you have for Van if he is fearful that the land is
contaminated? Should he tell Pearl about the old underground tank
that has not been used for 30 years? Should he put an "as-is" clause in
the contract? A clause releasing him from clean up liability? Brad, as
a broker, do you routinely inspect for toxics?
411. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(e) (1988).
412. And, If a hold harmless agreement is ineffective under the first sentence,
what is the purpose of the second sentence?




• Title insurance. Laura, is Pearl protected against toxics by her title
insurance policy? Does toxicity make title unmarketable? Is there is
language in her policy ab~ut this? What does exclusion lea) and defi-
nition (f) in the policy mean~14
• Cleanup liens.415 The' mortgage lender416 can ask, If our investi-
gation reveals no contamination, is it safe for us to loan money to
Pearl to buy the property? If toxics are revealed and the government
cleans up and puts a lien on the property, what is the priority of its
lien vis-a-vis our mortgage~17 If the government does not clean up
and Pearl stops paying the mortgage,418 how much can we expect to
see bid at a foreclosure sale~19 If no one else bids and we have to
take the property back on foreclosure, wiU we have to clean up? Is
there any risk that the government wiU make us clean up even if we
don't foreclose, claiming that we are a responsible party just because
of our mortgage?
• General liability insurance. Laura, is Pearl protected by any other
insurance? WiU her homeowner's liability policy protect her~20 Does
"a sum she is legaUy liable to pay as damages because of property
damage" cover her when she is compeUed by the government to clean
up her own property or only when she is sued by neighbors for dam-
aging their properties~21 Is this a covered "occurrence" if the con-
tamination is due to slow leakage? Which insurance company is re-
sponsible if the leakage has gone on for many years and she had
many different policies over that time? What protection does she have
414. Dukeminier has lick Mill Creek Apartments v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 283 Cal.
Rptr. 231 (Ct. App. 1991), for background, but the policy in that case was issued a
year before most policies were revised to account for this problem, making it some-
what obsolete.
415. See § 107(a); see also§ 107(a)(1) on the issue of lien priority.
416. If mortgages have not yet been covered, you will have to explain to the class
the nature and priority of liens, and the text questions may need to be postponed or
omitted.
417. And, in states where the such liens have super-priority, How can we make
loans to owners under tlwse conditions?
418. Laura, would you advise Peart to continue paying the mortgage if the clean-
up costs exceed the value of her equity?
419. Larry, Iww much would you bid for property that would normaUy be worth
$500,000 but required that $400,000 be spent on cleaning it up?
420. AlU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990), is a recent decision
that refers to all of the other significant cases on this issue.
421. Asking, If the state department of motor vehicles orders Peart to fix her
brakes, can she get her liability carrier to pay for the repairs? will make the point
clearer to students who are generally more familiar with automobile insurance than
with property insurance.
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if her policy contains the new absolute poUution exclusion clause?
Should insurance companies be permitted to exclude coverage, or
should the state department of insurance insist on it being excluded
in order to deter people from poUuting?
IV. LAND USE
Land use law presents issues that are often radically new and differ-
ent to property students. All other topics in the course have involved
the owner of a property interest dealing with another owner, either in a
negotiated transaction or else in the conventional kind of litigation in
which a plaintiff sues a defendant in court, with both parties represent-
ed by counsel and both having the ability to settle their dispute at any
time. Land use involves not only a new subject matter but also a new
legal environment, where owners are required to seek permits from
government officials, where these permits may be withheld if neighbors
protest or if other officials fmd them objectionable, where disputes over
the permits are aired at public meetings where anyone may speak,422
(without reference to the rules of evidenceY23 and where decisions
are made by commissioners who are not trained in law.424 When the
losers then seek an attorney, generally the first time any legal personnel
is involved, what is he supposed to do? Who does he sue and for what?
When he presents the matter to a judge, what is she supposed to do?
What is the issue before her? How is she supposed to decide the mer-
its? Nothing in the rest of the property course prepares students· for
answering these questions. For these reasons, the topic is usually post-
poned until the end the course.425
422. l.e., the owner, neighbors, brokers, members of the Chamber of Commerce,
contractors, environmentalists, preservationists, housing advocates, etc.
423. No one is under oath, there is no cross examination, statements are often ap-
plauded or booed, and there is considerable parading up and down the aisles.
424. The staff of the planning department has probably gone to planning school,
while the members of the planning commission-who are usually supposed to repre-
sent community values-have probably not gone to either planning or law school.
425. Most of the casebooks (Browder, Bruce, Chused, Donahue, Dukeminier, and
Goldstein) put it there, although a significant minority (Berger, Cribbet, Kurtz, and
Rabin) place it before conveyancing. Casner, Haar, and Singer have it near the end,
with a scattering of different smaller topics (respectively, miscellaneous rights and
taxes, "New Property" and "Property in People") coming after it.
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A. Writing a Master Plan
Since this legal setting is alien to most students, its novelty and unre-
ality should be minimized as much as possible. One way to do so is to
convert the students into planners, in order to imbue in them the needs
and aspirations of those wishing to regulate others' use of land.426 All
students are appointed to our local planning commission, covering
whatever neighborhood or town each actually lives in.427 As members
of that agency, they are to propose what to do to improve the commu-
nity. The first class is a mock planning commission meeting.
Class is told that before any concrete proposals can be accepted, the
commission is required to "plan," in order that the regulations be in
accord with a comprehensive plan.428 For pedagogical purposes, plan-
ning is treated as a necessary and preliminary formality, compelling the
drafting of a document429 containing statements of land use policy.430
The students' planning goals are collected on the blackboard,431
along with appropriate instructional comments made in response to
them. Many proposals should be rejected on technical grounds, since
they deal with nonland use matters (such as feeding the hungry) and
give you the opportunity to defme the field and show the distinctions
between planning for the physical development of the community and,
among other things, social planning, which is for some agency other
than the planning commission.432 Other proposals may relate to land
426. This approach puts the goals and mechanisms of regulating land use in front
of the legal restrictions imposed on regulation. It is the reverse of the organization in
Berger, Browder, Cribbet, Goldstein, Johnson, and Kurtz, who put taking issues in
front of regulatory mechanisms. It is even more at odds with Casner, Chused,
Donahue, and Rabin, whose coverage almost entirely omits land use tools.
427. Utilization of a planning commission, as opposed to some other regulatory
agency with direct or indirect control over land use, such as a water board or air
board, requires some introductory explanation by the professor, but most observations
are better covered while the mock commission does its work.
428. This gives you an opportunity to explain how the state has delegated its police
power to regulate land use to local communities, but conditioned its exercise upon
compliance with the terms of the enabling act, which often requires that planning
precede or accompany the enactment of regulations.
429. If such a plan does exist for the community where you teach, bringing it to
class generates substantial student interest.
430. Many policies expressed by students are really ordinances in form or effect,
and must be recast to fit the generality required of a plan. For example, a proposal
"to get rid of the McDonald's on First Avenue" may have to be rewritten as one "to
eliminate fast food activities on residential streets." Inducing the students to learn
this technique gives them realistic insights into how elegant sounding planning goals
often cover up dirty back room deals.
431. These statements should also be recorded by the student commission secretary,
along with the names of the proponents, because in later classes the proponents will
be asked to convert them into ordinances.
432. For example, proposals to reduce traffic might go the traffic or the police
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if her policy contains the new absolute poUution exclusion clause?
Should insurance companies be permitted to exclude coverage, or
should the state department of insurance insist on it being excluded
in order to deter people from poUuting?
IV. LAND USE
Land use law presents issues that are often radically new and differ-
ent to property students. All other topics in the course have involved
the owner of a property interest dealing with another owner, either in a
negotiated transaction or else in the conventional kind of litigation in
which a plaintiff sues a defendant in court, with both parties represent-
ed by counsel and both having the ability to settle their dispute at any
time. Land use involves not only a new subject matter but also a new
legal environment, where owners are required to seek permits from
government officials, where these permits may be withheld if neighbors
protest or if other officials fmd them objectionable, where disputes over
the permits are aired at public meetings where anyone may speak,422
(without reference to the rules of evidencey23 and where decisions
are made by commissioners who are not trained in law.424 When the
losers then seek an attorney, generally the first time any legal personnel
is involved, what is he supposed to do? Who does he sue and for what?
When he presents the matter to a judge, what is she supposed to do?
What is the issue before her? How is she supposed to decide the mer-
its? Nothing in the rest of the property course prepares students· for
answering these questions. For these reasons, the topic is usually post-
poned until the end the course.425
422. l.e., the owner, neighbors, brokers, members of the Chamber of Commerce,
contractors, environmentalists, preservationists, housing advocates, etc.
423. No one is under oath, there is no cross examination, statements are often ap-
plauded or booed, and there is considerable parading up and down the aisles.
424. The staff of the planning department has probably gone to planning school,
while the members of the planning commission-who are usually supposed to repre-
sent community values-have probably not gone to either planning or law school.
425. Most of the casebooks (Browder, Bruce, Chused, Donahue, Dukeminier, and
Goldstein) put it there, although a significant minority (Berger, Cribbet, Kurtz, and
Rabin) place it before conveyancing. Casner, Haar, and Singer have it near the end,
with a scattering of different smaller topics (respectively, miscellaneous rights and
taxes, "New Property" and "Property in People") coming after it.
1219
B. Converting the Plan into Regulations
1. Eminent Domain
Most of the casebooks start with eminent domain,437 which is cer-
tainly the most direct way for government to accomplish some of its
purposes. I choose one of the student proposals that involves a poten-
tial municipal activity. One year George said his town should have more
dog runs. Can we use eminent domain to accomplish that? Where
should we locate the dog run, since all of the land in the community is
already developed? Can we put the dog run in a back yard? Helen,
how large is your back yard? Ida, how large is yours? Are there any
trees in it? I propose to the Commission that we condemn Ida's back-
yard for dog run purposes; aU in favor? Laura, as city attorney, can
you protect us if Ida sues? Is a public use involved? WiU findings
help? Please draft them for us. WiU Ida be able to argue to the judge
that a dog run is not a good idea, or that it should be located some-
where else? Can we take the yardfrom Ida and then give it to Mark on
the condition that he operate a for profit, private dog run on it? These
questions provide a vehicle for discussing the extent of the eminent
domain power, its growth into urban renewal and slum clearance, and
the role of the judiciary in reviewing this activity.438
2. Zoning
Some student's planning goal inevitably requires a conventional segre-
gation of uses. Nina (or Laura, the city attorney), what ordinance
should we enact to carry out your proposal to eliminate [stores] from
[residential] areas? By starting from a situation with no existing legal
apparatus into which this idea can fit, the student must create from
scratch (with your help) a miniature zoning system. She will have to
draw a map dividing the city into districts with different use labels439
and then draft an ordinance listing the permitted uses in each district.
By not including the undesired use in the list for one of the districts,
ment issues.)
437. However, Berger, Casner, Goldstein, and Haar put it at the end; and Donahue
and Rabin both appear not to include it at all.
438. Since the most significant characteristic of eminent domain is that the govern-
ment must pay for what it does, you can go directly to takings questions by asking
whether the government would also have to pay if it zoned the property DR (dog
run), making that the only pennitted use of the site. The organization employed here
raises takings issues only after reviewing all mechanisms.
439. A division of the city into a single residential and a commercial district is
enough to get started. As new ideas are added, further districts and distinctions are
made to accommodate them.
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she will effectively exclude it from that district. Laura, is that legal?
Can we teU the owners of property in that part of town that they can-
not use their land the same way as owners in the other parts can~o
The map is next refined to incorporate additional related ideas from
the master plan: Residential and commercial districts are further divid-
ed as more distinctions are made within those categories. As this is
done, defInitional questions are put to proposers. How do we define
fast food establishments in order to distinguish them from other res-
taurants? Single-jamily houses? Also, Are there any uses that we want
to eliminate entirely from the community such as nuclear power
plants and toxic waste dumps from commercial areas441 (or trailer
parks, motels, or fraternity houses from residential zones)?
Next are questions about mapping. Paula, where do you want to
draw the line between your proposed residential and commercial dis-
tricts: down the middle of the street,442 along the rear lot lines443 or
straight down the middle of the block~ A separate theme is the
question of the size of zones. Can we make our Dog Run zoning dis-
trict exactly the size of Ida's back yard? Conversely, could we zone
only her property for liquor store use so as to eliminate aU competi-
tion to it? These questions raise spot zoning, anti competition and plan
comprehensiveness issues.
Height and bulk restrictions are covered similarly: Ray, how do you
want to enforce your policy of restricting taU buildings? Is there any
part of town where taU buildings should be permitted? Should we have
uniform (but different) height limits in residential and commercial
neighborhoods, or should there be a separate overlay zoning map for
heights? Should we allow taller buildings on the tops of hiUs or in the
vaUeys? Along the coast or inland? On corners or mid-block? Should
the height limit be uniform across the parcel or stepped back from the
440. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), is now gennane to
this discussion of the elementary validity of zoning.
441. As to which use to eliminate, you can then ask the proponents where they
think these locally unwanted land uses should be sited, and further, whether they are
guilty of environmental racism for wanting to dump them onto communities with less
wealth or political muscle.
442. Which has the effect of giving a different character to the two sides of the
street, appealing to neither.
443. Which will produce jagged gerrymander-appearing lines, unless all lots have the
same depth.
444. Which may put different parts of a single lot under different zoning classifica-
tions.
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lot line to the interior in order to preserve a sky plane? Should it be
averaged to conform to the heights of the surrounding buildings? The
same questions can be asked about building and lot sizes,445 floor-area
ratios, and setbacks for front, side, and rear yards.
3. Other Tools
Noneuclidian elements can be similarly treated.446 Here is the se-
quence in which I cover them:
• Flexibility devices. To one of the residential proponents: Does this
mean that there will be no corner grocery stores anywhere in the dis-
trict and that everyone has to get in their car to buy a carton of milk?
How can we aUow some, but not too many, little groceries? Can we
make them variances~7 Conditional uses (special exceptions)? If so,
what conditions should pre_exist,448 and what conditions might we
want to impose~9 What about having the city council rezone one
corner of a block instead~50
• Bonuses. To the proponent of some desirable use: What kind of in-
ducements can we offer to developers to get them to give us more of
them~51 Then, ask other students What other amenities should we try
to encourage through this device?
• Design review. To someone who complained about unattractive fea-
tures in the community: How can we keep ugly buildings from getting
built? Can we draft any rules in advance that will guarantee attrac-
tive structures? If we require that every building have front lawns or
bay windows, does that assure that they will be pretty? Can we tell
builders that we claim the power to reject their designs, even when
their plans conform to the zoning envelope? What should our ordi-
nance say? What kind of standards must we set to guide the review
board? Can we just tell the members not to approve of anything they
445. Suggestions may include maximum building sizes in city neighborhoods and
minimum lot sizes in the suburbs.
446. The appropriate threshold question for each technique could be, Does our en-
abling act authorize us to do this?
447. That question should trigger a review of when the variance procedure is appro-
priate and the role of a board of adjustment.
448. E.g., "No other grocery store within two blocks."
449. E.g., "No late hours or no trash cans outside (or more trash cans outside)." A
restriction on transferring title raises good questions about the proper limits of such
conditions.
450. This is also a suitable place to note the difference between the legislative role
of the city council and the administrative role of the planning commission or board
of adjustment and to ask whether such formal differences should lead to different
standards of judicial review when the loser challenges the activity.
451. E.g., trees, plazas, child care centers, mid-block corridors, and theaters.
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don't like? Does the state enabling act give us such power? If not, what
amendment should we propose to the legislature to get the necessary
authorityrt52
• Nonconforming uses. What steps can we take with regard to ex-
isting buildings or activities that we don't like? Can we make an own-
er tear down the building (or stop an activity at once) if it does not
constitute a nuisance? What kind of formula should we use in calcu-
lating how long a building or activity may continue under an amorti-
zation scheme?
• Preservation. How can we assure that the existing attractive
buildings are not destroyed or disfigured? Can we also protect build-
ings that are not themselves attractive but where important people
were born or lived or died? Can we protect interiors? What if the
buildings are not open to the public? Once a building is designated,
what restrictions should we impose upon the owner? If she pleads
hardship, are there any tradeoffs we can offerrt53 Can we preserve
an entire neighborhood, even though some of the buildings in it are
not attractive or historicalrt54
• Cluster and PUD zones. How can we avoid making each block look
the same as the others (with identical front and side yards, etc.)? If
our chief desire is that there be no more than ten housing units or at
least forty percent open space on a block, could we let the owner of an
entire block decide how she wiU layout the houses,perhaps even putt-
ing some of them right next to some others, so long as we get the prop-
er overaU amount of housing units and open space? Could we do the
same regarding mixing residential and commercial uses, so long as
452. I bring in a few pictures of grotesque buildings, to ask the review board how
it would react to their construction in our neighborhood. For some sources, see CLAY
LANCASTER, ARCHITECTURAL FOillES IN AMERICA (1960); MICHAEL SCHUYT ET AL., FANTAS-
TIC ARCHITECTURE: PERSONAL AND ECCENTRIC VISIONS (1980); and AlLAN VAN DINE,
UNCONVENTIONAL BUILDERS (1977). Dukeminier includes a drawing of how the house
proposed in Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970), may have looked.
453. Such tradeoffs include upzoning the property, purchasing a preservation ease-
ment, reducing property taxes or providing for income tax benefits.
454. Pictures of New York's Grand Central Terminal, for example, make these is-
sues more meaningful to students who have not been there. Chused and Dukeminier
both include pictures of the tower proposed to sit over the Terminal. These two
books, as well as Goldstein contain several interesting illustrations and maps. Daily
newspapers often contain land use articles of current interest that may fit into class
discussion during these weeks.
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no more than ten percent of the developed area was put to commercial
use?
• Subdivision control. What about the farms beyond the outskirts of
present development where there are no streets or utilities? Is it sensi-
ble to zone that land when we have almost no idea of what is appro-
priate out there? Can we impose a zoning designation on the land
that wiU force owners to request rezonings of their properties in order
to develop themra55 Since there are no roads out there now, how can
we assure that those streets tie in to our existing streets? In addition
to street layout, how much can we control the way the land is subdi-
vided into lots? How should we define what subdividing is? Should we
make the definition include converting apartment buildings into con-
dominiums?
• Exactions.456 Who wiU have title to those streets being laid out in
the new subdivision? Can we make the subdivider dedicate them to us
as a condition of map approval? Can we make her pave them before
we accept them? Can we make her build the curbs too? Can we askfor
five feet of land on the other side of the curbs and make her plant trees
there? Can we ask for a whole park? Can we ask for a park on the
other side of town, where it is needed more? Can we simply ask for
money in order to build the park ourselves? Can we make these re-
quests of individual builders even when no subdividing is happening?
• Development Agreements. If the subdivider is wiUing to do aU
this, how can we guarantee her that we wiu honor our end of the deal
and not impose new conditions later? What if we get turned out of
office and antidevelopment forces take over? Can we contract away the
police power? Can we prohibit the voters from passing new restric-
tions by way of initiatives that could apply to this property?
• Environmental Impact Review. Does the activity under consider-
ation require an environmental impact statement (EIS) or an envi-
ronmental impact report (EIR)? If a threshold analysis shows that the
project probably has no significant environmental effect, is an impact
statement stiU necessary? If an EIS or EIR is to be prepared, what
must it contain? Who gets to review the report? Must we consider
public reaction to it? If it shows that there wiU be adverse environ-
mental effects, must we disapprove the project? Can we require the
455. Interim zoning can be raised as a companion to this theme: What if we sud-
denly get word that a developer plans to build high rises in the unzoned outskirts?
Since our planning and zoning process requires months of hearings first, how can
we get some restrictions in place before she obtains a building permit?
456. Since I make takings a separate topic, the constitutional issues implicit in
these questions are not developed at this time.
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developer to mitigate adverse environmental effects as a condition to
approving the project?
• Growth Control.457 Should we impose direct numerical limits on
any kind of activitiesr58 Can we tell an 071Jner that he cannot engafJe
in or construct an otherwise permitted use of his property just be-
cause we have too much of that activity already? Can we limit
downtown office growth? Can we limit residential growth on the out-
skirtsr59 How should we restrict the growth? How should we allocate
the limited number of permits to be issued annuallyr60 Can we put
a complete stop to residential growth through a moratorium?
C. Attacks on Land Use Devices
The same student proposals also support inquiry into the constitu-
tional restrictions on the land use power. Several of the more problem-
atic restrictions may support inquiries to the city attorney as to their
resistance to owner and third party attacks. This format, as opposed to
having an affected owner seek legal advice as to whether she can chal-
lenge an already enacted regulation, allows a greater latitude of class
discussion, including consideration of options that could save the re-
striction from invalidation while still accomplishing the local purpose.
1. Takings
Larry, if we deny Helen a permit to {develop] her property, so as to
render it entirely worthless, can she sue us? What if we make findings
that state that a legitimate public purpose is involved, and that rea-
sonable means have been employed? This scenario, in which all eco-
nomic use has been taken, puts the situation squarely within Lucas v.
457. Since exclusion is treated as a separate topic, the discussion here concerns
mainly techniques.
458. This is an appropriate question to ask of anyone whose planning goal was to
reduce the level of a particular activity.
459. Subordinate questions here are: Is it desirable to limit residential growth?
Will new housing increase or deplete the municipal treasury? Does residential or
commercial activity generate more revenues through property and sales taxes? Does
residential or commercial activity require fewer e.7:pensive local services (especially
schools)?
460. Methods of allocating may include waiting lists, point accumulations, geography,
or auctions.
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South Carolina Coastal Council,461 and is the easiest way to get into
takings law, because no balancing of any sort seems required in that
situation.
What if we modify the restrictions, so as to leave some value in
Helen's property? Is there stiU a categorical taking or do we now have
some possible defenses? What would we have to prove; that is, what
are the tests? The two factor standard of Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis462 offers a more useful discussion agenda for
this question than the "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries" version in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 463 Following
Keystone, therefore, What should we declare our state interest is? Is it
legitimate~ Can Helen contend that we are merely attempting to
acquire a resource to facilitate a uniquely public function as Penn
Central seems to condemnr65 Can we show that the restriction or ex-
action has a real connection466 with that state interest? Once we es-
tablish the link, does it matter how much we restrict or demand of
Helenr67 How do we show that we are merely attempting to suppress
a harm to the public rather than compeUing Helen to confer a benefit
on the public?
With regard to the second factor of viable use, How far can we go in
reducing the value of Helen's land without getting into troubler68
Can Helen claim that we took aU of the value of the part of her proper-
ty that we restricted, or can we show that the entire parcel stiU has
value despite the restriction on part of it? Can we add some value to
her property by including transferable development rights in the regu-
lation? Can we acknowledge her loss of value but contend that it was
461. 505 U.s. 1003 (1992).
462. 480 U.S. 470 (1970). I.e., ·'does not substantially advance legitimate state inter-
ests, or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.'" Id. at 485 (quoting
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
463. 438 U.s. 104, 124 (1978).
464. Incidental to that question, many of the land use cases can be reviewed as to
what state interests they involved. Other than Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922), I do not believe that any of the major taking cases found a state in-
terest to be illegitimate.
465. For example, if we were to zone Helen's property ·park" in order to save our-
selves the cost of building a municipal one, then the student's attention should be
directed to Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381
(N.Y. 1976).
466. In light of Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), can an
"essential nexus" be shown?
467. I.e., Is there ''rough proportionality" between the need created by the develop-
ment and the demands made on the owner, pursuant to Dolan v. City of Tigard,
114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (l994)?
468. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). .
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not an "investment backed expectation?,,160 Can we show that restric-
tions upon other parcels generate an "average reciprocity of
advantage" to Helen?
Finally, If a court decides that our regulation does amount to a tak-
ing, what wiU it do to us? If it merely inva,lidates our existing restric-
tion, can we promptly enact another one only slightly different from
it? Can damages be awarded against usr70 How wiU they be calcu-
lated? Can we limit our liability to the difference between the permis-
sibly reducible value and the actual reduction caused by the restric-
tion? If we have to pay, can we pay in transferable development
rights?
2. Speech and Association
Speech issues are raised by asking a student opposed to pornogra-
phy: Can we restrict adult movie houses without being charged with
suppressing speech? What kinds of findings should we make'r71 Can
we enact a regulation saying adult theaters are not permitted any-
where in town, or must we permit them somewhere? Can we corifine
them to the heavy industry zones that are deserted at night? Should
we concentrate or disperse them? Can we do the same with biUboards?
Newsracks? T-shirt street vendors? Churchesr72
Associational rights are raised by attempting to exclude nonfamilial
groups from single-family zones. Can we keep [rooming houses, coUege
or law students, or halfway houses] out of the neighborhood by defin-
ing single-jamily housing in terms of occupant relationships rather
than architectural features?
469. 1 treat this as a vested rights question and ask whether we could immediately
abate a nonconfonning building if the ground itself still had a value greater than the
25% value that remained in Euclid. At what stage in the development process do
expectations become investment bMked so as lo become vested rights and thereby
insuJ.ated from rule changes? While Heten was thinking about purchasing the prop-
erty? After she had taken an option on it? Signed a binding contract? Closed es-
crow? Paid an architect? Submitted plans? Dug a foundation?
470. Under First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 311-12 (1987). TItis is also when inverse condemnations actions might be
explained.
471. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters mc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
472. TItis could include church-related activities, such as bingo games, parochial
schools, halfway houses, and prayer. meetings in private homes.
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3. Exclusion
This fmal topic is introduced by expressing a concern that the class'
land use regulations make housing too expensive for the poor. Propo-
nents of the previous goals are now asked What effect on housing costs
wiU [your element] have if we enact it't73
Open space and mandatory architectural amenities are easy cases of
cost-generating requirements. Growth control is more provocative. If we
enact a moratorium on new housing, what effect wiU that have on the
cost of housing (in town and nearby)? On prices of existing homes or
on the value of your house? On rents? On vacant parcels? Who are the
economic winners and losers? Of those groups, who gets to vote? Can
we provide any incentives to the tenants in town to induce them to
support growth control? If we add rent control to growth control, do
w~ have a winning paclf,age?
To move from economics to law, Suppose our plans do raise prices
but we like them anyway. Can the housing activists sue us? Do we
have to worry, since the local state judges are themselves property
owners in town? Can we be sued in federal court? Are we guilty of
violating the Equal Protection Clause't74 Is the test discriminatory
intent or discriminatory impact? If intent has to be shown, can we
avoid that by never actuaUy saying anything wrong at public meet-
ings? Are the poor a suspect class? Who has standing to sue? What
issues change if we are sued under the Fair Housing Act? What if we
are sued in state court and this is New Jersey? What is our Mt. Laurel
obligation? What if we are in [another state] instead?
Finally, to cover inclusionary goals, What techniques are available, if
we sincerely want to do something about the unhoused? How would
density bonuses work? What effect wiU mandatory set asides have on
the cost of housing? How wiU we decide who gets to purchase one of
the mandated ajfordable units? How can we make sure that the units
remain ajfordable? What about those people who do not get to pur-
chase one of the new units? Should we build the housing ourselves?
Should we build projects or scattered individual units? In what neigh-
borhoods should they be put? Should we provide subsidies instead of
trying to build housing? Should the subsidies go to housing suppliers
or to consumers? If we grant subsidies to the poor, should we restrict
473. Students are often embarrassed to perceive the unintended price effects of
their restrictions.
474. Housing discrimination can be treated as a major topic of its own, rather than
as an aspect of exclusion. Kurtz and Singer both have separate chapters on discrim-
ination after their land use chapters. Rabin also seems to do so (in addition to inter-
spersing rent control and public trust chapters amidst them).
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the funds to housing needs or let the recipients spend the money as
they think best?
CONCLUSION
The McCrate Report475 regards counselin(76 and negotiatin(77 as
skills essential to competent representation. In law school we too easily
assume that this requires us to offer specialized courses in these fields.
Those traits, however, can also be nurtured by us in our substantive
courses if, as part of teaching rules, we show our students how to use
them to help their clients both in their ordinary activities as well as in·
their court battles. The Property course is no less interesting or chal-
lenging when taught with those values in mind.
475. Report of the Task Force on Law Sclwols and the Profession: Narrowing the
Gap, A.B.A. Section of Legal, Education and Admissions to the Bar, Legal, Education
and Professional, Development-An Educational, Continuum (1992) (commonly re-
ferred to as the McCrate Report).
476.
6.4 Counseling the Client About the Decision to Be Made. In order to coun-
sel a client effectively, a lawyer should be familiar with the following skills,
concepts, and processes: . . .
(b) Assuring that the client understands his or her legal rights and responsi-
bilities with regard to the processes of making and implementing the deci-
sion, including the relative roles of the attorney and client in these process-
es ... ;
(c) Explaining to the client all of the options available to him or her with
regard to the decision to be made, including:
(i) The potential benefits of each option, including any potential positive
effects on the client's legal rights or responsibilities;
(li) The potential costs or risks which each option entails, including any
potential adverse effects on the client's legal rights or responsibilities;
(d) Assisting the client in evaluating the various options available to him or
her by:
(i) Providing the client with the benefit of the lawyer's legal expertise
(as it bears upon the decision to be made), including:
(A) Informing the client of any legal rules, principles, procedures, or
other aspects of the law or legal processes that may bear upon the
decision or the desirability of any of the options
Id. at 180. That pretty clearly involves the kind of planning advice sought to be
achieved in this article.
477. Section 7.1 describes "'transactional negotiation'· [as) "establish[ing) terms for a
future interchange or for a continuing relationship between the parties." Id. at 185.
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APPENDIX: ESTATES IN LAND
This topic might be teachable in a planning fonnat, but to make that
kind of treatment realistic, one would have to include, on the one hand,
modern taxation and trust rules and exclude, on the other, all the older
features of common law estates that have no current validity.478 Since
our pedagogical interests in this area are to infonn students of the his-
tory behind the old rules, such a lawyering approach would be mislead-
ing as well as inefficient. Litigating or reading recent appellate decisions
regarding these concepts also tends to mislead because the system of
estates in land resembles geometry more than law; most things have
their place and only one place, and most answers are either correct or
incorrect. Given that approach, there is not much sense in discussing
with the students whether different results would have been better on
grounds of policy, fairness, or efficiency.479 Delivering essential histori-
cal infonnation as quickly as possible saves time for richer coverage of
more current topics.480
With only a small amount of historical inaccuracy, most of the history
of the estate system can be laid out fairly coherently in a few hours of
lecture.481 The main component is a listing of the common law present
estates and future interests in land, all inserted into a large chart. The
478. One would then have an elderly owner come in to your office to dispose of
her estate. Johnson makes a bow in that direction with a section entitled "Choice of
Law on Ownership" in their chapter on Common Law Estates.
479. The casebooks take dramatically different approaches on this topic, many cov-
ering most points by text with a few cases on "hot" issues (such as determinable
versus subject to condition subsequent), although others still approach this via the
traditional case method. (Goldstein has 17 cases in this field; Cribbet has 16. No
book includes the case which I believe is most useful-Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d
583, 1961-where the California Supreme Court held that it does not constitute mal-
practice for an attorney to get the Rule Against Perpetuities wrong because it is so
hard to master.) Page allocations are similarly widespread, running from 40-60 in
Bruce, Browder, and Haar, to 130-40 in Casner, Dukeminier, and Goldstein; the
shorter lengths support the kind of one-week coverage this Article contemplates.
480. It is certainly true that numerous rules came between the Statute of Quia
Emptores and the Rule Against Perpetuities, and many of us sweated blood and tears
learning them as students. But to succumb to the temptation of justifying that suf-
fering, and also of dazzling students with our mastery of obscure lore, is to short-
change other topics in a course already overcrowded.
481. Getting through this much material in this little time is only possible if student
generated "what if . . . " questions are mostly ruled out, so that you can keep the
material in the predetermined order and not get sidetracked.
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finished chart is set forth below,482 but it is the writing out of the
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The columns are filled in vertically, with appropriate description and
infonnation by lecture as you go along. The headings are gradually put
on the board. First, "Freeholds" and "Nonfreeholds" are entered in Col-
482. Several of the casebooks contain similar charts (Berger, Browder, Donahue,
Goldstein, Haar, Kurtz, Rabin, and Singer). The reason for the particular one offered
here is that it is entered onto the blackboard in an order that makes the accompa-
nying lecture intelligible.
483. The column letters (A, B, and so on) are included here only for convenience;
they do not go on the blackboard.
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wnn A, with an explanation of the importance of ascertaining the tenni-
nation dates of estates (as an introduction to the principle that the
estates are classified by time rather than space).484 Then "Fees" and
"Life Estates" are entered (all in Column A), with coverage of herita-
bility and words of limitation.485 Finally, "simple" and "tail" are entered
(still in Colwnn A), with a discussion of the nature of heirs. Each estate
listed is "bigger" or "larger" than the one below it.
Before the other colunins are started, the headings over columns B,
C, and D,-"Absolute", "Condition Subsequent" and "Detenninable", re-
spectively-are entered on the board with the explanation that these
are drawn horizontally rather than vertically in order to show that es-
tates can be classified by their quality as well as their quantity. The
previous listing covered estates without qualification, e.g., absolute, and
in those cases the full name of the estate adds that word. Colwnn B is
filled in and Columns C and D are explained and also completed, in the
array shown above.486 Appropriate rules are mentioned along the way.
After the qualified fee simples are described, the lesser variations fol-
low easily.487 Estates subject to executory limitation are not yet men-
tioned.
Before Columns E and F are begun, the headings in the top line of
the chart-"Present" and "Future"-are entered and the concept of fu-
ture interests is introduced. Ignoring remainders for the moment, one
can say whenever the grantor does not give away a fee simple abso-
lute,488 he will have something left.
Colwnn E is then completed: first through the three Reversion boxes,
covering situations in which the grantor gave the grantee a "smaller"
estate than he held, and then through the Power of Termination and
Possibility of Reverter boxes on the fee simple row, covering those
cases in which the estate granted was "worse" or "poorer" rather than
"smaller." Finally, the remaining boxes-"Reversion plus Power of Ter-
mination" and "Reversion plus Possibility of Reverter"-are completed
as derivatives of the ones already done.
484. The nonfreeholds are left to landlord-tenant for significant coverage; here they
are barely mentioned.
485. Both fee tails and life estates can be elaborated in terms of the various per-
mutations.
486. A qualified estate should not be listed on the same line as the corresponding
absolute estate, but on descending steps in order to allow the list of future interests
to line up with them.
487. The illustration "To T for 10 years, so long as she pays the rent on time" is
easy for the students to grasp.
488. This is what the grantor is always assumed to have at the beginning.
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Column F covers the case in which grantor gives the future interest
to a third person rather than retaining it. "Remainder" is written in
whenever the corresponding box to the left is a reversion,both inter-
ests existing behind temporally smaller estates.
The Remainder box, however, requires further explanation and a
second chart. Because remainders are created by an express convey-
ance, rather than by the mathematical subtraction generating the rever-
sion, the grant must describe the duration of the remainder. Since a
remainder can be given a quality as well as a quantity, it may be made
subject to a condition subsequent in the same manner as a present es-
tate, meaning that there are defeasible and indefeasible remainders;489
Since a remainder is a future interest, it may also be subject to a condi-
tion precedent, which introduces the Contingent Remainder; the previ-
ously mentioned remainders are then more accurately described as
















489. The remainder subject to open can be explained in terms of partial defeasance.
490. Six boxes may be used if the Remainder Subject to Open is inserted as anoth-
er option.
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Returning to the main chart, the fmal boxes of Colwnn F are filled in
with coverage of Shifting Executory Interests and the role of the Stat-
ute of Uses. If desired, you can now amend the names in the present
estate columns to pick up that feature. 491
Following completion of this chart, you may want to do some lectur-
ing on the more notable common law rules affecting estates-e.g., the
destructibility of contingent remainders, the Rule in Shelley's Case, or
the Rule Against Perpetuities.492
Waste and Partition493
There are two modem issues arising from the separation of owner-
ship over time that can be covered in a less dogmatic fashion. Waste
and partition are real world estate problems that do require lawyers'
talents. Waste issues are raised by asking my student lawyer My wife
died and left her house to me for life and then to our children; Do I
have to keep it in repair, just to keep them happy? How much do I
have to spend on it for their sakes? Must I replace the roof, or can I
just patch it up to stop the leaks? Can I tear the house down and re-
place it with an apartment building against their wishes? What if it
is my niece, who is not likely to inherit the property anyway, who is,
objecting?
When my lawyer says that some of this constitutes waste, ask Where
in her wiU did my wife say that my interests were to be subordinated
to the children's? This raises the policy question of why the rights of
the present tenant are defined derivatively (Le., as that which does not
harm the freehold), rather than vice versa (giving the remaindermen
whatever is left after the life tenant has made appropriate use).494
491. E.g., "Life Estate Subject to Shifting Executory Interest," rather than "Life Es-
tate Subject to Condition Subsequent."
492. However, I have no helpful way of abbreviating or clarifying these issues.
493. Most of the casebooks include one or both of these topics as incidents of
estates. (Casner puts it before estates, as part of possession; and it is covered in
Bruce in Landlord and Tenant, which precedes estates.) Most books use Melms v.
Pabst, Brokaw v. Fairchild, or Moore v. Phillips on waste; for partition, Baker v.
Weedon is the clear favorite.
494. What should she have said in her will if she wanted me to have the ':tuU"
use of the property even if that does not leave that much for the children? What
was her most likely intent? gets to the same point.
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Partition495 follows by asking, What if I can't afford to keep the
property up, or it's too expensive for me to live there, but I do not have
money to buy something more affordable? Can I "cash out" my share
of the estate now? Even if the children don't want to? What will hap-
pen to the property? Who wiU get to live there afterwards? How much
of the proceeds from the partition sale wiU I get?
495. Although partition in respect of future interests does not appear in all of the
casebooks, Bruce, Johnson, :.nd Rabin have cases involving their valuation, which
raises some of the same issues.
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